NINEWA: TURKOMAN TRIBAL LEADER ON TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: TURKOMAN TRIBAL LEADER ON TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH THE
KURDS, AND NEW GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN BAGHDAD

MOSUL 00000047 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jerome P. Hohman, IPAO, Provincial Reconstruction
Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Sheikh Seyh Beyatli, leader of the Turkoman Beyatli
tribe, believes Turkey is meddling in Turkoman affairs in Iraq.
He claims Turkey's main goal is to remove any sort of historical
allegiances between the Kurds and Turkoman people to keep
federalism from taking hold in Iraq. Beyatli claims Turkey
fears a separate Kurdish-controlled unit in Iraq might entice
Turkish Kurds to seek a similar end. While there are tensions
between the Kurds and Turkoman over "Kurdization" policies in
Kirkuk where the two groups are in the majority, Beyatli claims
there are relatively no problems between the two minorities in
Ninewa. Beyatli says the impasse over government formation in
Iraq is the fault of both Prime Minister Ibrahim Al Ja'afari and
those seeking to end his candidacy. The most important issue is
to have a central government to ensure the country's stability
and security, he says. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Sheikh Seyh Abdulhamit Ahmet
Beyatli, leader of the Turkoman Dignitaries and Tribes of Iraq
(TDTI) party in Mosul on April 13.

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TURKISH INFLUENCE IN IRAQ SPLITTING TURKOMAN
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3. (C) Begun on February 6, 2004, the Turkoman Dignitaries and
Tribes of Iraq (TDTI) party claims to be a more independent and
secular-minded than rival Iraqi Turkoman Front (TF). Originally
aligned with TF, Beyatli moved away from that party believing it
was "too controlled by Turkey," and formed his own independent
organization, TDTI, which aligned with Ayad Allawi's secular
coalition for the December 2005 national election. After the
fall of the regime Beyatli worked with TF for "one year and two
months," he claimed, until the relationship soured over what
Beyatli said was the party's unusually close ties to Turkey. As
a tribal representative, Beyatli said he always needed to act in
the best interests of the Turkoman people. With TF, on the
other hand, he did not believe that this was the case. Turkoman
Front was receiving funding and direction from Turkey, claimed
Beyatli, and he did not want to be an "agent for Turkish
influence." Turkey was against federalism, especially for the
Kurds, he said, and so was TF. He claimed this issue caused a
split within the Iraqi Turkoman community that had "historically
aligned" itself with the Kurds, or at least sympathized with
their plight. Turkey did not want to see the Kurds get their
"rights" or the same might happen in Turkey, said Beyatli.

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GOVERNMENT FORMATION FOR STABILITY IN IRAQ
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4. (C) Beyatli said Iraqis were unhappy with the security
situation in the country, especially after the bombing of the
Golden Mosque in Samarra in February. He claimed former
Baathists and foreign insurgents were stirring the pot, so to
speak, of ethnic tension throughout the country. Beyatli
accused the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and Iraqi National
Dialogue Council (INDC),Iraq's two largest Sunni Arab political
parties, of "covering up" for the activities of terrorists.
"For decades these guys had the government in their hands," said
Beyatli, "but now they were causing chaos." Four months without
a government was too long to wait, all because Prime Minister
Ibrahim Al Ja'afari would not step aside and opposition groups
would not stop insisting Ja'afari do so, he said. The result
was a complete breakdown of Iraqi faith in the democratic
process. TDTI, on the other hand, although limited in funding
and support, was pushing both sides to work for the interests of
Iraqi society, he said. Beyatli said TDTI outreach included
convincing the people that it did not matter who sat in the
leadership position so long as there was a government that could
provide security and stability.

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KIRKUK AND "KURDIZATION"
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MOSUL 00000047 002.2 OF 002



5. (C) Beyatli claimed Kirkuk was a "Turkoman city." Saddam
Hussein's Arabization policy forced the Turkoman out, but since
the fall of the regime the Kurds had been reversing the process,
he said. As a result, the "topography had changed," claimed
Beyatli, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was now
giving money (up to 4,000 dollars) and employment assistance to
entice Kurds to migrate to Kirkuk. The Kurds numbered 23
percent historically, according to Beyatli, but were now around
35 percent of the population. The third largest group was the
Arabs, he said. Beyatli claimed that Turkoman and Arabs were
now joining together to fight Kurdization in Kirkuk, but that
they were having a tough time due to Kurdish control of the
provincial and city governments, and security forces in the
area.

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TURKOMAN AND KURD RELATIONS IN NINEWA
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6. (C) In Ninewa, however, Turkoman and Kurds did not number
more than 20 percent of the population, said Beyatli. And since
Sunni Arabs made up the majority it could be expected they would
win most of the seats in any provincial election, he said.
Between Mosul and Tal Afar, for example, there were 450,000
Turkoman, 350,000 of which lived in Tal Afar [NOTE: these are
unusually high estimates. Although predominantly Turkoman Sunni
and Shia, Tal Afar's total population numbers far fewer than
200,000]. Beyatli thanked Coalition Forces (CF) for
counterinsurgency efforts in Tal Afar last year, but said once
CF departed terrorists would take control of the city. He
blamed outsiders and foreigners for causing problems in Tal
Afar, believing Turkoman would "never attack one another."
Beyatli discounted claims of friction between Turkoman and the
Kurds in Ninewa saying the two groups were minorities and
therefore had more in common; a very different scenario than
Kirkuk. Although he believed the Kurds had tried to occupy Tal
Afar in 2004, Peshmerga forces were "pushed out" by Turkoman
residents. There had been relatively no problems in Ninewa
between the two groups since, he said.

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BACKGROUND AND COMMENT
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7. (C) Beyatli was a deputy commander in the Iraqi Army (IA)
during the former regime. He served as an independent national
assemblymember during the former regime. In 1996 Beyatli served
in the national assembly as an independent from Ninewa. In 2000
he ran again and won. He was proud of the fact that he was one
of five independents to win from Ninewa since at the time
independents competed amongst each other for a small number of
seats from Ninewa, while Baathists competed on a separate
ballot. He claimed he was asked by the CPA to play a role
during the formation of the country's first provincial council
in Ninewa in May 2003. Beyatli aligned with former Prime
Minister Ayad Allawi's secular list for Ninewa province last
year, but that his seat was quite low, number 15, and the list
won only two seats from the provincial ballot. Although
uncertain about the Turkoman's future in Iraq, Beyatli remains
steadfast in his work to move his people away from what he
claims is "Turkish meddling" in their affairs. We are uncertain
how influential he is within the Iraqi Turkoman community, and
how valid his claims are regarding are regarding Turkish
influence in the country.
GRANT