U.S.-RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP

S E C R E T MOSCOW 009978

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIAN COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP
MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the last U.S.-Russian Counterterrorism
Working Group (CTWG) convened in Moscow in December 2005,
bilateral CT cooperation has continued to move forward even
as the pace has remained uneven. Russia has focused on
strengthening its capacity to respond to counterterrorism
challenges by enacting legislation in March that established
an FSB-headed National Counterterrorism Committee (NCC).
Despite a stalemate in the UN 1267 Committee regarding
financial holds on U.S. and Russian designations, we are
encouraging the Russians to expand information-sharing on
Gulf-based "charitable organizations" that are funneling
money to terrorists throughout the world, including in
Chechnya. DFM Kislyak will likely raise standing Russian
concerns about threats posed by developments in Afghanistan.
Cooperation between U.S. and Russian law enforcement agencies
continues apace, with consistent working-level exchanges and
information-sharing. After years of Russian unwillingness to
engage on bioterrorism issues, progress was made on April 12
when an interagency USG bioterrorism experts team sat down
with a sizable Russian bio-experts team in Moscow. On
MANPADS, we are ready to move beyond initial information
exchanges. The Russians are increasingly confident regarding
the success of their counterterrorism strategy in Chechnya.
END SUMMARY.
.
NEW COUNTERTERRORISM LAW
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2. (C) President Putin signed a bill in March that is
designed to implement an earlier presidential decree
establishing a National Counterterrorism Committee (NCC),
headed by the FSB. The placement of FSB chief Patrushev as
chairman of the committee was a bureaucratic victory of sorts
for the security service, as it gave the FSB the lead role
over the Interior Ministry. The decree established a
"vertical of security," running from Regional
Counterterrorism Commissions headed by governors to the NCC
at the national level. In the event of a terrorist incident,
all government agencies represented on the committee would be
required to implement NCC decisions. While the measure is
designed to increase the GOR's capacity to address terrorism
incidents, it has not yet been put to the test, so it is too
early to judge its effectiveness.
.
TERRORISM FINANCE
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3. (C) Despite a stalemate in the UN 1267 Committee regarding
financial holds on U.S. and Russian designations, the U.S.
has proposed to expand joint work and information sharing on
Gulf-based "charitable organizations" that are funneling
money to terrorists throughout the world, including Chechnya.
Anatoly Safanov, Russia's Presidential Representative for
Counterterrorism, has noted that Russia has seen a drop on
the flow of money from the Gulf region to trouble spots in
the Caucasus, thanks largely to USG efforts in the Gulf.
.
AFGHANISTAN
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4. (C) Moscow's agreement with Kabul in July to reconcile
outstanding debt and its reiteration of a commitment to
forgive 100 percent of debt in the Paris Club goes a long way
to meeting a U.S. request in the CTWG dating back to 2003.
According to DFM Alekseyev in late June, Moscow continues to
look for investment opportunities in Afghanistan, with
resolution of the debt issue as removing a significant
obstacle to further economic cooperation. On the political
front, Russia is concerned about the upsurge in
Taliban/al-Qaida activity that began this spring. DFM
Kislyak will likely seize on the news that opium production
in Afghanistan has jumped to question the effectiveness of
current counternarcotics efforts and urge U.S. cooperation in
the Russian-led Operation Canal in Central Asia.
.
INTELLIGENCE/LAW ENFORCEMENT
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5. (C) Counterterrorism cooperation between U.S. and Russian
law enforcement agencies continues to be good. In April, a
delegation from the FSB and Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR) visited the FBI Academy for a joint exchange on best
practices regarding WMD. The FSB's elite Alpha Team, tasked
with hostage rescue missions, is scheduled to visit the same
Academy in October for joint training with their U.S.
counterpart. In September, an FBI bomb disposal team will
visit Moscow for a technical exchange with the Russians. We
are also working with the Russians on a number of terrorism
finance cases, the majority involving financing for Chechen

insurgents. Unfortunately, the Russians have not responded
to our proposal to establish an FBI/Russian Interior Ministry
shared fingerprint database of known and suspected
terrorists. The Interior Ministry is ready to sign an MOU
with the U.S. Secret Service that should pave the way to
reestablishing a permanent presence for the Service in Moscow
and further cooperation in combating counterfeiting and
cybercrime.


