Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSUL30
2006-03-22 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Mosul
Cable title:  

NINEWA: THE HERO OF TAL AFAR

Tags:  PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8115
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMOS #0030/01 0811452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221452Z MAR 06
FM REO MOSUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0437
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA 0031
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0020
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0024
RUEHMOS/REO MOSUL 0456
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000030 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: THE HERO OF TAL AFAR

REF: MOSUL 23

MOSUL 00000030 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSUL 000030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: NINEWA: THE HERO OF TAL AFAR

REF: MOSUL 23

MOSUL 00000030 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Mayor of Tal Afar Najim Al Jubouri -- the hero of
President Bush's March 20 speech in Cleveland -- is a rare
leader in a country fraught with fear and uncertainty. His
strong leadership, both as chief of police and mayor, helped
clean up this city of a quarter-million people in northwest Iraq
when it was overrun by terrorists and suffering from a decrepit
infrastructure. He helped reform the police by making them more
representative and accountable. He worked diligently with
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on counterinsurgency
efforts in September 2005. However, he also fears what will
become of him and his family once U.S. forces are drawn down in
the country. He doubts his countrymen are prepared enough to
fully understand democracy, and he questions the sincerity of
Iraq's political leadership. He is afraid of sectarian and
religious power in Baghdad, and believes that Iran has been
behind ethnic tensions in the country. We wonder just how
sustainable his efforts in Tal Afar might be once Iraq is left
to fend for itself. End Summary.


2. (SBU) PRT PolOff met with Tal Afar Mayor Najim Abdullah Al
Jubouri in Tal Afar on March 15.

--------------
PROFILE OF A STRONG LEADER
--------------


3. (C) Najim Al Jubouri prides himself on being a straight
talker and risk taker. He has a history of doing the right
thing for his country, often at the expense of his own and his
family's personal safety. As chief of police for Tal Afar, Al
Jubouri (known simply as "Najim") took an aggressive approach in
reforming, training, and equipping the local police to better
handle security in the area. His actions did not go unnoticed.
An assassination attempt against him was thwarted by a

bulletproof vest that proudly hangs on his wall, perhaps as a
testament to his convictions or as a reminder of what could have
been. Al Jubouri did not walk away from his job, but he did
move his family to safety in Baghdad and later to the west
Kurdish town of Dohuk. In a city starving for leadership --
especially after its former chief of police, Ismael Faris, fled
town leaving in his wake allegations of death and corruption --
Al Jubouri assumed the position of acting mayor in July 2005
(reftel). 3ACR Commanding Officer, Col H.R. McMaster, instantly
identified with Al Jubouri and the two began a partnership that
would ultimately benefit the city of Tal Afar. Al Jubouri
presided over successful counterinsurgency efforts in September
of last year, helping in planning and operations with Coalition
(CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).


4. (C) That today the dusty little city of Tal Afar has some of
the highest levels of available electricity in Iraq and few
shortages of potable water is Al Jubouri's work. Al Jubouri is
part vigilante, part maverick. He believes he has to work in a
system that does not appreciate the struggles of those living
outside Iraq's larger cities. He claimed Tal Afar needed strong
leadership to battle insurgents that overran it. He found that
seeking help from what he saw as a feckless provincial
government and a self-absorbed federal government was simply not
an option. He said Tal Afar stood in marked contrast to Mosul,
since schools were open, kids were playing in the streets, and
basic services were met. According to Al Jubouri the central
government was now controlled by "sectarians" and
"opportunists," and for that reason he adamantly said he would
rather report "directly to Washington." He credited the U.S.
Army for keeping him alive, for helping to rid Tal Afar of
terrorists, and for working to provide everything he needed to
run the city.

--------------
MONUMENT TO U.S. INTERVENTION
--------------


5. (C) Al Jubouri appears to have grown accustomed to his
direct access to CF and the USG. For this reason he said he was
not preoccupied with issues that troubled other government
officials, such as providing education, water, and electricity.

MOSUL 00000030 002.2 OF 003


Rather, he simply had bigger ideas for Tal Afar. "I want to
construct a high-rise building like Times Square," he said. But
if this were not possible a "large hospital would be nice." As
a show of his respect and admiration for the USG he claimed his
request should not be misunderstood: he just wanted to build
something that Iraqis could look to as a monument of the U.S.
contribution to the country. Al Jubouri said he believed the
city of Tal Afar should be made an example for Iraq with
something uniquely American.

