Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MUSCAT134
2006-02-01 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

YBA POSES QUESTION RE IRAN

Tags:  PREL EPET ETTC IR MU UN UNSC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000134 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, EB/ESC NSC FOR DNSA HADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PREL EPET ETTC IR MU UN UNSC
SUBJECT: YBA POSES QUESTION RE IRAN

REF: A. 05 MUSCAT 02


B. 05 MUSCAT 1304

C. 05 MUSCAT 1644 (NOTAL)

D. 05 MUSCAT 1876

E. 06 MUSCAT 130

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD L. BALTIMORE III.
REASON: 1.4 (B,D)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000134

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARPI, EB/ESC NSC FOR DNSA HADLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PREL EPET ETTC IR MU UN UNSC
SUBJECT: YBA POSES QUESTION RE IRAN

REF: A. 05 MUSCAT 02


B. 05 MUSCAT 1304

C. 05 MUSCAT 1644 (NOTAL)

D. 05 MUSCAT 1876

E. 06 MUSCAT 130

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD L. BALTIMORE III.
REASON: 1.4 (B,D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (U) Please note action request in para 8.


2. (C) Begin Summary: Notwithstanding the January 30 P5 2
Statement, the Omanis believe the key to a diplomatic
solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis may lie in a slight
delay before referring the Iranian case to the UNSC, even if
no action is called for until March. They base this belief
on a series of meetings that Minister Responsible for Foreign
Affairs Bin Alawi had over the past 48 hours in Tehran and
feel that such a move could yield some ancillary positive
political benefits elsewhere in the region as well. End
Summary


3. (C) Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf
bin Alawi (YBA) met with the ambassador on February 1 re his
recent trip to Iran. In YBA's view, "all the people relevant
to the decisionmakers" were surprisingly forthcoming in their
conversations with him. Dismissing Muscat's bilateral
relationship with Tehran as secondary, YBA reported that
there were two really important issues he was most concerned
about: (1) Nuclear developments and (2) Iranian foreign
policy in the Middle East.

--------------
NUCLEAR ISSUE
--------------


4. (C) YBA confirmed that this was the primary concern of his
interlocutors. The Iranians told him that they had accepted
the Russian offer in principle one month ago but they
remained concerned about specific details that Moscow never
made clear. Two outstanding areas still to be agreed upon
are: a) technical - exactly where would the enrichment take
place and over what period of time? and b) legal -
outstanding questions concerning sovereignty, the possibility
of forming a joint venture, plus territorial questions.

--------------
IRANIAN BEHAVIOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------


5. (C) YBA said he stressed the need for the Iranians to
reconsider their own foreign policy and the need for reform
in their approach to the West. He said he was direct and
specific in focusing on the core problems in the Middle East
and suggested that the Iranians were acting more like thugs
than a regional and historical power. He believes that the
Iranians need to employ some confidence building measures
with the West if they are serious about abandoning their
confrontational approach to Western interests. All of his
interlocutors, from Rafsanjani to Mottaki, reportedly
conceded this point but claimed they were currently totally
preoccupied with the nuclear question. YBA was told that
Tehran is prepared to initiate a package of policy shifts and
that YBA's should "tell your friends that we are ready to
change," but not under foreign pressure.

--------------
WHAT NEXT?
--------------


6. (C) YBA believes that there is a small but realistic
chance that if the Iranians had a few more weeks (he
specifically mentioned three) before the IAEA refers their
case to the UNSC, the Russians would have an opportunity to
clarify some crucial aspects of their offer and the Iranians
would make good on their offer to reform their foreign policy
re other matters in the region. He noted an Iranian law that
requires the government to suspend all cooperation with the
IAEA if Iran is referred to the UNSC, regardless of whether
immediate action is taken on it in New York.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador reminded YBA the Iranians have clearly
been told what they have to do, i.e., reinstate the full
suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
resume negotiations with the EU-3 in good faith, cooperate
with the IAEA, and implement the Additional Protocol. The
Ambassador also stressed the need for the Iranians to
understand that their non-responsiveness to the IAEA Board
and the fact that they were found in non-compliance with
their NPT safeguards obligations in September 2005 are major
sources of the current tension and that the key to resolution
lies in Iranian hands.

--------------
ACTION REQUEST
--------------


8. (C) YBA said he understood the points made in para 7 above
and was familiar with the P5 2 Statement. Nonetheless, he
would like an official response from Washington re exploring
the admittedly slim possibility of making headway in getting
the Iranians to start to reform their general foreign policy
in exchange for a delay of several weeks before referring the
nuclear issue to the UNSC. Please advise.
BALTIMORE