Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW7118
2006-07-06 07:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN DFM ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES

Tags:  PREL MARR PARM UNSC KN RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #7118 1870731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060731Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8513
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2600
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0254
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 007118 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES

REF: STATE 111132

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 007118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PARM UNSC KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM ON DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES

REF: STATE 111132

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche July 6 to
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Alekseyev.
Alekseyev said he was in absolute agreement that it was very
important to send the North Koreans a strong and clear signal
of the unacceptability of their missile launches. He had
delivered that message clearly himself the day before to DPRK
Ambassador Pak. Moscow had, however, "some reservations"
about imposing sanctions on the DPRK, a view Alekseyev said
Foreign Minister Lavrov had conveyed directly to the
Secretary when they spoke the previous day. Russia did not

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oppose sanctions in principle, Alekseyev stressed, but he
said Moscow doubted they would have the desired practical
effect.


2. (C) Alekseyev said he has been in close touch with both
the Chinese and the South Koreans and had stressed to both
the critical role they would have in delivering the message
to the DPRK. He said both he and Lavrov have urged the
Chinese to be direct with the North Koreans: to tell them
that actions they believe give them tactical advantage
actually have precisely the reverse effect. Alekseyev
acknowledged the difficulty of dealing with the North
Koreans' "different psychology," which caused them to react
inappropriately when they felt they were being ignored. He
was pleased to hear that EAP A/S Hill would be in the region
and hoped A/S Hill would be able to reinforce directly with
the Chinese the "critical role" they have in delivering the
message to the DPRK. Alekseyev said Russia did not have much
leverage with the North Koreans, but China and the ROK both
did.


3. (C) The Ambassador reviewed with Alekseyev the dates of
A/S Hill's proposed travel to Moscow. Alekseyev said he
would be very happy to receive A/S Hill, but would be
traveling to Mongolia on July 11-12 for the 800th anniversary
events. He said he would be available in Moscow all day on
July 13, but would depart again that evening for St.
Petersburg for G-8 Summit preparations.
BURNS