Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSUL31
2006-03-23 09:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Mosul
Cable title:  

KURDISH POWER PLAY IN MOSUL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS

Tags:  PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8934
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0031/01 0820909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230909Z MAR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0440
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0034
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0027
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0023
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0459
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000031 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: KURDISH POWER PLAY IN MOSUL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS
FULL TRANSITION OF SECURITY TO IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

REF: MOSUL 24

MOSUL 00000031 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



-------------------
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSUL 000031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: KURDISH POWER PLAY IN MOSUL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT REQUESTS
FULL TRANSITION OF SECURITY TO IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

REF: MOSUL 24

MOSUL 00000031 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



--------------
SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Ninewa Provincial Government leaders called for the
immediate transfer of security operations from Coalition Forces
(CF) to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). During a meeting with the
PRT and MNF-N, Governor Duraid Kashmoula, Vice Governor Khasro
Goran, and Provincial Council Chair Salem Haj Issa claimed Mosul
residents were resentful of continued CF presence, which has
undermined their credibility with the public. While security
has improved markedly since the fall of the city to terrorists
in November 2004, we doubt whether the Iraqis are as capable as
they think they are. We view the attempt by a lame-duck,
predominantly Kurdish, provincial government -- that saw Sunni
Arabs take a majority of seats from Ninewa during the national
election -- to assert its authority and ensure continued Kurdish
control of power in the province. End Summary and Comment.


2. (SBU) PRT Leader and MNF-N met with Ninewa Governor Duraid
Kashmoula, Vice Governor Khasro Goran, Provincial Council Chair
Salem Haj Issa, Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) Wathiq Al
Qudir, and Provincial Chief Judge Fasial Hadeed in Mosul on
March 14. PRT IPAO met with Governor Duraid Kashmoula and Vice
Governor Khasro Goran at Ninewa Provincial Hall on March 9.

--------------
CALL FOR TRANSFER OF SECURITY OPERATIONS NOW
--------------


3. (C) During a meeting with MNF-N and the PRT, provincial
government leaders called for the immediate transition of
security operations from Coalition Forces (CF) to Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). Governor Kashmoula asked for a meeting soon with
MNF-N and ISF officials to discuss intelligence sharing for

transfer of the battle space command. Kashmoula said he
believed sole ISF presence inside of Mosul would be beneficial
for everyone, especially CF and the USG, for political,
security, and economic reasons. Kashmoula said the sooner the
change took place they more legitimate the ISF would be. Vice
Governor Goran said the Iraqi Police (IP) had a great deal of
responsibility, but that CF needed to give it more leeway with
handling security. Kashmoula, Provincial Council Chair Issa and
PCOP Al Qudir recommended that CF be stationed on the periphery
to serve as a quick response force when called on by ISF.


4. (C) Al Qudir claimed the public viewed terrorism in the city
as a "jihad" against CF, and that moving CF out of the city
would help better the public's perception of the security
situation. During an earlier meeting with the PRT, Kashmoula
said he was upset by what he saw as misstatements about the
transfer of security from Coalition Forces (CF) to Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) in Mosul. He claimed Mosul residents
resented this and faulted him for misleading them, which has
undermined his and the provincial government's credibility.
Kashmoula said he was concerned that these types of actions by
CF would create more unrest and ill will towards Americans.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) We are skeptical about the Iraqi request. While their
desire to put more of an Iraqi face on security operations is
admirable and speaks well to any potential drawdown of CF in the
country, realities on the ground suggest that Kashmoula, Issa,
and Goran have other advantages in mind. Since terrorists
overran Mosul in November 2004, the city has continued to
improve markedly with regards to security thanks in large part
to CF efforts, as was noted in a presidential speech at the end
of last year. It may be that the provincial government, made up
of predominantly Kurds and Kurdish sympathizers, is working to
assert its influence before provincial elections slated for
later this year. The request for a rapid transfer of
operational authority from CF to ISF over the next few months
would be a way of "delivering" something to constituents
(reftel).


6. (C) Why have more of an IA presence, specifically, in Mosul?

MOSUL 00000031 002.2 OF 002


The IA 2nd Division is commanded by MG Jamaal, a former
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Peshmerga commander, and its
forces are still mainly Kurdish. Goran, himself a KDP leader as
well as vice governor, has been playing this card for some time
now. For example, he told the PRT on numerous occasions that he
would like more 2nd Division IA presence in Mosul, requesting on
one occasion that the IA should have five or six checkpoints in
the center of the city, contrary to CF and Al Qudir's wishes
(reftel). Perhaps the Kurds saw the writing on the wall during
the national election, where Sunni Arabs political parties took
a majority of seats from Ninewa in the national assembly. It
could be that the current government believes that ISF control
of security, especially before the elections, would allow the
Kurds to assert their authority and influence over politics in
the mostly Sunni Arab city. In short, the current provincial
government should probably be seen as little more than a tool of
Kurdish ambition in Ninewa, and the request for the immediate
transfer of security operations for what it is: a ploy to
enhance the political fortunes of the current provincial
government and its backers in Kurdistan.
MUNTER