NINEWA: SHAMMAR TRIBAL LEADER ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000045

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: SHAMMAR TRIBAL LEADER ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION,
PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND SECURITY

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CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Western Ninewa Sunni Arab tribal leader Sheikh Abdullah
Al Yawar believes all ethnic and political groups in Baghdad are
responsible for failings with the new government formation. He
believes the last government's problems were not only the fault
of Prime Minister Al Ja'afari, but also that of the Kurds, Shia,
and Sunnis. He recommends that sectarian parties -- allowed to
participate he claims "thanks" to the USG -- should put aside
their prejudices for talks to resume. Abdullah wants provincial
elections to occur as soon as possible, but recommends that the
tribal community -- the "true voice" of the people -- play a
larger role in the government. He predicts the Iraqi Islamic
Party will win the vote in Mosul, and the tribal community in
western Ninewa. Abdullah says Coalition Forces cannot leave
Mosul because Iraqi Security Forces are not fully prepared. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Sunni Arab Sheikh
Abdullah Homaidi Aljeel Al Yawar, Shammar tribal leader in
western Ninewa, in Rabiya on April 7. Al Yawar (more commonly
known as "Sheikh Abdullah") inherited the throne after the death
of his father (by the same name) in 2003. Al Yawar's interest
is in general contracting. He has had direct ties with local
politicians and previously supported cousin and vice president
Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawar, although the relationship has soured over
the past year.

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TRIBAL PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION
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3. (C) Sheikh Abdullah said he was confident a solution would
be found to the impasse over central government formation.
Prime Minister Ibrahim Al Ja'afari failed, he said, but not all
of those failings were completely his fault. Shia and Kurdish
political parties were to blame too, said Abdullah. He claimed
all political parties would need to come together soon to help
settle the problem or more blood, money, and time would be lost.
The USG was also at fault, claimed Abdullah, for allowing
"religious" parties to participate in the democratic process.
Such parties should "thank the U.S." for allowing them to exist,
but also sectarian groups should take the lead with
reconciliation, he said. The Kurds did not like Ja'afari,
claimed Abdullah, because he did not take their side in
settlement of Article 58 and the "Kirkuk issue." Sunnis
disliked Ja'afari too because they accused the Shia of "killing
Sunnis," he said. Abdullah said these disagreements could be
easily overcome if sectarian parties realized they were working
for the benefit of the new government. Abdullah recommended the
USG closely monitor any talks in the formation of the new GOI.

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PROVINCIAL POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
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4. (C) Abdullah claimed the Ninewa economy was in shambles and
the provincial government was "nowhere to be found." Sunnis
were as much to blame for problems in Ninewa as the Kurds,
claimed Abdullah. They could accuse others, such as the Kurds
and Shia, but not themselves, he said. He recommended that
provincial elections take place as stipulated in the TAL, 60
days after the formation of the new government. Early elections
were important because the current provincial government was not
representative. Abdullah suggested that any provincial election
take place over two days instead of one, since it would allow
more people to get to the polls. Given the security situation
in Mosul, claimed Abdullah, it was unreasonable to expect voters
to travel into unsafe areas in one day to vote. Abdullah
claimed that any new Ninewa government should also include
tribal leaders, since they were the true voice of the people in
the province. Abdullah claimed that he had been in talks with
IIP members who were seeking his support for the provincial
elections. [NOTE: Abdullah withdrew his public support for
cousin Vice President Ghazi Al Yawar during last year's national
election, claiming Al Yawar reneged on promises to improve the
province]. Regardless, he said, Mosul would vote in favor of
the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP),which he considered the strongest

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political party in the province, and tribal leaders would fare
the strongest in western Ninewa. However, any new government
would have to consider representation from Ninewa's extensive
minority community, such as the Yezidis and Christians.

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SECURITY FORCES IN NINEWA
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5. (C) Abdullah rejected calls by many politicians in Mosul for
the immediate removal of Coalition Forces (CF) from the city.
"Who will protect it?" asked Abdullah. The time was not right
for such a decision, he said. Besides, the Iraqi Army (IA) was
not ready to take over, claimed Abdullah. He accused the USG
made mistakes with formation of the IA by "training militias,"
such as the Badr Brigades and Peshmerga. As a result many in
the IA were "not officers," since they were not trained in a
military academy or training college, he said. Western Ninewa
needed CF, said Abdullah. Even the IIP realized this. Abdullah
claimed the Shammar tribe gave a list of potential IA candidates
to CF to pass to the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad (MOI),but
that "no one" was contacted. Abdullah said many Shammar left
the IA between 1991 and 2003 after the Kuwait War and because
Saddam Hussein was using the IA to kill the Kurds and Shia, he
said. Since the tribal community was asked after the fall of
the regime to not form militias, members of the tribal community
should be allowed to serve in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
he said. Abdullah, who claimed he was very close to the Yezidi
community in Sinjar, said members of that community came to him
to express their frustration that they could not join the ISF.
He said the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the area
prevented the Yezidi from doing so.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Abdullah, a powerful businessman and tribal leader,
considers himself the "true" voice of the Shammar (and even
Yezidi) community in western Ninewa. His reach into politics is
mostly centered on the Rabiya city council, but as mentioned
earlier, he claimed he did play an important role with helping
Ghazi Al Yawar get elected in January 2005. His older brother
Fazil served as Ghazi Al Yawar's staff assistant for some time
before he was removed from his position late last year.
Perhaps, for that reason Abdullah switched his allegiance to the
IIP. He claims his family has been in talks with the IIP for
years, and knows IIP provincial leader Dr. Mohammed intimately.
Abdullah says the IIP is courting him, trying to win his support
to form a strong coalition for provincial elections slated for
later this year. Abdullah represents much of the old Iraq,
where power brokers reign and deals are made in the interests --
not necessarily values -- of each party, regardless of ethnicity
or allegiance. If Iraq continues on a path towards democracy
then anomalies such as Abdullah might find themselves out of
business.
MUNTER