ABKHAZIA: DFM KARASIN SPELLS OUT TOUGH RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009414

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: ABKHAZIA: DFM KARASIN SPELLS OUT TOUGH RUSSIAN
LINE


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: At his initiative, DFM Karasin on August 28
briefed Western Friends Chiefs of Mission on developments in
Abkhazia, which he had recently visited. He said Georgia's
July operation in the Kodori Gorge was a violation of the
1994 ceasefire agreement and had created a "disbalance" in
the region. He demanded the withdrawal of all Georgian armed
formations from the Gorge. He called Georgia's deployment to
the Gorge of the Government of Abkhazia in Exile a
"provocation" and warned of Abkhazia's "ultimatum-like"
response. He called Georgia's refusal to allow the CIS PKF
to monitor the Gorge a violation of the ceasefire. He noted
the upcoming renewal of UNOMIG's mandate, and said Georgia's
action calls it into question; Russia would favor a statement
on Kodori in any UNSCR (Ambassador later told Karasin
privately that this would be a very complex issue and urged
him to think carefully before setting off down this road).
Karasin called on the Western Friends to recognize that
Abkhazia and South Ossetia were "alarmed" at what they
perceive as a Georgian commitment to resolve the conflicts by
force. He called on Western Friends countries not to aid the
"militarization" of Georgia. Karasin saw no need for a Civil
Police contingent in Gali. End summary.


2. (C) Karasin, with special negotiator Bocharnikov and IV
CIS Department acting Director Tarabrin, received chiefs of
mission from the Western Friends -- U.S., UK, Germany and
France -- on August 28. He expressed Russia's concern over
the situation in the Kodori Gorge, which is "tending to
degrade." He singled out Georgian President Saakashvili's
August 15 instruction to create the infrastructure to
relocate the "Abkhaz Government in Exile" in the Gorge. He
noted that the Abkhaz have said that would be unacceptable,
and have responded with tough, "ultimatum-like" responses
declaring their unwillingness to resume peace negotiations
unless the situation reverted to that before the Georgian
operation. "We cannot ignore their attitude," Karasin said.


3. (C) Karasin stated that the May 1994 ceasefire agreement
demanded the withdrawal of all Georgian troops from the
Kodori Gorge. He stressed that this applied to all Georgian
armed formations (i.e., Interior Ministry forces as well as
MOD). Karasin noted that the UNOMIG Chief Military Observer
also believed the Georgian action to be a violation of the
ceasefire. He added that subsequent agreements forbid the
construction of military infrastructure there (the
implication being that some of the construction ordered for
relocating the Government in Exile might be a violation).
Karasin asserted that contrary to notification agreements,
the Georgian side never informed the Abkhaz side of its
intention to carry out the operation.


4. (C) Karasin said that his trip to Sukhumi had convinced
him that the Georgian operation had effected a "substantive
disbalance" in the regional situation. The Georgian demand
that the CIS PKF not participate in monitoring the Upper
Kodori Gorge was a clear violation of Article 4.2 of the 1994
ceasefire, he asserted. The Georgian excuse that the PKF
presence was unacceptable to the local population "does not
withstand critical scrutiny." Rather, new SRSG Arneaud had
stressed the importance of the PKF during his recent visit to
Tbilisi.


5. (C) Karasin reminded the Friends that the UNOMIG mandate
needed renewal by October 15. He questioned whether any
renewal would be worthwhile if Georgian forces do not leave
Kodori. Bocharnikov added that the absence of comment on
Kodori in previous UNSCRs had led to the current situation,
and implied that Russia will demand a statement on Kodori in
the October resolution. (After the meeting, Ambassador
privately told Karasin that Russian concerns could seriously
complicate the process of adopting a UNSCR.)


6. (C) Karasin said that Tbilisi's action to renege on
previous agreements was also noticeable in South Ossetia.
Karasin counted "on your wisdom to tell Georgia that it
cannot resolve these conflicts by force. Rather, it will
destroy what has been accomplished. If we unite our forces,
however, we can facilitate progress in negotiations."
Karasin called on the Friends to understand the Abkhaz
position on non-renewal of hostilities and security
guarantees. He cited the Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination
Council as a hopeful venue, though the "changed
circumstances" might make sessions problematic. At the same
time, the Sochi working groups on IDPs and the railroad had
not exhausted their potential.


7. (C) Karasin said that the opening of a human rights office
in Gali was a positive impulse, but he said he was not
convinced that deployment of a Civil Police contingent would

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aid negotiations. The criminal situation, which has improved
in the past year, does not warrant physical reinforcement of
police structures. Ambassador suggested that the Civil
Police idea deserved further study and might help ease
tensions over time.


8. (C) Karasin said that after normalization of the situation
in the zone of conflict progress might be made on peace
initiatives, including Bagapsh's "Key to the Future and an
analogous paper elaborated in Tbilisi (Comment: He made no
mention of the Boden Paper. End comment). In reply to a
question by the Ambassador, Karasin stressed that the next
step needed to be fostering a greater understanding by both
the Abkhaz and the Georgians of the factors that alarmed each
of them. He feared that the Kodori operation might
strengthen those in Tbilisi who believe that a similar quick,
forceful strike on Abkhazia might end that conflict. He
labeled this a dangerous tendency that made both the Abkhaz
and the South Ossetians nervous. He called on the
international community to demand completely the elimination
of the use of force and the return of the status quo ante in
Kodori. He labeled the relocation of the Government in Exile
a "provocation" to create a second power structure in
Abkhazia, though given that Kodori is inaccessible for eight
months of the year, we would have to wait and see what
happened there in reality. He noted that Russia is
additionally concerned about Kodori because it lies on
Russia's borders.


9. (C) Ambassador replied that international community needed
to continue its efforts to reduce tensions in the region.
Russia also needed to use its influence to restrain the
Abkhaz and calm the situation. The French Charge noted that
Western Governments have urged Tbilisi to show restraint.
Karasin replied that while Georgia listens to Western calls
for restraint, in reality it is engaged in intensive
militarization, buying tanks and howitzers from Central
Europe. Calls for restraint must be accompanied by concrete
measures to prevent militarization. Karasin ended with a
dire warning that under current circumstances public opinion
in Southern Russia (read: the ethnic autonomies of the North
Caucasus) is becoming harder to restrain and is taking on an
increasingly belligerent tone. Karasin called for another
meeting of the Moscow chapter of the friends later in
September, before work started on the new UNSCR.


10. (C) Comment: Russia is trying to regain the initiative
after the success of Georgia's Kodori operation. The Friends
group has rarely met in Moscow, and Karasin appears to want
to ensure that it will start doing so as a counterweight to
the Tbilisi chapter. The aim of his tough message appeared
to be to convert Russian unhappiness about the Georgian
operation into something tangible in a UNSC Resolution. At
the same time, Russia appears to be genuinely concerned that
fighting will break out in Abkhazia as hard-liners gain in
strength in Tbilisi and the Abkhaz become harder to control.
That would force a change in the status quo, and change in
any direction threatens Russian interests.
BURNS