NINEWA RULE OF LAW ISSUES PART I: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

JUSTICE FOR: CARL ALEXANDRE AND KATHLEEN OCONNOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/1/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR KCRM
SUBJECT: NINEWA RULE OF LAW ISSUES PART I: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMITTEE OFF TO POSITIVE START (CORRECTED COPY)

REF: MOSUL 37; A) MOSUL 17; B) MOSUL 16

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CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



[CORRECTED COPY -- SUBJECT LINE]

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In recent months we have heard criticism of the Iraqi
criminal justice system in Ninewa. Even officers at the
Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) say they are "tired"
of seeing terrorists released by "cowardly judges" or "corrupt"
military and police officials. Corruption and cowardice aside,
problems now tend to be centered on poor communication and
coordination among the Iraqi judiciary and the security forces.
The impetus for the Ninewa Criminal Justice Committee (NCJC) is
to serve as an effort to acknowledge these problems and work
towards solutions collectively to improve the criminal justice
system in the province. The first meeting, held in late March,
exceeded expectations by both the parties involved as well as
PRT and MNF-N officials observing. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PRT Rule of Law Coordinator and PolOff met with
Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) BG Wathiq Al Qudir, Ninewa
Chief Judge Faisal Sadeeq Hadeed, Investigative Judge Amer
Rasheed Hammedi and Iraqi Army (IA) 2nd Division Commander MG
Jamaal, and MNF-N at One West Iraqi Police (IP) headquarters in
Mosul on March 25.

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DIAGNOSIS OF A PROBLEM: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
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3. (C) The public is frustrated with the effectiveness of the
criminal justice system in Ninewa. During a conversation with
two colonels from the Provincial Joint Coordination Center
(PJCC) on March 24, Col Ismael Hussein Khader told PolOff he and
his colleagues at the PJCC had been working hard over the past
three years -- at risk to their own personal safety -- to make
Iraq safer. However, he claimed, they felt their work was
negated when "well-known terrorists" were released from prison.
He and Col Khaled Suleiyman believed these events damaged the
public's faith in government institutions. Khader believed
there had to be some sort of collusion between terrorists and
judges, and members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Even
Coalition Forces (CF) were complicit since they were not doing
enough to keep the bad guys behind bars, he said. "The
terrorists have the streets," he exclaimed. He and Suleiyman
asked for USG assistance to rid local government and security
forces of corruption and help restore the public's faith in the
government. "We think America could do something to leave a
good impression," they said.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
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4. (C) Over several meetings with IA, IP, and judicial
officials similar complaints arose: there was little or no
communication, and a great deal of distrust, among institutions.
Chief of Police Al Qudir told PRT officials on several
occasions he recognized the need to increase the public's trust
of the police. Since there had been corrupt officers in the
past, he admitted, it caused a large rift with constituents.
Such problems were complicating the force's ability to improve
since they were not receiving information tips, for example,
from concerned citizens about terrorist activities in their
neighborhoods. More importantly, was that the public thought
the IP was complicit with the release of terrorists from prison.
This made him angry and fostered his own distrust of Ninewa's
judges with prosecuting cases (ref a). Chief Judge Hadeed and
Investigative Judge Hammedi saw the problem from another angle.
While the IP and IA commanders could "go public" and "blame" the
judiciary for releasing terrorists (ref b),judges were
forbidden to defend themselves in the press. Even more
frustrating, according to Hadeed, was that the "truth" was not
getting out: although some judges were corrupt, most were
working hard to hear terrorist cases with missing evidence,

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crimes scenes not protected, and ISF investigators not allowed
to testify by their commanders. "The system cannot continue
that way it's going," said Hadeed. "We have to do something to
figure this out with the army and police." Here was where the
PRT's Rule of Law unit stepped in.

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THE RESULT: NINEWA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMITTEE
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5. (C) The first meeting of the Ninewa Criminal Justice
Committee served as a chance for the PCOP, IA, and judiciary to
begin honest dialogue and work on issues to improve coordination
on criminal investigations and evidence collection. Chief Judge
Hadeed began the meeting by spelling out the local judiciary's
frustration with IP and IA investigative information. He
chalked up the problem to poor communication and a lack of
education by ISF investigators on criminal case reporting
procedures. "There was no contact" with ISF on cases and
therefore they could not be tried. With Ministry of Interior
commandos, for example, the judiciary had "very little contact."
ISF was acting like they were above the law, he said. Even CF
was guilty since they did not know Iraqi law, claimed Hadeed.
One of the biggest problems was when ISF were transferring
suspects to CF custody. "Judges should be involved and given
all documents," he said. Admitting the judiciary was also to
blame Hadeed said some judges were "being lazy," for not quickly
moving through cases. But most upsetting, said Hadeed, was when
the IA would not allow their agents to testify.


