NINEWA: PROMINENT - AND SHADY - SUNNI SHEIKH ON SECURITY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: PROMINENT - AND SHADY - SUNNI SHEIKH ON SECURITY AND
PROVINCIAL POLITICS

MOSUL 00000043 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



--------------
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) With the advent of democracy in Iraq, Ninewa's tribal
leaders in the Sunni Arab community fear losing their
traditional influence. However, there are tribal leaders
working behind the scenes who still hold sway over politics and
business affairs, especially such persons with strong ties to
the inner sanctum of the Iraqi government. Sheikh Hannash might
be one of these tribal leaders (he has close business and
political ties to Iraqi Vice President Sheikh Ghazi Al Yawar).
Hannash, who has a shady past, a lot of money, and has had
dealings with Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF),believes that security
forces in the province should be more representative, that
proper checks and balances be in place before any future
elections take place, and that the USG could help to better
these issues and the economic situation in Iraq. End Summary
and Comment.


2. (C) PRT Leader and PolOff met with Sheikh Ghazi Hassan
Hannash Al Ta'i in Mosul on April 2.

--------------
SECURITY ISSUES
--------------


3. (C) Hannash repeatedly urged for the creation of more
representative security forces and the reinstatement of the 4th
Division of the former Iraqi Army (IA). Taking aim at militias
in southern Iraq, Hannash said the IA could not be "sectarian."
While more work would need to be done to make the police and
army in Ninewa more reflective of its diverse population,
certain things were necessary to really improve security.
Bringing back the IA 4th Division, he said, would work best
since under the former regime the force was not sectarian.
Regarding the Iraqi Police (IP),Hannash said he personally
thought highly of Provincial Chief of Police Wathiq Al Qudir,
but that there were still many corrupt officers on the force
that needed to be removed. He accused Kurdish criminals of
dressing in IP uniforms and searching cars. He claimed this was
a serious problem that needed to be addressed with the public,
since criminals were taking advantage of motorists by harassing
them. It was causing the public to lose confidence in Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF),he claimed. Any effort to correct the
problem should be jointly addressed by IA and IP, together, with
help from the USG.


4. (C) Hannash said he did not understand how the USG could not
control the security situation in Iraq, since it could "control
the whole world." He accused CF and ISF of relying too much on
"questionable intelligence" when conducting raids. Tensions
with the public were building as a result, he claimed. Hannash
recommended warning first time suspects rather than arresting
them. Identifying a guarantor would then help to watch over the
suspect and keep him out of trouble. But if the suspect was
continuing his engagement in criminal and terrorist activities
then he could be prosecuted. Hannash said he feared too many
innocent people were taken in to custody. He said mutual
respect was necessary to strengthen ties between Iraqis and
Americans.

--------------
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Hannash recommended provincial elections take place as
soon as possible, but only if the democratic process could be
assured. He called the current provincial government "butchers
from the streets" since he believed they were unqualified for
their jobs. He said all political candidates should be screened
for their qualifications before being allowed to run for office.
Hannash suggested establishing election committees made up of
all parties and ethnicities to observe voting on election day.
After the polls were closed the ballots should be immediately
counted in front of the committee, he said, since it was the
transit of election materials that was most susceptible to
tampering.

--------------

MOSUL 00000043 002.2 OF 002


ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
--------------


6. (C) The economic state of the country was "in shambles,"
claimed Hannash. He said he could not understand how a country
so rich in natural resources had such a difficult time feeding
its people. He recommended that the Islamic aid organization
Awqaf work with the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad to help the
poor. A committee, or several committees, could be established
to address issues of poverty, he said. If a social safety net
could be established with help from the U.S., he claimed, such
efforts might even better Iraqi public opinion of the USG.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) We need to be very careful with whatever Hannash tells
us. Hannash allegedly has ties to insurgent activity and the
former Baathist regime, and was known to be an associate of
Saddam Hussein. His name continually surfaces during
conversations with contacts in Ninewa province. Interestingly
enough, he was given the opportunity to participate in the
constitutional committee in June 2005 as a representative of the
Sunni Arab population. He accused the USG of bringing President
Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President
Massoud Barzani to power. He also claimed that Iraq's security
and economic situation was entirely in the hands of the U.S.
Hannash might never admit that he and his countrymen are in
charge of their own future. It seems he is quite content to
blame the USG for problems in Iraq instead.
MUNTER