Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MUMBAI1506
2006-08-11 18:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Mumbai
Cable title:  

STILL NO BREAKTHROUGH IN MUMBAI TRAIN BOMBING INVESTIGATION, POLICE SAY

Tags:  ASEC CASC IN KISL PGOV PK PREL PTER 
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INFO RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 9068
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 001506 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR OPS CENTER, S/CT, SCA/INS, DS, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/SCA,
DS/ICI/PII

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/11/2016
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, CASC, ASEC, PK, IN
SUBJECT: STILL NO BREAKTHROUGH IN MUMBAI TRAIN BOMBING INVESTIGATION,
POLICE SAY

REF: A: MUMBAI 1360; B: MUMBAI 1332; C: MUMBAI 890; D: NEW DELHI 5063

CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph M. Pomper, Acting Principal Officer,
Consulate General Mumbai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



Summary

-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUMBAI 001506

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR OPS CENTER, S/CT, SCA/INS, DS, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/SCA,
DS/ICI/PII

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/11/2016
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, CASC, ASEC, PK, IN
SUBJECT: STILL NO BREAKTHROUGH IN MUMBAI TRAIN BOMBING INVESTIGATION,
POLICE SAY

REF: A: MUMBAI 1360; B: MUMBAI 1332; C: MUMBAI 890; D: NEW DELHI 5063

CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph M. Pomper, Acting Principal Officer,
Consulate General Mumbai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



Summary

--------------

1. (C) K. Raghuvanshi, the Chief of the Maharashtra
Anti-Terrorism Squad, told Congenoffs on August 11 that
investigators had made "no major headway" in their search for
the perpetrators of the July 11 Mumbai train bombings. The
operation was professionally planned and executed, and those
responsible left few traces and no clues. None of the persons
arrested since July 11 could be linked to either the planning or
the execution of the attacks, Raghuvanshi conceded. However,
all were conclusively tied to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) or the
Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),the two
organizations that Indian investigators still believe were
behind the attacks, he said. The interrogation revealed details
about the LeT's efforts to recruit and train sleeper cells among
dissatisfied Indian Muslims. The young men received training in
Pakistan, had returned to India as "hardened jihadists," and
were sad proof that Islamic fundamentalism was here to stay in
India. It would be no surprise if Indian-born Muslim extremists
were soon implicated in terrorist attacks elsewhere in the
world, he said. Raghuvanshi claimed that the ATS had names and
locations of the LeT camps where the arrested received training,
and he admonished the USG to put pressure on Pakistan to crack
down on the facilities. However, he declined to share the
information on the Pakistan camps with us. End summary.

"No Major Headway"

--------------

2. (C) K. Raghuvanshi, the Chief of the Maharashtra
Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS),told RSO and Pol/Econ Chief on
August 11 that investigators have made "no major headway" in
finding the perpetrators of the July 11 train bombings in Mumbai
that killed over 180 people. Despite weeks of painstaking work
at the b
omb sites, investigators have found no useful clues,
except that a mixture of ammonium nitrate and RDX was used in
each of the bombs that exploded nearly simultaneously in seven
different commuter trains at the height of the evening rush
hour. The police had no traces of the timing devices or the
containers used by the perpetrators to plant the bombs, each
weighing 3 to 4 kg, nor did they have any reliable explanation
why the first class cars of the trains had been targeted. The
terrorists may have wanted to hit better-off commuters, or the
first class cars, located at the front of the train, may have
provided an easier escape route for the persons who planted the
bombs, Raghuvanshi said. The police did not know how many
persons planted the bombs, or where they did so. Investigators
were also still trying to determine whether the one body still
unidentified in a hospital morgue was actually that of a
terrorist operative.

Arrested Persons Not Linked to Bombings

--------------

3. (C) The persons arrested or otherwise detained by the police
(ref A) in the weeks after the bombings have not been linked to
either the planning or execution of the attacks, Raghuvanshi and
his deputy, Subodh Jaiswan, conceded. However, all were
conclusively tied to LeT or SIMI, the groups that investigators
still believe are responsible for the bombings. Several of the
suspects admitted that they received weapons and explosives
training in Pakistan in the past several years. The police had

MUMBAI 00001506 002 OF 003


proof that some had received money via hawala transfers from
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. None of those interrogated appeared
to have instructions to carry out a concrete act in India,
Raghuvanshi said. Instead, several had admitted that they
returned to India as sleeper cells and were awaiting
instructions. Their knowledge of each other was limited and
compartmentalized, and was a sign that they were part of a
well-organized and professionally managed organization.

