Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW9823
2006-09-06 13:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN MFA ON HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Tags:  PREL MOPS GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009823 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009823

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON HELICOPTER INCIDENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Following the September 3 firing on a
Georgian military helicopter over South Ossetia, the
Ambassador contacted DFM Karasin to highlight the danger
posed by the incident and to urge Russia to use its influence
with the South Ossetians to prevent its repetition. Karasin
acknowledged the incident was a serious matter and urged that
all sides avoid an overreaction. German, French and UK
envoys told the Ambassador they are also asking Russia to
take steps to lower tensions. MFA officials continue to
argue to us that the helicopter flight was provocative and
violated cease-fire protocols, but recognize that the
shooting has created a dangerous situation. They say they
are urging South Ossetian authorities to act with restraint.
Russia is likely to use the JCC meeting tentatively scheduled
for mid-September to repeat Russian claims, but GOR officials
might also suggest clarifications to the protocol regulating
over-flights of South Ossetia to avoid another such incident.
End Summary.
.
GOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS
--------------


2. (SBU) General Marat Kulakhmetov, the Russian commander
of the Joint Peacekeeping Force, provided an initial Russian
reaction September 4 by claiming that the over-flight and
attack on the helicopter were both violations of existing
cease-fire agreements. Later that day, the MFA spokesman
Mikhail Kamynin provided a more one-sided response. After
providing details of the incident, he said that the Georgian
actions were a "provocation" aimed at undermining the peace
process and were an attempt to seek alternative means to
settle the dispute. Ambassador-at-Large for South Ossetia
Yuriy Popov directly blamed the Georgians for provoking the
incident in September 4 comments to the press.
.
DFM KARASIN
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador spoke with DFM Karasin three times
following the September 3 incident. In his conversations
with Karasin, the Ambassador underlined the serious danger
posed by this incident and urged the GOR to do all that it
could to avoid its repetition. Moscow needed to stress to

the South Ossetians that they must exercise restraint.


4. (C) Karasin acknowledged that the Russian government
understood the incident was a serious matter. He said there
was a need by all sides to avoid "political and emotional
reactions" until the facts were clear. He appreciated U.S.
efforts to urge restraint. In a later conversation, Karasin
was mildly apologetic about statements to the Russian press
made by Ambassador Popov and reaffirmed that Russia
understood that the shooting had created a serious situation.


5. (C) The German Ambassador told the Ambassador September
6 that Germany's Ambassador-at-Large for the Caucasus had
also urged DFM Karasin in meetings here to use Moscow's
influence with the South Ossetians to lower tensions and
prevent the shooting incident from spinning out of control.
The British and French Ambassadors also said on September 6
that they would soon be approaching the Foreign Ministry with
similar messages. (Note: The Germans also warned Karasin
against trying to include language about the Kodori Gorge
operation in the upcoming rollover of the UNOMIG mandate. In
turn, Karasin signaled Russian opposition to the deployment
of civilian police in Gali. End Note.)
.
MFA CIS DIRECTOR KELIN
--------------


6. (C) Russian MFA 4th CIS (Caucasus) Department Director
Andrey Kelin told us in a September 5 meeting that Russia saw
the helicopter "incursion" and the shooting as "gross
violations" of the rules governing military activity in the
Zone of Conflict (ZOC). Tracing the supposed route of the
helicopter's flight on a large wall map, Kelin argued that
the helicopter had looped around a large area in the ZOC and
had not just incidentally crossed over the ZOC en route to
western Georgia. He said the flight was a clear
demonstration by Georgia designed to provoke a reaction from
South Ossetian forces. As an aside, he claimed it was not
even clear whether Georgian MOD Okruashvili was actually
onboard the aircraft when the firing occurred.


7. (C) We stressed U.S. concerns about the dangers posed by
the shooting and reiterated the need for restraint,
encouraging the GOR to urge the South Ossetians to take
immediate steps to lower tensions. Kelin acknowledged that
the South Ossetians should use the JCC to register protests
about alleged violations of prior agreements rather than

MOSCOW 00009823 002 OF 002


resort to force. He said the Russian government had already
told the South Ossetians they must exercise restraint, but he
argued that Tskhinvali viewed the helicopter flight in the
context of Georgian operations in the Kodori Gorge and
Tbilisi's efforts to "sabotage" the Joint Control Commission.


8. (C) Kelin said that the JCC was likely to meet in
mid-September, but the venue and exact dates had not been
finalized and might be pushed off by the South Ossetians.
Kelin was headed for Tbilisi on September 6 for a previously
scheduled meeting with his Georgian MFA counterparts to
discuss Georgia's interest in joining NATO. According to
Kelin, Georgia had taken the initiative to invite the
Russians to discuss NATO. Kelin was unaware of any plans for
First DFM Denisov to meet with his counterpart or for
Presidents Putin and Saakashvili to meet in the future.
.
NEXT STEPS
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Popov told us September 6 that he still
expected the JCC to meet soon, perhaps in Tskhinvali on
September 13-14. He had been discussing the timing of the
next meeting with his Georgian counterpart, DFM Antadze, on
September 3, shortly before hearing about the shooting. He
noted that he had not been in contact with Georgian officials
since learning about the incident.


10. (C) Popov said that the GOR obviously would raise the
incident at the next JCC meeting, and said that once all
sides were able to ventilate, he expected the JCC to focus on
the "ambiguous" language in the 2002 protocol governing
over-flights. Popov acknowledged that protocolary language
about "unauthorized" flights being a danger to peace begged
the question since the JCC had never decided which authority
would "authorize" flights. He said the GOR was intensively
studying this issue, but said Moscow was not inclined to
accept Georgian claims that Tbilisi had complete control over
the airspace over South Ossetia. He argued that this was
inconsistent with previous agreements and, if exercised,
might lead to "a disaster."


11. (C) In an earlier conversation, Georgian Political
Counselor George Karlashvili told us that the JCC meeting was
now likely to be held on September 14-16, but in Vladikavkaz,
pending South Ossetian assent. He said that First DFM
Denisov was supposed to travel to Georgia by the end of
September, but the MFA had not yet confirmed dates.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) While initial MFA statements were unhelpful in
lowering tensions, Russian officials clearly recognize that
the shooting incident created a dangerous situation that
could easily veer out of control. We will continue to press
Moscow to engage directly with the South Ossetians to lower
tensions.
BURNS