Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW7385
2006-07-12 11:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S GEORGIA POLICY: "THE CAUCASUS BENEATH ME"

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6378
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #7385/01 1931108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121108Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8830
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 007385 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S GEORGIA POLICY: "THE CAUCASUS BENEATH ME"

REF: A. MOSCOW 7340 AND PREVIOUS B. TBILISI 1647 AND
PREVIOUS C. OSC CEP20060702950094

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 007385

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S GEORGIA POLICY: "THE CAUCASUS BENEATH ME"

REF: A. MOSCOW 7340 AND PREVIOUS B. TBILISI 1647 AND
PREVIOUS C. OSC CEP20060702950094

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Russia's policies towards Georgia are the product of
three factors: anger unleashed by perceptions of betrayal
and disrespect, fear of encirclement by a West intent on
dismembering Russia's conception of the "Post-Soviet space,"
and solidarity with the separatist Abkhaz and South
Ossetians, especially among their ethnic kin in the North
Caucasus and among the Russian military. Those three factors
do not produce a coherent policy which might, for example,
promote the growth of Russian economic preponderance within a
Georgia that, like Azerbaijan or Armenia, balances between
Russia and the West. Instead, childish exchanges of rhetoric
are punctuated by hostile acts, whether centrally ordered
(such as the bans on Georgian wine and mineral water) or not.


2. (C) Russian policymakers see separatist conflicts as their
strongest lever in dealing with Saakashvili's government,
which they universally view as belligerent, amateurish, and
out of touch with the Georgian people. But, paradoxically,
that leverage cannot be used, because Russia's over-riding
goal is to preserve the status quo in the conflicts. Russia
has little incentive to seek to resolve the conflicts, even
in exchange for Georgian agreement to drop its NATO
aspirations. Nor will it annex the territories. Some in
Russia may be tempted to use the conflict lever to oust
Saakashvili, but most Moscow policymakers fear the
consequences. Most Russian officials seem to believe that
Georgia will re-start hostilities in South Ossetia this
summer, and the Russian military is taking steps to counter
that perceived threat to the status quo. Georgian Government
and Parliament action on the PKOs in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia are likely to keep the cycle of rhetoric and tension
rising over the next few months. End Summary.

Paradise Lost
--------------

"Some years ago,
There, where the currents

Of the Aragvi and the Kura flow together,
Embracing like two sisters..."

Lermontov, "Mtsyri"


3. (C) No issue engages Russian emotions (as opposed to state
interest) as much as Georgia. While Russians look at two
centuries of Georgians from Bagration to Stalin as integral
to Russia's history, to Georgians those two centuries
represent just the latest episode in over two millennia of
transient alien occupations to be survived with charm and
cunning. The "spoiled child of the Russian Empire," as one
Georgian put it, Georgia was enshrined in the Russian soul as
a playground where the northerner could relax at song-filled
feasts, enjoying the companionship of the friendly natives,
drinking endless toasts to each other in Georgia's prized
wine, beaker after hedonistic beaker full of the warm South.
As the Georgian Ambassador here put it, the Georgians always
told the Russians how much they loved them, "and they
actually believed us." What a betrayal, then, when the
Georgians pushed the Russians away and started feasting with
none other than the Americans! As one Russian general said
grumpily when the first American trainers arrived to
implement the Georgia Train and Equip Program, "The Americans
think they will teach the Georgians to fight. In reality,
the Georgians will teach the Americans to sing."


4. (C) That was under Shevardnadze, for whom the Russians had
nothing but loathing -- "liar" and "swindler" were among
their more polite labels for him. All that is forgotten, and
Russians now remember him as a "statesman" and a "real
politician" -- in comparison with his successor, Mikheil
Saakashvili. This change has more to do with Saakashvili's
personality than his policies. If anything, he is more
straightforward and honest with the Russians than
Shevardnadze was. But it is clear that Putin thinks of
Saakashvili as a disrespectful punk (though an entertaining
conversationalist),and words of conventional wisdom here
describe Saakashvili as "unpredictable," "irrational,"
"emotional," and "incapable of thinking ahead." The Russian
political class is convinced that Saakashvili is out of touch
with the Georgian people, to whom, they claim, he has failed
to deliver good government and economic improvement.

