Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MUSCAT382
2006-03-15 14:57:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/15/2006

Tags:  AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS KVPR MU EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000382 

SIPDIS

TERREP CHANNEL
NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, NEA/ARPI, AND NEA/EX
DEPT ALSO FOR DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/CC, AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS KVPR MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/15/2006

REF: A. LEGATT/RSO E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

B. RSO/DSCC E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

C. MUSCAT 0357

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c).

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000382

SIPDIS

TERREP CHANNEL
NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, NEA/ARPI, AND NEA/EX
DEPT ALSO FOR DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/ICI/PII, DS/DSS/CC, AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER CASC KSAC KHLS KVPR MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 03/15/2006

REF: A. LEGATT/RSO E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

B. RSO/DSCC E-MAIL DTD 03/15/2006

C. MUSCAT 0357

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(c).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The DCM chaired a meeting of the core Emergency
Action Committee (EAC) on March 15 to assess the Embassy's
security posture prior to the local weekend, and in light of
recent unsubstantiated threat reporting (references A and B).
Noting no substantive changes in the local security
environment since the last meeting, members agreed that the
Embassy's already heightened security posture and force
protection condition (FPCON) remain appropriate. End Summary.

--------------
Security Environment
--------------


2. (SBU) On March 15, the DCM chaired a meeting of the core
EAC to assess the Embassy's security posture prior to the
local weekend, and in light of recent unsubstantiated threat
reporting (references A and B). The meeting opened with a
discussion of the local security situation, which the EAC
continued to characterize as stable. P/E did, however,
comment on a significant increase in internet message board
traffic related to a March 14 Israeli raid on a Palestinian
prison, for which the bulk of blame was being specifically
directed at the U.S. and U.K. governments. As a result,
members agreed on the need to closely monitor public
sentiment.

--------------
Unsubstantiated Threat Information
--------------


3. (SBU) The meeting continued with a review of
unsubstantiated threat information received by the Embassy on
March 15 from Legal Attache Abu Dhabi (reference A) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (reference B).
Specifically, both reported that on March 8, the American
Citizen (Amcit) wife (residing in Ohio) of Omani national
Hilal Hasan Ali JAAFAR (residing in Oman) alleged to an FBI
agent that JAAFAR threatened to "bomb" the U.S. Embassy in
Oman (NFI). It was further reported that on March 15,
JAAFAR's wife told another FBI agent following up on the
aforementioned allegation that JAAFAR threatened to "kill
anyone" from the Embassy that "attempted to take his son
away." RSO noted that FBI officials question both the
emotional stability and credibility of JAAFAR's wife (e.g.,
she previously admitted to fabricating information to advance
her personal agenda). NOTE: This incident is the latest in a
series of events connected with an emotionally charged
custody battle involving JAFAAR, his wife, and their three
Amcit children, one of whom is residing with JAAFAR in Oman.
Details of the custody case to be reported septel. END NOTE.


4. (SBU) Given the nature of the information available,
members of the EAC do not assess it to constitute an imminent
threat to Embassy Muscat or its personnel. However, members
agreed to seek immediate assistance from the Royal Oman
Police in determining the veracity of the threats allegedly
made by JAAFAR, as well as on specific precautions for any
"Welfare and Whereabouts" visits to JAAFAR's Amcit son by
Consular personnel. Members also convened a special meeting
of the Visas Viper Committee related to this case (to be
reported septel).

--------------
Residential Security
--------------


5. (SBU) Prior to concluding the meeting, OMC (USDR) raised
the issue of significantly increased pedestrian and vehicular
traffic around two Embassy-leased residences, currently
occupied by DOD personnel, citing growth of a local business.
Accordingly, members agreed to formally request assistance
from the Muscat Municipality in an attempt to control
commercial traffic in the affected area. NOTE: Both
aforementioned leases are scheduled for summer 2006
termination. END NOTE.
--------------
EAC Conclusion
--------------


6. (S/NF) Upon careful consideration of all alleged threat
information above, the EAC concluded that there have been no
substantive changes in the local security environment since
the last meeting held on March 11 (reftel C),and agreed that
the Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON
remain appropriate. Embassy Muscat remains acutely aware of
the need to monitor both the regional and local security and
threat environments, and is prepared to take the necessary
countermeasures should changes to either occur. DCM, P/E,
MGT, RSO, ARSO, SIMO, CONS, OMC (USDR),and Duty Officer
participated in the meeting.
BALTIMORE