6. (C) In a case of particular import for the Russians, the
GOR has requested we arrange for the extradition to Russia of
suspected terrorist Mohamed Kamal El-Zahabi, a Lebanese
national, who is currently in U.S. custody pending trial on
immigration charges of fraud and false statements. El-Zahabi
has been charged with terrorism-related offenses in Russia.
The Russian procuracy's request has been pending since
December 2005; in September, we informed the GOR that we were
interested in the possibility of removing him to Russia under
U.S. immigration law.
.
COUNTER NARCOTICS
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7. (U) The GOR has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate
with U.S. law enforcement on counter narcotics, and the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) has a record of cooperation with the
GOR drug law enforcement agencies, although DEA still
struggles to obtain pro-active intelligence from their
counterparts on high-value targets. The Embassy's Law
Enforcement Section continues its efforts to expand Russia's
ability to combat narcotics trafficking. In the past 12
months, the USG has allocated USD 1 million worth of
equipment to enhance the Russian Federal Counter Narcotics
Service and Customs' ability to combat narcotics trafficking.
.
BIOTERRORISM
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8. (S) After years of unwillingness to engage on bioterrorism
issues, progress was made on April 12 when an interagency USG
bioterrorism experts team met with a sizable and diverse
Russian bio-experts team in Moscow. The meeting took place
under the auspices of the WMD Subgroup of the U.S.-Russia
Counterterrorism Working Group. The meeting focused on three
areas: intelligence sharing; law enforcement cooperation;
and joint efforts on terrorism. The Russian side was
cooperative and both sides agreed to identify and move
forward with concrete, practical next steps for joint
efforts. In response to GOR questions posed at the April
meeting, the USG in mid-July shared with the GOR a
bioterrorism intelligence package. However, the scope of
future cooperation is not clear. According to MFA contacts,
there is disagreement between the security services and other
agencies on the usefulness of further steps.

MANPADS
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9. (C) The U.S.-Russia MANPADS Arrangement was finalized on
February 24, 2005. A series of expert level meetings and
information exchanges have taken place; the next information
exchange is due September 30 and experts are to meet in
Moscow January 24-26, 2007. The expert-level meetings have
been a useful forum to discuss best practices regarding
physical security and stockpile management, end-use
monitoring, destruction methods and assistance programs. We
have exchanged regional threat assessments and discussed
black markets. The U.S. delegation believes implementation
will soon move toward more concrete activities. Outstanding
issues are: U.S. decision on whether or not to provide
information on U.S. systems destroyed annually; Russia
sharing information on systems transferred by the Soviet
Union to specific countries.
.
CHECHNYA
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10. (C) The Russians have consistently portrayed the conflict
in Chechnya as international terrorism, not a
nationalist/separatist insurgency. Ironically, they have
defeated the Chechen insurgency but have spurred wider
Islamist movements in the North Caucasus. Chechen Prime
Minister (and strongman) Ramzan Kadyrov, like his father, has
successfully improved security within Chechnya by attracting
rebel fighters away from the insurgency and into his
militias. Remaining Chechen separatist fighters -- and
Islamists from the rest of the North Caucasus -- have formed
a Jihadist movement with ties to international networks that
seeks to establish an Islamic state throughout the region.
The deaths of Chechen separatist leaders Abdul Khalim
Saidullayev and Shamil Basayev -- orchestrator of Beslan,

among other terrorist attacks -- were critical setbacks for
the insurgency, which now lacks a charismatic leader.


11. (C) The Russians have not addressed the issue of
recruitment into the Jihadist movements, which is fueled by
economic hardship and the repressive policies (especially
against religion) of local authorities in the North Caucasus.
The British engaged the Russians on Muslim outreach as part
of their CT dialogue. The Russians appeared interested, but
there has been no follow-up yet. One factor constraining
further U.S.-GOR cooperation is residual skepticism within
the security services over U.S. intentions in the North
Caucasus, and suspicion that the U.S. welcomes the weakening
of Russian state authority in this region.
.
COMMENT
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12. (C) While cooperation remains uneven across the CTWG
issue areas, there are areas where progress has been made.
We continue to believe that an emphasis on accomplishing
specific tasks -- in the first place through the Action Plan
-- is the right approach. The CTWG is most valuable when it
spurs the sort of working-level contacts that we have on a
regular basis with our closest partners. We are not there
yet with the Russians, but the CTWG is the most promising
means we have to encourage practical cooperation in the fight
against global terrorism.
BURNS