Empire Lost
--------------

MOSCOW 00007385 002 OF 004




5. (C) Though Saakashvili's foreign and security goals are
not so different from Shevardnadze's, the times have changed
and Georgia has come much farther towards reaching those
goals, including NATO membership. At the same time, Russia
has seen its position within the region deteriorate. A wave
of hysteria has swept Russia that the U.S. fomented both the
Orange and Rose revolutions to encircle Russia with hostile
regimes and NATO bases, and Russian pundits warn that the
U.S. (and George Soros) now have Russia in their sights.
Although Ukraine's NATO prospects engage Russia's state
interests more, Saakashvili and his vocal sidekick DefMin
Okruashvili are the incarnate bogeymen of the Color Scare.
Beyond the popular hyperventilation, there is consensus among
Russia's political class that the country's security is
threatened by "Orange technologies" emanating from
Washington, and that Russia must defend itself along the
border of the former Soviet Union -- the architecture of the
"Post-Soviet Space" must stay intact to keep Russia whole and
free of foreign domination.

Brethren Regained
--------------


6. (C) The restive North Caucasus is a haven of support for
anti-Georgian separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
That affects Russian policy as a whole, especially as the
North Caucasus is a center of Russian policy incoherence.
North Ossetia, the linchpin of Russia's hopes for stability
in the North Caucasus, is not anxious to integrate the
heavily armed Southerners, whose economy has been dominated
by criminality for the last 15 years. But North Ossetia will
oppose any Georgian attempt to reintegrate South Ossetia --
and the North's importance to stability will make Russia
listen. The Adyg peoples -- Kabardians, Cherkess and Adyge
-- are ethnic cousins to the Abkhaz and fought against
Georgia in the Abkhaz separatist struggle (the Abkhaz defense
minister is a Kabardian). They, too, will oppose Russian
concessions to Georgia, and the growing Islamist insurgencies
in those republics will tend to dissuade Russia from making
such concessions, which would predictably weaken the
pro-Moscow leaderships. The Russian military, too, supports
the separatists, in part because Abkhazia was always a
vacation spot for the generals, and the shrinking Russian
military presence abroad has left fewer such opportunities
for deployment in lucrative postings.

Lurching Towards Policy
--------------


7. (C) The nostalgic hostility, fear of NATO encirclement,
and North Caucasus concerns do not allow Russia a consistent
set of goals in dealing with Georgia. Russia's one true
security goal -- neutralizing a perceived western containment
-- should lead Russia to treat Georgia as it does Armenia and
Azerbaijan, allowing it to balance its western and Russian
relations while ensuring it does no real damage to Russian
interests; all the while increasing Russia's investment and
share of trade. But Russia has never pursued this goal
single-mindedly, instead embroiling itself in separatist
conflicts that appease the North Caucasians, the military,
and the lunatic fringe of neo-Imperialists in Moscow.


8. (C) This has given the separatists and the emotion-driven
an inordinate say in Russia's policy towards Georgia. Russia
has allowed itself to be drawn into childish shouting matches
with Georgian politicians that often end in Russia having to
show who's got more testosterone by taking some
counter-productive action. A case in point is the ban on
Georgian wine and mineral water. Russian fringe politicians
and Georgian officials call each other names; the Georgians
include the Russian government and Putin in their name
calling; and Russia imposes a ban on Georgian wine. This
engenders a new cycle of name-calling; Georgian DefMin
Okruashvili says Russians can't tell the difference between
wine and "fecal matter," and Russia bans Georgian mineral
water. The net result is that Russia alienates the very
Georgians who most want good relations with Russia --
exporters of products such as wine and mineral water. Wine
alone made up just under 49 percent of Georgian exports to
Russia in 2005.


