KURDISH VIEWS FROM NINEWA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSUL 000024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS PINT PGOV PHUM IZ MARR
SUBJECT: KURDISH VIEWS FROM NINEWA

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CLASSIFIED BY: Cameron Munter, PRT Leader, Provincial
Reconstruction Team Ninewa, State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)



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SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (C) PRT Mosul had lengthy discussions with three Kurdish
leaders in late February: two top Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) officials and one from the rival Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). All were united in their support for continued
American presence in Iraq, the difficulties Ja'afari faces in
forming a new government, the need for change in the rules
governing provincial elections, the focus of Kurdish leaders on
Article 58/Kirkuk, and their wariness about Turkish motives in
northern Iraq. There were some differences between the
Mosul-based leaders (representing both parties) and the KDP
leader from Irbil on the formation of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and the merger of the parties: the Moslawis
were optimistic, but Karim Sinjari, interior minister of the
KRG, foresaw a difficult and protracted fight among the Kurds
over the next year. Similarly, Sinjari was somewhat more
forthcoming about economic problems, including energy shortages
and corruption, than his more sanguine counterparts to the
south. Speaking before the bombing in Samarra, all expressed a
cautious optimism about opportunities in Ninewa province and
Kurdistan as a whole, and a determination to tackle tough
problems head-on. PRT Mosul got the strong impression these
leaders think time is on their side: they seemed to believe they
can push ahead patiently on economic development and other key
issues unimpeded by strife elsewhere. End Summary and Comment.


2. (SBU) PRT Leader and TF-BOB Brigadier General Rife met with
Karim Sinjari, Interior Minister of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and one of the leading figures in the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP),on February 19 in Irbil. PRT Leader and
Poloff met with Khassro Goran, Ninewa Vice Governor and
provincial KDP Director, at KDP Mosul Headquarters on February

21. PRT Leader and Poloff met with Aso Mamand, Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) Ninewa Director and one of the leading
figures of the party, Abdelbari Mohammed Faris Al-Zebari, Ninewa
Deputy Director and National Assembly Delegate, and Sheikh
Mayadeen Ma-roof Moyadeen, Ninewa PUK Spokesman, at PUK Mosul
Headquarters on February 22.

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FORMATION OF THE NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
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3. (C) Kurdish leaders in Ninewa estimate that formation of the
new Iraqi Government might take some time. Asked whether they
believed Ja'afari would remain as Prime Minister, Sinjari
replied "we have to accept him," but added that it depended on
how Ja'afari negotiated. Sinjari, Goran, and Mamand all noted
that (Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq --
"SCIRI's" nominee) Abdul al-Mahdi would have been a better
candidate, but the Shia had chosen Ja'afari, and that was their
decision. Of course, they added, Iran would now have greater
influence. And so would Al Sadr, who was a front for Iran as
well, as evinced by Iran "moving Al Sadr all over the region
now," said Sinjari. "We don't like Ja'afari," Sinjari went on,
"he gets nothing done. But you reject him and you reject the
Shias." Mamand doubted Ja'afari could bring the country
together, but all agreed it was better to have Al-Sadr inside
the tent rather than outside.


4. (C) Goran, Sinjari, and Mamand presumed the Kurds would
retain the presidency and that the biggest changes would take
place within the ministries. Goran said he did not believe a
Kurd would serve as minister of Defense or the Interior. He
claimed such a post would be widely resisted by Arabs, since any
action by a Kurdish minister would be seen as an "attack against
Arabs." Sinjari disagreed believing that the Kurds must get a
power ministry, such as Defense. Goran speculated the Kurds
would get Foreign Affairs instead. Sinjari stated it would
improve things if former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi were to get
a post; until now, the Shia coalition had said no to this, but
perhaps he could surface as Interior or Defense Minister.

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PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
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5. (C) There was wide consensus among the Kurdish leaders that

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provincial elections would not take place for a while. "The new
government needed to be formed and new election laws drafted
first," said Goran. While he thought elections could come as
early as August, Mamand and Sinjari said they did not expect
anything to occur that early. Mamand claimed there had to be a
strong central government before provincial elections could be
called. Sinjari and Mamand also believed it should be possible
to have elections at different times in different provinces: in
key provinces, as soon as possible. Sinjari urged the U.S. to
work with governors and the Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq (IECI). Sinjari said the IECI should be changed based on
lessons from previous experience, since it was important that
the balloting be safe and secure. Mamand claimed local IECI
Director Oday Abed (a Sunni Arab) purposefully prevented
"thousands" of displaced Kurds from voting in the election. He
accused Abed of ensuring displaced Arabs could vote in Tal Afar,
but made no effort to help the Kurds. Mamand said voting
requirements should be re-written to make them more flexible,
especially for the displaced. Expecting the Kurds who left
Ninewa for security reasons to return to Mosul was unrealistic,
he said.


