Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MUSCAT841
2006-05-29 12:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER: TIME NOT RIGHT FOR GCC

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM PREF IR IZ LY MU 
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O 291233Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6602
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000841 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PREF IR IZ LY MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER: TIME NOT RIGHT FOR GCC
MISSION TO TEHRAN

REF: A. MUSCAT 734 AND PREVIOUS

B. MUSCAT 809

C. MUSCAT 792

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000841


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PREF IR IZ LY MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER: TIME NOT RIGHT FOR GCC
MISSION TO TEHRAN

REF: A. MUSCAT 734 AND PREVIOUS

B. MUSCAT 809

C. MUSCAT 792

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------

1. (C) The timing is not right for an Oman-led GCC mission to
Tehran, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin
Alawi told the Ambassador in a late evening meeting May 26.
He predicted that such a mission, if not properly planned and
timed, would entangle GCC governments in unproductive
deliberation and debate with Tehran. On Iraq, he said that
the security situation in Baghdad does not allow for a visit
of a senior Omani official to Iraq. However, he suggested
that the U.S. urge Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki to visit
Riyadh to secure public support from King Abdullah for his
new government. Having just returned form his visit to
Libya, Bin Alawi said that while formal diplomatic relations
with Tripoli will resume, Oman is unlikely to open an embassy
there until next year. On the ongoing security operations in
the southern Dhofar region to round up illegal migrants, the
Minister claimed the government must now figure out what to
do with the captured illegal Somalis, who cannot be returned
to their home country. End summary.

Time Not Right for GCC Mission to Tehran
--------------

2. (C) Bin Alawi repeated previous statements (ref A) made by
him and by MFA Under Secretary Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi to the
Ambassador that an Omani-led GCC mission to Tehran would
prove useful only if the timing were right and plans for
managing the issues were very carefully drawn. In Oman's
view, he said, neither exists at the moment. Therefore, for
the time being, there will be no mission to Tehran. While
pointing out that Oman does not, in principle, oppose such a
mission, he expressed doubts that any mission in the
foreseeable future could produce meaningful results, either
on the various bilateral issues of GCC states or on regional
issues.


3. (C) Bin Alawi said the other GCC countries have not
pressured the Omanis to move forward on the Omani-led mission
idea, but he expected the matter would be raised again when

GCC foreign ministers meet early next month for their regular
session. According to Bin Alawi, Oman will argue against a
GCC-Iran face-to-face as it would confer on Iran "too much
status and power," referring to the adverse perception of a
joint delegation of six regional governments seemingly
appealing to one. (Note: Per Bin Alawi, the last
"high-level" GCC delegation to meet with Iran occurred
shortly after the 1991 Gulf War and "accomplished nothing.")
Bilateral discussions remain the preferred approach in Oman's
view.


4. (C) The Minister said, "we know the Iranians better than
the others (GCC states) and they (the Iranians) would
manipulate this to their advantage and put us all in an
awkward position." He said that the Iranians would no doubt
come prepared with "appropriate" responses and proposals to
GCC issues, tying up GCC governments in a useless diplomatic
exercise. Moreover, he said, the Iranians would likely
attempt to address individual GCC state issues, e.g., the UAE
islands dispute, in the broader GCC-Iran context. "Why wold
we (the GCC) want to get tangled up in a messthat would lead
nowhere and produce nothin?" Bin Alawi concluded that the
GCC mission would only make sense if the EU-3 negotiations
with Iran on the nuclear portfolio made significant progress.
The Ambassador underscored that irrespective of manner, the
Iranians must be made to understand that the issue of their
nuclear program is not just with the U.S. or other Western
governments; it's a concern of the entire international
community. The Minister agreed, asserting that the point has
been made on several occasions in Omani bilateral discussions
with the Iranians.


Oman, Libya Resuming Diplomatic Relations
--------------

5. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query on his recent
visit to Tripoli, Bin Alawi said he arrived in Tripoli the
day after we announced the resumption of U.S.-Libyan
diplomatic relations. The Libyans were "sky high" over the
announcement, he said. The primary reason for his visit --
the first by an Omani minister on a bilateral mission since
the Sultan went in 1973 -- was to open doors for Omani
business in Libya's rapidly expanding market. However, Oman
probably will not open an embassy in Tripoli for another
year, although Tripoli may send an ambassador to Muscat soon.
Qadhafi still has "issues," commented Bin Alawi, e.g., he

will not visit Italy until Rome apologizes for its occupation
of Libya and he is still trying to figure out how to get back
on Saudi Arabia's good side.

Iraq: New PM Should Visit Riyadh Soon
--------------

6. (C) The Ambassador commended the Minister on the Omani
government's positive public statement (ref B) on the
formation of a new Iraqi government and on the Sultan's
message of congratulations to Prime Minister Maliki and
suggested that it would be a good time to reconsider a
high-level visit to Baghdad. The Minister said he understood
the need for such visits by Arab, and particularly GCC,
governments but no visit of a high-level Omani is planned;
security makes it "just too risky." However, he suggested
that the new Iraqi prime minister should visit Riyadh soon to
secure the public support of King Abdullah. He asked the
U.S. to urge Maliki to visit Riyadh "and get on Abdullah's
good side as soon as possible," especially to get Saudi
support for addressing the Iraqi government's problems with
the Sunnis.

Dhofar Operation: What To Do With Somalis
--------------

7. (C) Bin Alawi would not comment on the government's
ongoing security operations in Oman's southern Dhofar region
(ref C),initially intended to round up illegal Somalis.
However, he did not dispute the Ambassador's recounting of
reports that have come to the Embassy's attention. He
indicated that the "problem in Salalah" has been wrapped up,
but some illegals have taken refuge in the mountains outside
Salalah. He disclaimed reports of armed resistance, but
acknowledged the government now has a new problem: what to
do with hundreds (comment: maybe over 1,000, per some
reports) of Somali illegals who cannot be returned to
Somalia. "We're working on that," he said.

Comment
--------------

8. (C) Left largely unsaid in Bin Alawi's argument against
the proposed GCC mission to Tehran is Oman's reluctance to
jeopardize its essentially issue-free relationship with
Tehran. Such a mission, regardless of intent, would
inevitably be saddled with the several bilateral issues GCC
states currently have with Tehran, which Oman would prefer
not to deal with and believes should be left to bilateral
channels. Moreover, issues of primary concern to regional
governments and to the U.S. -) Iran's nuclear weapons
development program, active opposition to Middle East peace
and support for terrorism )- would receive short shrift by
Tehran.
GRAPPO