9. (C) Another case in point is the set of explosions in
southern Russia on January 22 that cut off deliveries of
Russian gas and electricity to Georgia. All we know of the
perpetrators is that they were targeting Georgia and that
they had the reach to conduct simultaneous operations in two
widely-separated points in the North Caucasus. Whether
lunatic fringe or separatist, the perpetrators were enabled
by Russia's atmosphere of hostility to Georgia, support for
the separatists, and policy incoherence and instability in
the North Caucasus. The net result of the explosions was

MOSCOW 00007385 003 OF 004


that Saakashvili had a concrete example to show the Georgian
people that their sufferings did not originate with
government shortcomings in Georgia, but in subversive action
taken in (and, in his view, originating with) Russia.


10. (C) Much publicity has been given to the possibility that
Russia could cut off remittances home from Georgians working
in Russia. Russians tend to view these remittances as a form
of Russian "aid" to Georgia, rather than as part of the
profit made by productive contributors to the Russian
economy. Cutting off remittances would probably be
counterproductive. Nonetheless, future rounds of nasty
rhetoric could lead Russia to cast around for some action to
show its displeasure, and the chattering classes have seized
on this as a way of showing Russia's might.

Supporting the Separatist Status Quo
--------------


11. (C) The status quo in the separatist conflicts over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is optimal, in the Russian view.
Russia controls the two territories, the military is kept
happy, and Georgia's emotions over the regions make them
valuable cards for Russia in dealing with Georgia. Russian
officials have told us that they view the unresolved
conflicts as deterrents against NATO acceptance of Georgian
membership. Since the regions border Russia, NATO would
"have to think twice," an MFA official told us, before
accepting a member which might lead NATO into a conflict with
Russia. Any change would be worse for the Russians, who
would either lose control (if Georgia reimposed sovereignty)
or take on international responsibility and probable
opprobrium (if it annexed the territories, as Georgia accuses
Russia of wanting to do, and as some in Russia recommend; or
if it recognized their independence). Fighting would
threaten the status quo and subject Russia to heavy pressure
from the North Caucasus to annex the regions, something
Moscow (as opposed to Nalchik or Mozdok) would prefer to
avoid.


12. (C) Russian peacekeepers are in place in both separatist
regions. The belief here is that those peacekeepers are all
that stand in the way of war and genocide, and that the
peacekeepers have died to protect the peace. We would also
note that for nearly fifteen years Russian officers have
found their deployments to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia
PKFs to be lucrative, and the Russian military is deeply
committed to remaining in place -- and deeply irritated by
Georgian suggestions that the Russians be replaced by more
neutrally oriented international peacekeepers. As long as
the conflicts remain frozen in the status quo, the Russian
military has a justification for remaining in place;
occasional crises help bolster that justification. The
Russian PKO support for South Ossetia's reaction to Georgia's
July 9 closure of its de facto border with South Ossetia --
in retaliation for the July 8 Russian closure of its border
with Georgia -- showed a willingness to inflame a crisis.


13. (C) The need to preserve the status quo means Russia will
not, in our view, engage in a good faith effort to resolve
the separatist conflicts. It also means that Russia would
probably not hand the regions back to Georgia, even in
exchange for Georgia giving up its NATO aspirations. Though
Lavrov (but not Putin) has dangled that deal before
Saakashvili, no Russian could trust Georgia not to revive its
NATO aspirations at a later date, nor could Putin deliver
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia without risking a major
explosion in the North Caucasus.


