Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MUNICH437
2006-07-13 12:41:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Consulate Munich
Cable title:  

EADS/AIRBUS CRISIS -- THE VIEW FROM EADS' MUNICH

Tags:  ECON EAIR ETRD PGOV EINV PREL EUN FR GM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7783
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ
DE RUEHMZ #0437/01 1941241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131241Z JUL 06
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3358
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0007
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUNICH 000437 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA AND EB/IFD/OMA
PASS TO USTR MOWREY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EAIR ETRD PGOV EINV PREL EUN FR GM
SUBJECT: EADS/AIRBUS CRISIS -- THE VIEW FROM EADS' MUNICH
HEADQUARTERS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

REFS: A) Berlin 1803, B) Paris 4277

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUNICH 000437

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA AND EB/IFD/OMA
PASS TO USTR MOWREY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EAIR ETRD PGOV EINV PREL EUN FR GM
SUBJECT: EADS/AIRBUS CRISIS -- THE VIEW FROM EADS' MUNICH
HEADQUARTERS


SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.

REFS: A) Berlin 1803, B) Paris 4277

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Senior German EADS officials told the Consulate
that Noel Forgeard's departure was necessary for EADS to
move beyond its current mess, and the Forgeard affair was
but one example of the challenges of dealing with spotlight-
seeking French partners. As for BAE's divestiture of its
EADS shares -- it was a case of good riddance. The
officials said the A380 program was unfairly suffering from
bad press due to inevitable teething pains, but would
ultimately prove a technological and commercial success.
Nevertheless, Airbus had made some mis-steps that
contributed to an improved competitive position for Boeing.
End summary.

--------------
EADS -- NOT JUST A FRENCH COMPANY
--------------


2. (SBU) POL/ECON Officer and Econ Specialist met July 10
with two senior European Aeronautic, Defense and Space
Company (EADS) officials. One of the officials manages
DaimlerChrysler's 22.5 percent EADS share, and the other is
in the office of EADS' German co-CEO, Thomas Enders. EADS
is the corporate parent of Airbus and Eurocopter, and also
has defense and space divisions. EADS has a dual CEO
structure, with one German, the other French. Similarly,
the corporate headquarters is physically split between
Munich and Paris. DaimlerChrysler is generally viewed as
representing the German national interest in EADS as the
German government does not directly hold shares in the
company, unlike the French government.

--------------
THE FORGEARD AFFAIR
--------------


3. (SBU) When asked about Noel Forgeard's unceremonious
exit from the French co-CEO slot at EADS, one of our
contacts made clear Forgeard's departure was for the good

of the company. He described Forgeard was an over-
ambitious "maniac." The German-half of EADS never knew if
he acted with the backing of the French government, or was
promoting his own agenda. This was especially true last
year when he attempted to abolish the shared French-German
leadership structure at EADS and claim the top job for
himself. Our contact assumed this power-grab was driven by
prestige. To be on equal footing with his counterparts in
French industry, namely the CEOs of the CAC-40 firms,
Forgeard needed to be unrivaled in his leadership of the
company -- not a co-CEO.


4. (SBU) Both officials told us that from the German
perspective, it made sense to preserve co-leadership at
EADS for the time being because, as the French made the
current mess, it should, after-all, be cleaned-up by a
Frenchman. It was a positive development that former
French railways chief Louis Gallois had been picked to
replace Forgeard. Thomas Enders would have had less clout
with French managers and government officials.
Additionally, Gallois was a skilled manager with experience
in the aeronautics industry.

--------------
DEALING WITH THE FRENCH
--------------


5. (SBU) Our contacts said many of EADS' internal problems
stemmed from France's inability to come to terms with the
fact it was incapable of maintaining its own national
aerospace industry. They mentioned the late-1960's
Dassault "Mercure," a French attempt to compete with the
Boeing 737, of which only 17 units were ever sold. They
continued that the French view seems to be that France is
the innovator, uniquely capable of coming up with aircraft
concepts/designs, while the Germans are content with
product execution. Not only was this not the case, but the
A380 was actually the brainchild of a German engineer,

MUNICH 00000437 002 OF 003


Juergen Thomas. As if to illustrate the French penchant
for dominating the spotlight, one of our contacts turned to
the other and joked, "What, you mean we're not a French
company?"


