OUT AS PROCURATOR GENERAL, USTINOV RETURNS AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006762

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2014
TAGS: PGOV RS
SUBJECT: OUT AS PROCURATOR GENERAL, USTINOV RETURNS AS
JUSTICE MINISTER

REF: A. MOSCOW 6547

B. MOSCOW 6268

C. MOSCOW 5934

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine,
for reasons 1.4 (B & D)


1. (U) On June 23 President Putin nominated Vladimir Ustinov
-- who on June 2 had been removed from his prior position as
Procurator General -- to be Minister of Justice. In his new
position Ustinov succeeds former Justice Minister Yuriy
Chayka, who on June 19 was named as Ustinov's successor as
Procurator General. In effect, Ustinov and Chayka have
simply exchanged jobs, and some journalists have concluded
that the changes carry less political significance than had
initially been believed at the time of Ustinov's removal as
Procurator General.


2. (C) Most Russian analysts do not share that conclusion.
While commentators here are continuing publicly and privately
to mine the appointments for insights into the succession
process, the primary conclusions currently being drawn here
include that:

- The changes reemphasize that at least at the current phase
of the succession process, Putin retains his role as (in the
words of the Center for Political Technologies) "the demiurge
of Russian politics." None of Putin's three decisions -- to
remove Ustinov as Procurator General, to appoint Chayka in
his place, and to appoint Ustinov as Justice Minister -- was
widely expected, and Putin has not felt constrained to
provide even post-factum explanations for any of the moves.
Some speculate that as the succession process moves forward
and its uncertainties drive increasingly sharp competition
among members of Putin's entourage, he will repeatedly need
to act in a similar fashion to discipline "competitive
excesses" and restore the balance he wants to maintain.

- The job of Minister of Justice is a reponsible and
respected position, but in terms of power it is a clear step
down in the Russian system from the Procurator General, who
has traditionally had far more levers at his disposal (as
figures from Gusinskiy and Berezovskiy to Khodorkovskiy can
confirm from their personal experience). Almost no one here
would dispute that Ustinov has been taken down a peg by
Putin, and that by extension the "siloviki" group of which
Ustinov has been a leading figure has also taken a hit. That
impression is only strengthened by the two-week delay during
which Putin kept Ustinov twisting slowly, slowly in the wind
before announcing his new assignment. It is not clear
whether Putin's failure to immediately announce Ustinov's
follow-on assignment was part of a disciplining process, or
whether internal forces within the leadership group had any
influence on Ustinov's eventual nomination as Justice
Minister.

- By concluding the episode with the naming of Ustinov as
Minister of Justice (rather than as a Presidential
Representative in some remote area of Russia or as a diplomat
abroad),Putin has sent the message that Ustinov had not
irreparably blotted his copybook. While taken down a peg, he
remains a member of Putin's team. Some commentators regard
this as confirmation (a) that Putin tends to display loyalty
to his team and is loathe to fire any team member outright,
(b) that the balance that Putin wanted to restore among the
competing groups required only a measured take-down of a
silovik, not an outright purge, and/or (c) that Putin's team
in fact has a very thin bench, with few quality replacements
available to step up into major assignments, forcing Putin
periodically to recycle familiar faces into new positions,
rather than bring in fresh blood.

- Russia is a country of weak institutions, and the key
relationships are personal, not institutional. It is not
inevitable that the Justice Ministry under Ustinov will be as
peripheral an institution as it was under Chayka, or that the
Procuracy General under Chayka will be as strong as it was
under Ustinov. It will be at least initially assumed,
however, that any politically relevant assertiveness of the
Procuracy under Chayka will be steered directly by Putin,
whereas many believed that Ustinov was at times pursuing his
own agenda or that of the "siloviki" corporately in his
actions as Procurator General.

- How vigorously Ustinov may try to remain a leading
political figure and to expand the influence of his new
Ministry will depend in part on how he has read the meaning
of Putin's action. If he understands that he has in essence
been told to lower his profile and look more directly to
Putin for instructions, he may remain for some time in the
background. The commentator Aleskey Zudin remarked that "if

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Ustinov doesn't lower his level of political activity, that
will mean that Putin is losing political strength."

- Since the Justice Minstry has responsibilities, inter
alia, for the registration of political parties -- a
significant area of influence as Russia approaches the 2007
Duma elections and 2008 succession -- as well as of NGOs and
religious organizations, many are already concerned that he
may impose his own views on those new responsibilities.
Independent Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov commented, however,
that the Justice Ministry under Chayka was already
politicized, and Ustinov's appointment would likely bring few
changes. A Kommersant article reported that a source close
to the Kremlin did not rule out that Ustinov's new
responsibilities related to political parties might lead to
increased tensions between two Presidential Administration
deputy heads: Vladislav Surkov, who takes the lead on most
issues relating to political parties, and Igor Sechin, who is
generally seen as the leader of the "silovik" faction and who
has close personal and political ties to Ustinov.

- Some will be looking for changes in the economic as well
as the political sphere. Commentator Stanislav Belkovskiy,
for instance, stressed that the removal of Ustinov from the
Procuracy General means that "Sechin has lost the ability to
use the Procuracy to resolve commercial conflicts." That
could potentially have significant consequences as the
competing groups around Putin fight for property and
financial advantage before the end of his Presidency.

- One apparent loser in the Ustinov/Chayka shuffle is
Presidential Representative to the South District of Russia
Dmitriy Kozak, who many had expected to return to the capital
as Procurator General (and as such become a potential
candidate for the presidential succession) or at least as
Minister of Justice. Kozak may yet return to Moscow in a
responsible position, but Putin clearly passed over an
opportunity to bring him back now in a position for which he
had obvious qualifications.

- Initial expectations or at least hopes that Ustinov's
removal from the Procuracy -- and his speculative replacement
by Kozak -- might mean an intensification of anti-corruption
activities and/or a reform of the Procuracy have been
deflated. There is a sense that, whatver the changes may
mean in terms of intra-leadership competition for power, they
probably will mean very little for anti-corruption or
government reform efforts.


3. (C) The Embassy had only very limited cooperation with
the Ministry of Justice under Yuriy Chayka's leadership, and
we therefore expect Ustinov's appointment to have little
impact in that regard. Most USAID programs in the area of
rule of law are handled directly with the Russian judiciary,
and there too we anticipate little change. Ustinov's
appointment could potentially have an impact on USAID
programs in the area of democratization and support for civil
society if it affected the registration of NGOs, since most
USAID funding in that area is channeled through NGOs. At
this point, however, the NGO community is waiting to see how
implementation of the new NGO law will proceed, and it is not
clear that Ustinov's role in the Ministry will bring
significant changes in that regard.
BURNS