Background of Those Arrested

--------------

4. (C) All of those detained were born in India and were Indian
citizens, Raghuvanshi said. All were Sunni Muslims of the
Deobandi sect, and were followers of the Ahl-e-Hadeeth movement,
Jaiswan said. Most were "semi-educated" and not as tech-savvy
as they had often been portrayed in media reports. For most,
their knowledge of computers was limited to the internet,
e-mailing and web-chatting. The persons arrested in Bihar had
the same profile, Raghuvanshi said. One also had a Nepalese
passport which he used to travel to Pakistan frequently.

Young Muslims Return to India "Hardened" and "Poisoned"

-------------- --------------

5. (C) Raghuvanshi said the police were trying to understand the
mindset of the young men who had been detained. He said those
that had gone to Pakistan had received an intensive course of
ideological indoctrination and had come back "hardened" and
"poisoned." Several of the young men told interrogators that,
in the training camps in Pakistan, they had been taught that
India and the U.S. were united as enemies of Islam. They viewed
Indian policy in Kashmir and U.S. support for Israel as
identical signs that both of these countries had targeted
Muslims around the world. They were ideologically committed to
jihadi thinking and could be expected to support or carry out
the worst forms of terrorism, Raghuvanshi said. While all had a
negative view of the U.S. role in the world, none of those
detained had given any indication that they had instructions or
intentions to target U.S. facilities or Amcits in India,
Raghuvanshi said. Recent media reports that some of those
arrested had targeted U.S. companies in Bangalore were
inaccurate, he told us. Anything that the suspects had intended
in Bangalore was "a purely Indian matter," he said.

"Muslim Extremism Here to Stay"

--------------

6. (C) Raghuvanshi said that the investigations were
demonstrating that jihadi extremism was here to stay in India.
The LeT and other foreign Islamic terrorist groups had
successfully used frustration and anger among India's Muslims to
penetrate the large and diverse Muslim community, he said.
(Note: Unlike P.S. Pasricha, Maharashtra Director General of
Police -- see ref B -- Raghuvanshi did not claim that the modus
operandi of the attacks pointed towards Al Qaida involvement.
End comment.) While Indian Muslims have never been linked to a
terrorist atrocity outside of India, Raghuvanshi said, a
different scenario was highly likely in the future. There were
now enough determined jihadi operatives among Indian Muslims, he
said. The U.S. and other Western countries should not be
surprised if, at some time in the near future, an Indian-born
and Indian-bred Muslim became involved in a terrorist attack
somewhere in the world.

No Definitive Links to Other Terror Incidents in India

-------------- --------------

7. (C) Raghuvanshi said investigators had no clear evidence

MUMBAI 00001506 003 OF 003


linking those arrested after July 11 to the sizable arms
seizures in Aurangabad in May (ref C). The police only knew that
those arrested post-July 11 or in Aurangabad were members of
sleeper cells organized by LeT. There was some personal
familiarity among those arrested in the two incidents, but no
clear useful operative linkage had been established. The police
were also unable to establish a clear link between the
Aurangabad seizures, the Mumbai train bombings and the foiled
attack on RSS headquarters in Nagpur (ref D). However, the
police now have evidence that the three suspected terrorists
killed in Nagpur were all Pakistanis.

Comment

--------------

8. (C) Raghuvanshi and his deputy were visibly frustrated at the
lack of true progress in the investigation. They were also
quick to point fingers at Pakistan, arguing that forces there,
and not Al Qaida for example, were the main threat to Indian
security. Raghuvanshi also claimed that the ATS had information
on the LeT training camps in Pakistan, and admonished the USG
for not putting more pressure on the GOP to address the issue of
terrorism. At the same time, he declined to share any
information on the camps with us. His reaction was in line with
a previous lack of willingness to share operative details with
the USG.

9. (C) Comment continued: Raghuvashni's comment that Muslim
extremism was "here to stay" in western India was a worrisome
statement from the local law enforcement official who is
probably best able to judge the mood among Mumbai's large Muslim
community. His observations matched what we are increasingly
hearing from both Muslims and non-Muslims in the city. Local
youth, most of them poorly education and without a perspective,
are falling prey to extremist groups who use the images of the
2002 Gujarat carnage or the 1992 destruction of the Babri mosque
as a recruitment tool. The number of those who actually fall
prey to such recruitment tactics is very small, and most likely
restricted to certain sub-sects of the Sunni Muslim population.
Nonetheless, even a handful of such persons suffices to stain
the image of the entire Muslim community in the eyes of many
Indians, or to support an operation such as the July 11
bombings. End comment.


POMPER
OWEN