MFA ARAB CHIEF ON IRAN, PALESTINE, SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000162

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, NEA/ELA, INR/B

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID KPAL PARM KNNP PINR XF MU
SUBJECT: MFA ARAB CHIEF ON IRAN, PALESTINE, SYRIA

REF: A. MUSCAT 134


B. MUSCAT 130

C. SECSTATE 11443

D. STATE 19516

E. STATE 8416

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In a February 5 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, MFA Arab
Affairs Chief Ambassador Ahmed al-Harthy expressed deep
misgivings about the IAEA's decision to report Iran to the UN
Security Council, fearing the move pushes a diplomatic
solution further out of reach. He said recent Oman-Iran
discussions on bilateral investment projects were still in
early stages, but confirmed Oman's desire to purchase Iranian
natural gas. Al-Harthy urged the USG to give Hamas time to
reconsider its policy positions, refrain from pre-judging the
situation, and to open a direct channel of communication.
The question of whether a Hamas-led government would receive
direct budgetary support would be decided by Arab League
consensus. He feared U.S. pressures were putting Palestinian
President Abbas in an impossible position, with dangerous
consequences. Al-Harthy reaffirmed there were no plans for a
visit to Oman by Syria's president. End summary.


2. (C) On February 5, Pol/Econ Chief pulsed MFA Arab Affairs
Department Chief Ambassador Ahmed bin Yusuf al-Harthy on a
range of regional issues. Al-Harthy had returned just a few
days prior from having accompanied FM Yusuf bin Alawi on his
visit to Iran (refs A, B); al-Harthy chairs the Omani side of
the Oman-Iran Joint Political Committee. He regularly
participates in the Omani delegations to Arab League and GCC
ministerials, and appreciated the opportunity for a
"undiplomatic" discussion. (See bio note in para 11.)

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Iran/IAEA: Worried About UNSC Involvement
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3. (C) As reported ref A, FM Bin Alawi returned from Iran on
January 31 conveying Tehran's assertion that a delay of
several weeks in the drive to have the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BoG) report Iran to
the UN Security Council (UNSC) would give Iran time to reach
a uranium enrichment deal with Russia. Otherwise, Iran
threatened to halt cooperation with the IAEA and its
inspectors. (Bin Alawi also passed this message to the UK,
French and German ambassadors.) Al-Harthy was therefore
greatly discouraged and pessimistic over the IAEA BoG's
February 4 decision and the predictably harsh initial
reactions from Iran (ref D). He underscored Oman's deep
desire to see a diplomatic resolution to the impasse, but
said the February 4 action now makes it considerably more
"complex."


4. (C) Iran's position, he opined, will now harden as strong
nationalistic elements in Iranian domestic politics pull the
nation further from engagement with international
institutions. Despite the BoG's overwhelming consensus for
its action, Ambassador al-Harthy was under the impression
that Iran had been in compliance with its IAEA obligations
and that DG ElBaradei (who called on the Omani MFA a year
ago) was satisfied with Iran's cooperation. Asked why he
would believe Iranian claims about the status of talks with
Russia when Russia itself voted in the IAEA BoG to report
Iran to the UNSC, al-Harthy opined that Moscow might simply
have been bowing to USG pressure. He was likewise under the
impression that the Iran nuclear file now rests solely with
the UNSC. P/E Chief raised facts to counter Ambassador
al-Harthy's presumptions, underscoring that the issue
remained in diplomatic channels and that states like Oman
must continue sending a consistent and firm signal to Tehran
that it must live up to its international obligations. P/E
Chief used ref E points to note how Iran's noncompliance
undermines Oman's desire to have Israel commit itself to the
NPT and other nuclear treaties.