6. (C) Sinjari believed that in Ninewa province, security at
previous elections had been good, but the process needed
technical help. He had seen a change in Mosul over time: the
electorate did not just follow the lead of mullahs any more, but
rather, people made their own choices. He suggested that to
guard against tampering of ballots, representatives of all
parties should oversee the counting process, which should take
place at the sites where ballots were cast. He said the public
did not believe that ballots were tamper-free once they left the
site. All three men requested United Nations play a role in
observing the elections as well. Regarding any outcome from the
elections, the Kurdish leaders were split. Goran and Mamand
said "without a doubt" that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) would
gain control of the provincial government. Sinjari said he
thought the balance of power in Ninewa would not change. Goran
said he realized how important the provincial elections would be
for Sunnis when he received information recently that Sunni
groups had been meeting regularly to strategize on how to "take
back" the provincial government. Goran seemed more concerned,
however, about a possible "fight" if the government changed
hands. He said the Kurds had been discriminated against
historically in Mosul, and had even been refused to own property
under the former regime. Goran said he feared a return to these
old policies if Sunnis took control.

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MERGER OF THE PUK/KDP AND THE NEW KRG
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7. (C) Although they all seemed optimistic that the KDP-PUK
merger would be complete a year from the time of the signing,
historical tensions among the parties were still evident.
Sinjari took some shots at the PUK, accusing Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani of not sticking to agreements. He also said the
PUK was difficult to negotiate with since they were a collection
of several groups. However, he said talks were going well at
the top levels. Goran said the parliament would serve in Irbil,
and that any offices in Suleimaniya would eventually be moved.
It was hard work, Sinjari admitted, but it would get done on
time, that is, in December of 2006. He concluded, "Nothing is
more important than this."


8. (C) Goran said proceedings for the new Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) were moving forward as well. He noted talks,
which began on February 22, would be completed within two weeks.
Sinjari said he anticipated changes: the Interior Ministry
would go over to the PUK and the KDP would get the position of
State Minister in the Ministry (which Sinjari himself might
fill). He believed Finance and Peshmerga would go to the KDP,
Justice and Interior to the PUK. The number of ministries would
expand to match the number of ministries in Baghdad, so the 24
ministries would expand to match the GOI ministerials. For
example, Sinjari said, the KRG ministry of Transportation and
Communication would become two separate ministries, as in
Baghdad. Some would go to KDP, some to PUK, and some to
minorities.

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ARTICLE 58 AND THE "KIRKUK" ISSUE
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9. (C) An issue of importance for the Kurds is resettlement of
the displaced. Interpretation of Article 58 (of the TAL),and
specifically what happens to Kirkuk, had been at the root of the
debate. They had faith neither in Prime Minister Ja'afari nor

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in the Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC). Goran called
IPCC judges "cowards" with "no money to compensate anyone."
Referring to it as a red line issue, Sinjari said the Kurds
wanted settlement of the Kirkuk issue before the December 2007
deadline. He said the KDP would push this issue hard in the
coming year. Mamand, on the other hand, seemed more confident
the Kirkuk issue could be solved within the legal framework of
the national assembly. He also proposed that the people of
Kirkuk should ultimately decide through a referendum. Goran
said the most important event that could help decide the issue
would be the census coming up in 2007. He claimed it would be
the first "real" census since 1957 and would prove once and for
all that "Kurds" were in the majority in Kirkuk. Goran said the
census would be important not for purely political reasons.
Knowing who the population was, he said, would allow the
government to better target resources in the country.

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CORRUPTION AND PRIVATIZATION IN THE KRG
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10. (C) Sinjari said the KRG would press forward on private
enterprise since it was the only way to achieve a strong
economy. The KRG had a law read this month, and this law, when
passed, would encourage outside investment to bid on state-owned
enterprises, making them able to own land in the KRG, for
example, or enter into a joint venture. He said there would be
a conference of investor states in Irbil in April with
representatives from two hundred countries. Sinjari claimed
corruption was being dealt with. "Corruption exists, but not on
the scale some claim," he said. He said the government had
created a supreme control/audit commission to make sure
privatization bids were transparent, and that any tender would
go through the government office. Mamand said that any U.S. or
foreign company investing in Iraqi Kurdistan would have no
better friend than the PUK. He said they would be on the side
of industry if it faced any sort of interference.