6. (C) Chief of Police Al Qudir said the IP was upset as well.
There were cases where they caught insurgents "red-handed" in
the act of committing a crime, but that the case was later
thrown out because the IP did not follow procedures. He said
this problem was more pronounced with CF, but that the IP was
cooperating better with CF, and CF was now waiting until the IP
finished their investigation before taking custody of the
suspect. Al Qudir also claimed that witnesses and informants
were sometimes difficult to track down.


7. (C) Iraq Army (IA) 2nd Division MG Jamaal began by
launching into his frustrations with the judiciary. He claimed
if there was no law then only chaos would exist, and as a result
all sides would have to work together. He believed terrorists
were benefiting since judges were not standing firm against
them. He blamed lawyers for exploiting the system for personal
gain. More importantly, however, Jamaal expressed his strong
commitment to uphold the law, claiming he was doing everything
he could to enforce it. Jamaal did not understand why his
investigators' testimony was needed if the IA caught terrorists
in the act of committing a crime or having given a documented
confession. His conclusion was that it was the fault of the
court system that terrorists were released.

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SOLUTION: BETTER COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION
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8. (C) Jamaal's solution? Judges had to be firmer and not
allow lawyers to push them around. He said the work of the IA
was becoming increasingly more difficult because most terrorists
knew they would only have to stay in prison for three to four
months before being released. He accused judges of buying off
on terrorists that pleaded they were coerced into confessing
under duress. Using a battlefield analogy, Hadeed reminded Gen
Jamaal that there were two types of leaders: those on the
battlefield, and those planning the war from behind a desk.
Comparing himself to the desk officer, Hadeed claimed the law
did not allow him much flexibility. Like Jamaal, too, he was a
soldier who was limited by the rules of engagement. Accusations
that the judges were folding under pressure from terrorists had
been mitigated, he said. They now conducted terrorist
investigations with panels so that any decisions would not
single out a particular judge. He said that if a panel had
received a threat the case would not be prosecuted locally, but
shifted to the Higher Juridical Council in Baghdad. Such
precautionary measures did not allow judges to "fool around"
with case procedures, he said. Furthermore, if judges refused
to hear cases it would only reflect poorly on Hadeed, which
could also cost him his job.


9. (C) Admitting their forces had committed procedural errors,
Generals Jamaal and Al Qudir extended an olive branch to Hadeed.

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Crime scenes had to be protected, they agreed, and evidence not
compromised (ref b). The judges had to see the IA
investigators, Hadeed requested, since the case would have to
otherwise be thrown out. The ISF could not keep moving
detainees to different courthouses, such as Dohuk, that were
outside of Ninewa's jurisdiction and could not adequately hear
the cases, he said. Al Qudir said the IP would work better with
IA investigative experts to protect crime scenes and better
collect evidence. Moving one step further, Jamaal recommended
the ISF form a committee for IA agents to meet and work with the
judges. There should be cooperation between investigative
judges and the IA investigators, he said. Investigative Judge
Hammedi agreed and said more would need to be done to train ISF
investigators on interrogation and investigation procedures.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Building the capacity of the criminal justice system to
identify, investigate, and successfully prosecute dangerous
criminals is key to bringing the security situation under
control. As the capacity of the ISF to perform their security
function increases, building their capacity to perform their
investigative function to assist the courts is of equal
importance. Because the courts in Iraq ultimately control the
investigative process and also act as the prosecuting authority,
cooperation and coordination with the ISF is critical. As is
clear today, an ISF raid that captures an insurgent cell leader,
for example, is only truly successful if the suspect can be
taken off the streets and incarcerated consistent with Iraqi
law. The NCJC is a small but important step in efforts to make
such successes the rule rather than the exception. In addition,
[consistent with the PRT mandate] the NCJC places the
responsibility for strengthening the relationship between the
ISF and courts in the hands of the Iraqis themselves. However,
due to the distrust and finger pointing of the past, the
committee will likely continue to require U.S. facilitation in
the near term. In time, the goal is that the police, army, and
courts will see the value in working together to secure the
province under the rule of law and will continue to do so after
U.S. facilitation ceases.
MUNTER