5. (C) Ambassador al-Harthy described the Omani-Iranian
linkages that Muscat hopes to wield to keep Iran engaged in
the world community. There are at least three separate
binational commissions that function: the Joint Political
Committee (at the Foreign Ministry level, which al-Harthy
chairs); an economic committee chaired by Minister of
Commerce and Industry Maqbool Sultan; and a military/security
committee (which primarily deals with illegal immigration and
smuggling concerns). He said the large investment projects
raised in the recent Tehran meetings (ref B) were still in
the formative stage, but will be discussed further in the
economic committee when it convenes in March. He said there
is only one modest Iranian investment project actually on the
ground at present, within the Sohar industrial complex.
Asked why Oman seeks to buy Iranian gas (ref B) when it
already has a purchase arrangement with Qatar and UAE (the
Dolphin project),Ambassador al-Harthy said it was unsound to
rely exclusively on a single supply source.
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Hamas/Palestine/Israel
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6. (C) Al-Harthy attributed Hamas' victory in the recent
Palestinian legislative council elections to Israeli policies
that have deprived the Palestinian people of any hope in the
peace process. With a cat-ate-the-canary grin, he also
blamed USG calls for democracy in the Middle East as
producing governments with which the USG will not want to
deal. He was dismayed by USG statements already indicating
that Washington will not provide assistance funds or deal
directly with Hamas, rather than taking a more patient course
to await formation of a new government. P/E Chief reiterated
Washington's praise for the successful conduct of the
elections and explained USG statements that funding would not
be provided to either terrorist-designated entities or to any
future Palestinian government that rejected the peace process
in which the USG, international community and Oman itself had
so heavily invested.


7. (C) Reiterating Oman's desire for a just peace between
Israel and Palestinians, al-Harthy urged the USG to send an
envoy to talk directly to Hamas representatives rather than
engage in diplomacy via the media. He also said PA President
Abbas was placed in an impossible position by the USG
preconditions, because backing Hamas would give Israel an
excuse to marginalize him as it had done to Arafat, while
rejecting Hamas would be both undemocratic and political
suicide. Al-Harthy urged the USG to throw Abbas a life-line
to survive this transition period in tact. Not least, he
said it was paramount to put USG pressure on Israel to
achieve broad progress on the roadmap and not resort to
further unilateral actions. (On February 7, the Deputy
Director of the MFA Under Secretary's office told P/E Chief
that the Arab states have always kept Hamas at arm's length
and Hamas realizes full well that it needs to moderate its
position in order to break down those barriers. He added,
however, that Hamas needs some space to take this action and
urged pressure on Israel not to target Hamas leaders at this
delicate stage.)


8. (C) Asked whether Oman would still provide financial aid
to a Palestinian government if run by rejectionist forces,
Ambassador al-Harthy indicated that Oman has little choice in
the matter. At the annual Arab League summit, a collective
decision is made on how much money to contribute to the
Palestinians, and in what form (i.e., directly to the PA or
to approved third-party NGOs, etc.). Based on that decision,
Oman is assigned a specific quota. He could not recall what
Oman's dues for 2005 were (it was $1 million in 2004),but
said half went directly to the PA and half to NGOs. If the
next AL summit so directs, Oman will do the same in 2006
regardless of who is running the PA.

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Syria - No Bashar Visit on Horizon
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9. (C) P/E Chief reiterated ref C points urging Oman not to
welcome a visit by Syrian President Bashar al-Asad were one
to be requested. Ambassador al-Harthy said he was unaware of
any plans for a visit but didn't offer substantive reply as
to what might be Oman's response to a Syrian approach. He
expressed some surprise by the U.S. demarche, however, saying
he had detected a decrease in US-Syrian tensions of late.
When P/E Chief disabused him of that notion, al-Harthy asked
what is to be gained by such pressure on Damascus. It
certainly would not bring Hariri back to life. P/E Chief
reminded him of the UNSCRs obliging Syria to cooperate with
the murder investigation, noting that bringing the guilty to
account would help prevent further such political murders and
bolster Lebanon's sovereignty. Al-Harthy retorted
pragmatically that Syria and Lebanon will always be closely
linked. P/E Chief replied that close relations hardly give
Damascus the right to murder Lebanese leaders and
journalists. Al-Harthy noted positively that Syria and Iraq
were poised to restore diplomatic relations and hoped that
Syria was doing a better job of policing its side of the
border.
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Comment
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10. (C) While Ambassador al-Harthy did not appear to be
well-versed on IAEA/UNSC details (the province of a different
MFA department),his generously frank views are broadly
consistent with MFA and even public sentiments. He aptly
summarized the conversation by noting that, while our tactics
may sometimes differ, Oman still shares the same goals as the
USG. End comment.

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Bio Note
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11. (C) Ambassador al-Harthy appears to be in his 60's, is
about 5'6" with a long white beard. He speaks English fairly
well and does not use an interpreter in meetings with
Americans. (He often attends the Minister's meetings with
visiting USG officials.) He enjoyed visiting both of his
sons when they attended college in the U.S. (Oklahoma and
Louisiana respectively). Al-Harthy is also related and on
close terms with an Omani employee of the Embassy's Public
Diplomacy section.
BALTIMORE