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TURKEY: NEW BORDER CROSSING AND MOSUL CONSULATE
-------------- --


11. (C) The Kurdish leaders seemed skeptical about the
possibility of a second border crossing between Iraq and Turkey.
Sinjari noted that the Turks wanted this second crossing so the
road could run directly through Tal Afar, thereby avoiding
Kurdish areas of control altogether. U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State David Welch had visited the site of a possible second
border crossing and, Sinjari claimed, had agreed that it was a
non-starter. The Habur Gate border crossing, Sinjari said, was
capable of handling 3,000 vehicles either way in a day; the
Turks, he said, allowed only 600-700 through daily. But there
were plans on the Iraqi side to improve the existing Habur Gate
crossing. The Iraqis planned to build a tunnel that
"straightens out" the road at the border, and to build a second
bridge alongside the existing one to increase capacity for
traffic. He looked toward an opening "in the spring."


12. (C) On the recent visit of a Turkish diplomatic delegation
to Mosul to plan for the reestablishment of a consulate, Sinjari
said he said it would be good for business and Turkish
investment. On the other hand, he said it was less positive if
the Turks would engage in intelligence activities. Mamand
agreed but remained skeptical that the consulate would in fact
be a "political office." Mamand said Iraq needed all the help
it could get from the international community, but that problems
were bad enough in Mosul -- with "Islamic fanatics" and "former
Baathists" -- without interference from the Turks. Sinjari
commented on Turkish bases in Iraq, and Turkish complaints that
Peshmerga harassed them. He said that there was no problem with
the bases, but that the Turks should operate in the open. They
traveled, he said, in civilian clothes and unmarked cars. Thus,
when they came to checkpoints, they were stopped until their
identities could be established. He suggested the Turks should
tell Iraqi/Kurdish authorities where they wanted to go and that
they should travel in uniform, so there would be no such
misunderstandings. "They tell us in advance, and we'll let them
through," he said. He called for clear dialogue.

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TURKEY, IRAQ, AND THE PKK
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13. (C) When asked about his party's relationship with the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),Sinjari answered, "we consider
the PKK a terrorist organization." But when questioned whether
reports that the KDP turned a blind eye to PKK activity, Sinjari

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said, "we neither help nor hinder them." Goran expressed more
sympathy for the beleaguered party from Turkey, especially
noting the large number of Kurdish refugees residing in
Makhmour. Although Sinjari claimed the camp was a breeding
ground for terrorists, Goran approached the issue differently.
He called the PKK and Makhmour camp issue a Turkish problem that
was "beyond time" for settlement. "In 2006, there is no
justification for continuation of the Turk's program," he said.
Sinjari said the inhabitants would go home to Turkey if the
Turks were wise enough to propose an amnesty. The Turks,
however, would not bend on the PKK leadership, and would not go
in this direction. He suggested the Turks should look at the
political, social, and economic aspects of the problem of
refugees at Makhmour, but instead they only looked at the
military aspect. Sinjari commented that he believed the Turkish
civilian authorities were unable to sway their military
counterparts. Goran and Mamand agreed that any Turkish designs
on entering the European Union would be dashed if they could not
"solve their internal problems with minorities." Sinjari noted
that the Turks had five armored bases in Kurdistan, and four
bases with Special Forces. Their putative mission, he said, was
to fight PKK, so they do nothing because armor is little help
against rebels in the mountains.

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OIL AND FUEL IN NORTHERN IRAQ
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14. (C) Asked about the energy situation, Sinjari noted that
there was a significant problem. Iraq exports oil, but security
was abysmal, he said. With regards to reports that Iraq's oil
industry lost 6.5 billion dollars last year, Sinjari suggested
the Iraqis should spend "that 0.5 billion" to secure and protect
the industry and pipelines. Those the Iraqi government pays to
protect pipelines -- tribes in western Iraq -- were the ones
that were causing the damage, he averred. In Kirkuk, there were
terrible security problems. Sinjari said that 10,000 persons
worked in the oil industry there, and 99 percent of them were
loyal to Saddam; historically, only Arabs favored by Saddam had
received jobs in that strategic industry. Sinjari said that the
problem was at the heart of the oil industry's security and that
the people who ran the refineries were the ones who were
allowing it to be sabotaged. He suggested that the current
staff be sent home "with their pay" and that the Russians who
built the refinery and installations in the first place should
be brought back to make the oil industry work. Asked about the
capabilities of Oil Minister Chalabi, Sinjari said, he "thinks
about his pocket" only.


15. (C) Regarding accusations of trafficking and smuggling of
fuel with complicity by the authorities on the KRG border,
Sinjari became somewhat defensive. He said there were shortages
in the KRG too. He explained that each region was given its
share by the representatives of the oil company and "we get our
share like anyone else." At the moment, Irbil had enough
propane and benzene, and the recent agreement by Iraqi and
Turkish authorities on payment of overdue fees meant the
situation would ease soon. Sinjari confirmed reports that
Norwegian exploration efforts, financed through the Northern Oil
Company, had hit low-sulfur oil north of Dohuk. He added that
they were planning to build a new refinery near the site. He
said that in fact, there would be a new refinery in Irbil as
well since it was sitting on a "sea of oil." Every city should
have its own refinery, Sinjari said, which would help
distribution woes.