--------------
SUNNI EXAGGERATIONS
--------------


6. (C) When asked about Sunni and Shia relations in the city,
Al Jubouri, a Sunni Arab, said he admitted some Shia Iraqi
Police (IP) officers were bad. However, he bitterly accused
Sunnis of being "hypocrites" who "exaggerated" events to their
advantage. He said that when the Golden Mosque in Samarra was
bombed on February 22, Shias attacked mosques for a few days and
then calmed down. He said, however, that if Shias had actually
bombed an important Sunni shrine, like the Tomb of Abdel Qudir
Qadelawi, there would have been "blood on the streets." Al
Jubouri accused the predominantly Sunni, Iraqi Islamic Party
(IIP),of contributing to tensions between Sunnis and Shias. He
claimed the IIP did not call for calm after the Samarra bombing,
and instead "falsely" announced that three Sunni mosques had
been bombed in Tal Afar instead.

--------------
"KILLER MISTAKES"
--------------


7. (C) Although Al Jubouri is clearly a friend of the U.S., he
saved his harshest criticism for the USG and its actions in
Iraq. "The Americans made a few killer mistakes," he said, and
the U.S. "should have never listened" to Ahmed Al Chalabi. They
also should not have allowed sectarian Islamic parties to
participate in the new government and to help write the
constitution, he said. He claimed religious political party
involvement in the new constitution had brought Iraq "back
hundreds of years." Al Jubouri accused hard-line "religious"
parties of being "more dangerous than Saddam Hussein." Since
the U.S. was supporting all groups in Iraq, he said, it left the
country vulnerable to a sectarian takeover. He claimed "Imams"
were dictating politics and "destroying women's rights" by
forcing them to "wear tents on their heads." He did not rule
out what he claimed was the "strong influence of Iran" that had
been contributing to tensions in Iraq. He said the ISF was
"built incorrectly," since the USG was "training militias"
instead of an independent army. As an example he said, "The IA
in the north is supported by the Kurds." Lambasting the
international media, Al Jubouri called the U.S. press "weak" for
not reporting enough on "good stories" in Iraq, especially the
work done by CF and the USG. "The U.S. spent a lot of money on
schools," said Al Jubouri, "but most Iraqis believe the money
came from the Iraqi Government." He claimed Iraqis loved the
U.S. but that, too, was "never reported."

--------------
A FUTURE WITHOUT THE USG
--------------


8. (C) "I'll quit," Al Jubouri said immovably when questioned
what he would do once CF troops were inevitably drawn down. Al
Jubouri said he believed the Iraqi public was not educated
enough to understand the profoundly "positive work" that had
been done in Tal Afar. He even accused his fellow city
councilmembers of being "more interested in helping themselves"
than with caring about the city. Al Jubouri frankly said, "If
it was not for the Coalition Forces we would not have anything."


--------------
STILL TIME TO "SAVE IRAQ"
--------------


9. (C) Despite his criticisms, Al Jubouri said he was holding
out faith that all was not yet lost in the country. He
suggested that the USG still had the power to affect the outcome
in Iraq, but that it would have to act with a "frozen heart."
Al Jubouri recommended that only a "secularist," like Ayad
Allawi, could lead the country. He said he believed Allawi was
the perfect candidate who would "work for everyone." "If you
fixed the head, the whole body would be okay. But right now,
things were lopsided," he claimed. Al Jubouri said democracy
was a foreign concept for Iraqis, and that the democratic

MOSUL 00000030 003.2 OF 003


process would take time to develop. He claimed sectarian
parties took advantage of people's religious and personal
security fears. He said in Basra before the election, for
example, the Shia coalition (United Iraqi Coalition #555) was
marching through the streets carrying empty caskets, declaring
voters "would die" if they voted for Allawi.


10. (C) When asked whether the invasion was worth the effort,
Al Jubouri said the U.S. "won the fight but was losing the war."
He compared the USG to a person standing in water up to his
chest, looking in panic for a way out. Al Jubouri said the same
tactics that worked to free Tal Afar from terrorism should also
be applied to "liberate Iraq." He recommended the USG install a
secular government under Allawi, change the constitution so that
it "does not appear like the Koran," and prohibit religious
parties from participating. He claimed that these changes would
correct the problems in Iraq "within months." He asked that the
USG free Iraq the way the Protestant Reformation liberated
Europe. He compared life in Iraq and the Middle East today to
that of Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries, where "religious
leaders ruled and repressed the people." Once the Europeans
were freed, said Al Jubouri, the "whole world changed." And the
same could be done for Iraq.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Najim Al Jubouri is without a doubt a rare and brave
leader, and a hero to the people of Tal Afar and Iraq. On a
visit to a primary school with the mayor and members of 1/1AD,
the students, teachers, and administrators received him with a
welcome fit for a king. He firmly believes in "one Iraq," and
when he enters a classroom the first question he asks is whether
the students are "Sunni or Shia." The response, of course, is
"We are Iraqis!" Although Al Jubouri is a living legend and
positive example of bold leadership in a country fraught with
fear and uncertainty, it seems that deep down he is aware that
his efforts might be all for naught. This was confirmed when he
repeatedly and firmly told us he would "quit" once CF left. We
wonder how sustainable his successes will prove if and when the
U.S. troops in his area are redeployed.
MUNTER