6. (SBU) One our contacts related how after some French
officials reacted to the Forgeard crisis by publicly
calling for more French government influence over EADS,
French government officials called Enders' office and asked
for copies of the EADS shareholder agreement. [Note: The
shareholder agreement excludes the French government's
influence on operational decisions. End Note] Having
studied the agreement, the French then stepped back from
their push for greater influence the next day.


7. (SBU) Asked about the recent decision by the British
BAE Systems to divest itself of its 20 percent stake in
EADS, our contacts characterized this as a case of good
riddance. BAE had been a schizophrenic partner anyway,
never quite knowing if it was a European company, or a
quasi-U.S. firm.

--------------
A380's Woes
--------------


8. (SBU) Both officials reported that EADS' management had
been taken by surprise over the reaction by the media and
financial markets to the delays with the Airbus A380.
Further, Forgeard's comments blaming Airbus' Hamburg
production facility for the wiring harness problem were
unjustified. This was a case of "garbage in, garbage out"
-- Hamburg was producing harnesses with configuration
information from Toulouse -- the problem did not lie in
Germany.


9. (SBU) Our contacts downplayed recent reports that the
A380 would generate significantly more wake turbulence than
expected, resulting in an ICAO requirement that other
aircraft have a 10 nautical mile safe following distance
from A380s -- double the normal separation. They said the
reports overstated the problem, and in reality, an A380
would generate only slightly more wake than a Boeing 747.
One of the officials confided that on the day of our
meeting, Airbus was doing wake testing in Oberpfaffenhofen
on one of its four flight-capable A380s, as well as a 747.
The company hoped these tests would vindicate the A380.
Even if the 10 nautical mile separation rule remained in
place, the official said he did not expect there would be
enough A380 traffic at a given airport for it to be a
significant problem.


10. (U) In spite of the delivery problems, our contacts
were confident that the A380 project would ultimately be a
success. Airbus needed to sell 300 of the aircraft to
break-even -- a goal they believed to be attainable given
that the A380 is only at the beginning of its 25-year
product life cycle.

--------------
BOEING VS. AIRBUS
--------------


11. (U) Both men conceded that Airbus was facing a tough
year in its competition with Boeing, but both were
confident that Airbus would catch up. [Note: Airbus orders
are down 58 percent for the first half of 2006 compared to
the same period last year, with Airbus trailing Boeing by
363 orders year-to-date. End Note] Our contacts
acknowledged that with its focus on the A380, Airbus had
misjudged customer's interest in Boeing's 787 Dreamliner.
Airbus had also not expected the remarkable reliability of
the twin-engine Boeing 777, which had pulled customers from
the less-efficient four-engine Airbus A340. One of our
interlocutors, while expressing admiration for the 777's
record, pointedly said that a mid-ocean failure of both
engines on a 777 would bring customers back to the A340.


12. (U) The officials also blamed the media for ignoring
good news from EADS, including the U.S. Army's recent
announcement that it had awarded a USD 3 billion contract
to EADS subsidiary Eurocopter to provide up to 352 UH-145
light utility helicopters -- Eurocopter's first U.S.
defense contract. They expressed the hope this was a good

MUNICH 00000437 003 OF 003


omen for EADS' bid to get a contract to build tankers for
the U.S. Air Force, even if only a split contract with
Boeing.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


13. (SBU) The Forgeard/EADS crisis has been widely
portrayed by the media as a French affair -- a notion the
German management of EADS appears content not to challenge.
However, underneath the stoic German face of EADS is
obvious frustration with the damage and embarrassment the
French partnership has caused the firm. Despite our
contacts' stated optimism regarding the prospects of the
A380 program and the ability of Airbus to respond to the
challenge of the 787 Dreamliner's success, one had the
impression they, and their colleagues, feel at present a
little like Hans Brinker -- in this case doing their best
at damage control.


14. (U) This report has been coordinated with Embassy
Berlin.


15. (U) Previous reporting from Munich is available on our
SIPRNET website at www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/munich/ .

ROONEY