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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN NINEWA
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16. (C) In addition to oil problems, Goran noted Moslawis were
receiving fewer hours of electricity than they had a year
before. He believed such conditions only bred discontent and
fed directly into the hands of terrorists. Goran admitted the
public had "every right" to be upset since the provincial
government had "done nothing for three years." He said they
needed to bridge this credibility gap by showing that they were
solving problems. Goran said press reports of disgruntled
Americans questioning the viability of reconstruction projects
in Iraq were understandable. He said he was frustrated that the
Iraq Government could not move beyond its highly centralized
past, which complicated provincial government efforts. Goran
said the biggest problem Ninewa faced was that it lacked funding
(although he admitted there was money being sent soon from
Baghdad). He said the provincial council had a list of
prioritized projects and that all it needed was the resources to
start them. He said the Provincial Reconstruction and

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Development Committee (PRDC) had completed several projects in
Ninewa. Taking a dig at USG and Coalition Force efforts,
however, Goran said that almost the same number of projects had
been done "without the PRDC's involvement." Goran said it was
"very important" that Iraqis have a role in project oversight
and management. Goran appeared to blame contracting corruption
and overcharging on American ignorance. He said "only Iraqis"
knew the "real" prices and quality of materials. And therefore
the PRDC would be the best way to ensure the integrity of any
project.


17. (C) Although Goran claimed Iraqis had made gains in areas
such as freedom of speech, travel and association, he claimed
the most important issue was to have a good economy. Goran and
Mamand claimed poor economic conditions allowed terrorists to
more easily spread their propaganda. Goran said many youth are
brainwashed by terrorists who use them to plant bombs and commit
attacks. Using Mosul University as an example, Goran noted
there were several student groups who opposed the U.S. presence
in Iraq by "breeding hate." He said the best way to combat such
sentiments was to have more cultural exchanges. Noting his own
experience studying in Europe, Goran said he believed exchange
opportunities for the young were crucially important to bridging
the cultural gap and ease tensions. Mamand said the PUK has
worked in Ninewa to develop several "apolitical" youth centers.
He claimed it was important to ensure youth were engaged in
positive activities.

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SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS AND CONCERNS
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18. (C) Goran said the security situation in Mosul has been
improving and that security forces have been making progress.
Goran said now that the Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Army (IA)
were doing a good job, the provincial government could
concentrate on more important issues, such as trying to provide
basic services. Goran noted the recent bombing of a popular
restaurant frequented by IPs where two police and six civilians
were killed. He said the people of Mosul were "tired of bombs
and attacks," and after the incident many people were calling
into television programs to denounce violence. Mamand said new
Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) Wathiq Al Qudir had made
improvements in the city but that there were still corrupt
people in the force left over from his predecessor. He said he
has been working hard to get Al Qudir to remove these officers
from the force. Goran commented that more should be done
regarding background checks on volunteers since terrorists could
easily enter the force. Goran and Mamand said they also hoped
for a more representative IP, which could better provide
security in Mosul and surrounding minority villages. Mamand
said the launching of the Mosul Airport would be a bad idea,
since the city was still overrun by terrorists. He recommended
that efforts to continue with the project be put on hold until
the security situation improved.

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COMMENT
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19. (C) The Kurds are uniformly thankful for the American
presence in the north, and clearly choose to portray themselves
as closely aligned to U.S. goals. All interlocutors spoke of
their parties' commitments to freedom and prosperity in Iraq,
emphasizing that the legitimate goals of Kurds and other
distinct groups should be respected; they portrayed their
electoral and economic successes as successes of American policy
as well, feigning surprise when, in discussions of security
issues, their American guests spoke of the need to curb Kurdish
enthusiasm for expansion south and west. It is telling that the
Kurds living in Mosul, KDP and PUK alike, see the issues of
Ninewa and Kurdistan through similar lens; Goran is not only the
vice governor of Ninewa, but a significant player in Kurdistan
politics, and Mamand, while director of the PUK in Ninewa and a
leading member of the party nationally, is clearly up to his
elbows in Kurdistan politics as well. Gently, patiently, these
Kurds are assessing their chances to effect change on such key
issues as the fate of Kirkuk and maintaining control of
provincial governments in the next elections. If they have
their way, they will do so in such a manner that they can claim
they are championing American goals in Iraq at the same time.
MUNTER