TFLE01: IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE, SUPPORT FOR GOL:

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 001191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP; NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2016
TAGS: PREL MU
SUBJECT: TFLE01: IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE, SUPPORT FOR GOL:
OMANI PRIORITIES AT AL MINISTERIAL

REF: A. STATE 128426

B. TFLE-GRIMM TELECON OF 8/5/06

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) On August 5, the Ambassador delivered ref A points to
Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi.
Bin Alawi fully agreed with these points and the broader
strategy contained therein, but made clear that the Arab
League would not move beyond endorsing Lebanese Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora's seven-point plan and calling for an
immediate cease-fire. Bin Alawi rationalized that Siniora's
government would fall if pushed beyond what Siniora had
already been able to obtain from his cabinet. He stated that
it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a new
government to form, providing Hezballah the opportunity to
quickly fill the vacuum given its growing support in the
region.


2. (C) Bin Alawi argued that obtaining an immediate
cease-fire would be the best way to empower the Siniora
government, which could then work with the international
community to tackle the longer-term issues of forming a
stabilization force and disarming Lebanese militias. To this
end, bin Alawi relayed an earlier conservation he had with
the British Ambassador in Muscat about the UN vote on August
8 for an immediate cease-fire, with a follow-on vote on a
longer-term plan shortly thereafter. Bin Alawi cautioned,
however, that the international community should be careful
not to weigh down the Lebanese government with excessive
obligations. Furthermore, bin Alawi was not optimistic that
Hezballah would disarm willingly, leaving the international
community with a daunting task that neither Lebanon nor
Israel has been able to achieve.


3. (C) Bin Alawi shared with the Ambassador his plans to
travel to Amman, where he would join fellow Ministers in
traveling to Beirut aboard a Royal Jordanian Air Force flight
on August 7. He noted that the Ministers had scheduled a
1300 meeting with Siniora, then a meeting Lebanese parliament
speaker Nabih Berri. After a possible roundtable discussion,
the Ministers would then return to Amman later in the day.
En route to Amman, bin Alawi will stop in Riyadh to consult
with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal.


4. (C) Comment. By word and by tone, bin Alawi made it clear
that Oman's first priorities will be securing an immediate
cease-fire and supporting the Siniora government. Avoiding
loading up the GOL with obligations and conditions that, in
his view, would inevitably lead to the collapse of the
government is fundamental to Oman and the Arab League. This
is something the Omanis want to avoid at all costs and the
reason, we suspect, for the visit to Riyadh where bin Alawi
will likely seek Saudi, and more generally, GCC support for
the Omani position.
GRAPPO