14. (C) Some in Russia will be tempted to welcome a Georgian
resort to fighting in South Ossetia -- or even to engineer it
themselves -- as a means of ousting Saakashvili. They would
reason that fighting would spread to Abkhazia under the pact
reached by Kokoity and Bagapsh in Sukhumi June 14. Abkhaz
and Ossetians could displace tens of thousands of Georgians
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (a reprise of May 1998 in
Abkhazia). This demonstration of Saakashvili's inability to
defend the people might lead to a popular uprising against
him. However, the Russians have no candidate to take
Saakashvili's place, and they would be forced to annex or
otherwise take responsibility for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On balance, Moscow would probably reject such an operation.
As Russia's special negotiator for South Ossetia Yuriy Popov
told us June 30, "Saakashvili gets under our skin ... but we
like him right where we've got him." However, the January 22
explosions are a worrying precedent. Some -- possibly
separatists in South Ossetia or Abkhazia -- have shown that
they are willing to start action whose consequences the GOR
has to live with. In June, Georgian authorities foiled a
plot to assassinate an opposition political leader.
Georgians charge that the alleged perpetrator, an Ossetian
from Georgia resident in North Ossetia, was tasked by unnamed

MOSCOW 00007385 004 OF 004


special services with carrying out the assassination to
destabilize Georgia by making it appear as though the
Saakashvili administration were behind it.


15. (C) The high level of tension -- and of mutual suspicion
-- could also lead to an "August 1914" scenario of sides
slipping into conflict despite themselves. Popov told us
June 30 that Russian intelligence was reporting that
Saakashvili had ordered his forces to engage in "small
provocative attacks" against the Russian PKF in South Ossetia
(he added that the same analysts believed the U.S. was
encouraging the Georgians to take such action). Popov
pointed to Georgian deployments to mixed villages in South
Ossetia (he had just come back from a meeting in Tskhinvali
between the Georgian and South Ossetian Interior Ministers to
resolve the issue),other reinforcements in the region, and
military exercises. The Russian military, he said, was
prepared to counter the perceived threat, deploying itself
"to be ready to counter any contingency." We pointed out to
Popov that the Georgian military was likely to perceive the
new Russian deployments as a threat, and would also deploy
itself to counter "any contingency," leading to a cycle of
increased military confrontation.

Dialogue and Its Background
--------------


16. (C) The June 13 conversation between Putin and
Saakashvili did not produce concrete results, but the fact of
dialogue was a damper to tensions. The Tskhinvali meeting
between MinInt Merabishvili and "MinInt" Mindzayev did
produce some results, including a commitment for the two men
to meet monthly. Saakashvili is due in Moscow July 21 for an
informal CIS summit. On June 13, he and Putin discussed
holding a bilateral meeting on the margins.


17. (C) The meetings may have new fires to put out, however.
The Georgian parliament is expected imminently to take action
on the Government's February 15 report about the Russian PKF
in South Ossetia. DefMin Okruashvili recently urged
Parliament to demand the withdrawal of the PKF (Ref. C).
(DFM Karasin drily noted to U/S Burns and EUR/AS Fried on
June 28 that the PKF was not in South Ossetia at the
invitation of the Georgian Parliament or Government, and
would not leave at their unilateral behest). On July 15 the
GoG is due to report to the Georgian Parliament on the CIS
(read Russian) PKF in Abkhazia, starting the cycle of tension
there. It was in expectation of those actions that the
"Presidents" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia met June 6 in
Vladikavkaz and again June 14 in Sukhumi (with Transnistria
leader Smirnov) to announce a mutual security pact to counter
Georgian "aggression" against the peacekeepers.


18. (C) With these events forcing tensions higher, dialogue
becomes even more of a necessity -- just to keep the
situation from going further downhill; real improvement is a
long way off. Emotion towards Georgia and pressures over the
separatist conflicts have disbalanced Russia's policy (itself
none too clear). On the conflicts, the center is caught --
between the demands of Georgia and the West to work towards
resolution, and the demands of the separatists and military
to pursue annexationist policies. The center wants neither
of these options, and would prefer to steer a course between
the two. However, Russia's emotions towards Georgia make
even that option murky, and without dialogue to dampen
emotions the cycle of childish rhetoric and pointless hostile
actions will continue. The U.S. can best contribute by
promoting that dialogue and letting the Georgians and
Russians talk face to face.
BURNS