Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW6563
2006-06-21 10:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 211039Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7885
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1049
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0411
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1794
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0214
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006563 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT

REF: A. MOSCOW 5413


B. MOSCOW 5483

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs
Kirk Augustine. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 006563

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER RS IR AF CN KZ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SCO REPRESENTATIVE ON JUNE 15 SUMMIT

REF: A. MOSCOW 5413


B. MOSCOW 5483

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs
Kirk Augustine. Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov
gave us a readout June 20 of the June 15 SCO Summit. He
encouraged the United States to have more dialogue with the
SCO to avoid misunderstandings, perhaps as a formal "dialogue
partner" to the organization. He said Russia and the SCO
have their own misgivings about U.S. intentions in the
region, and acknowledged that more dialogue would be
warranted on that subject as well. Vorobiyov recounted
dissatisfaction expressed by all SCO members, except for
Russia and China, with the performance of the Afghan
government and admitted that no efforts to combat drug flows
from Afghanistan had been particularly successful. Vorobiyov
characterized the summit tasking to develop guidelines for
the admission of new members as a way to appease the current
observers; he thought the guidelines would take years to work
out. He also offered views on Ahmadi-Nejad's performance at
the summit as well as on SCO component organizations. End
summary.

The U.S. Presence
--------------


2. (C) Russian Ambassador-at-Large for the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Vitaliy Vorobiyov discussed
the June 15 Shanghai Summit and SCO developments with us on
June 20. The USG's repeated demarches in the lead-up and the
Secretary's phone call to Chinese FM Li hours before the

SIPDIS
summit gave Vorobiyov the impression throughout the event
that the United States was a silent "eleventh participant,"
he told us only half in jest. He said the U.S. ought to find
ways to talk with the SCO directly as an organization. He
understood that the USG would not be seeking observer status
in the organization at this time, but thought that the
concept of a "dialogue partner" might be developed and might
be appropriate for the U.S. He said that SCO members were

eager for more dialogue with the U.S., and a report that SCO
SYG Zhang distributed on his recent meeting with Ambassador
Randt in Beijing had been very well received. Vorobiyov was
pleased that Zhang and Amb. Randt had agreed to continue
talking.

Strengthening the Secretariat
--------------


3. (C) Vorobiyov thought that the decision taken at the
summit to strengthen the authority of the Secretariat would
make interlocutors take it more seriously. He showed us the
resume of incoming SYG Bolat Nurgaliyev, the current Kazakh
Ambassador to Japan, whose election to the post had been
approved at the summit. Vorobiyov said he did not know
Nurgaliyev, but his past posts as ambassador to both the
United States and to various East and South Asian countries
made him a well-qualified choice.

Misunderstandings
--------------


4. (C) Vorobiyov was concerned that there was still much
misunderstanding in the U.S. about the SCO's intentions, and
cited reports he had seen in the Western press of U.S.
lawmakers giving voice to those misunderstandings (he was not
specific about which lawmakers or which comments). He
emphasized that the SCO is and will remain a transparent
organization, eager for dialogue.


5. (C) We pointed out the emphasis of Russian press reports
about the summit on its alleged anti-American character,
including Putin's comments that Russia opposed "the
duplication of organizations, unnecessary competition, and
establishment of closed clubs" in the region. Vorobiyov said
the idea had taken hold in circles within the Russian and
other SCO member governments that the U.S. remained intent on
establishing new regional organizations that were intended to
exclude Russia and China. He said Putin had raised these
concerns with both the President and Secretary. The concerns
had been around for several years, but only now did some
believe that the alleged U.S. plans had become official USG
policy and had begun to be operationalized. He cited the
"Greater Central Asia Initiative" as an attempt to "mix the
problems of Central Asia with those of Afghanistan and South
Asia." Vorobiyov said the concerns were shared by the SCO as
an organization, so it had to react by opposing them in the
summit declaration. He stressed that the declaration
reference had been indirect, in order that it not be viewed
as confrontational


6. (C) We told Vorobiyov that the U.S. had no plans to
establish duplicative or exclusionary structures in Central
Asia. Our efforts, for instance, to combat narcotics
trafficking through the region were inclusive and focused on
a widely shared goal. Vorobiyov agreed that fighting drugs
traffic was a "tremendously difficult" endeavor, and that no
one may even sufficiently understand how to go about it, much
less be able to reduce the flow. We told him that the "Paris
2 Moscow 1" conference, to be convened later this month in
Moscow under G-8 auspices, would be useful for coordinating
efforts and deconflicting. Vorobiyov did not argue with U.S.
plans for economic development ideas in Central Asia, saying
each country could make up its own mind about its interests.

Afghanistan
--------------


7. (C) Vorobiyov was not specific about when the SCO's
long-planned Afghanistan Contact Group would be on the
ground. He said its mandate would be to involve itself with
"all forces" in the country. Vorobiyov noted that President
Karzai had drawn open criticism at the summit from all SCO
members -- except for Russia and China -- for the failures of
Afghan authorities to maintain control. Karzai had "said
words in defense, maybe defensively" about his government's
efforts. Vorobiyov thought the criticism would persist.

New Members
--------------


8. (C) Commenting on the leaders' tasking to ministers
during the summit to develop guidelines and procedures for
the admittance of new members to the organization, Vorobiyov
said that it was simply a bureaucratic exercise to show that
it was taking requests for new members seriously. Among the
current observers, only Pakistan had formally requested
admission, but Vorobiyov doubted the Pakistanis had a clear
idea of what membership meant. He related that President
Musharraf had cited only three of the SCO Charter's numerous
paragraphs before pronouncing that the organizations terms
were acceptable. While the other observers had not filed
formal membership applications, Vorobiyov reported that Iran
was "actively sounding out" the possibility, and there had
been "heavy hints" from India. Despite the new tasking, he
said the membership admission guidelines would take years to
develop. In the meantime, the SCO was looking for ways to
involve the observers more deeply in the organization.

Iran
--------------


9. (C) Vorobiyov provided his impressions of Ahmadi-Nejad's
summit appearance. He was not surprised that the Iranian
chose not to use strong or inflammatory rhetoric at either
the summit plenary of in his press appearance. What did
surprise Vorobiyov, he related, was that Ahmadi-Nejad spoke
so "smoothly," as though he were signaling that he could be
"constructive," and not always "narrow-minded." An
unidentified Central Asian friend pointed out to Vorobiyov
that Ahmadi-Nejad was using "strange literary language" and
that the "Shiite influence on his mentality" was obvious. He
did not discount that the Iranian's choice of language may
have been intended to show that he was not speaking for
domestic consumption.

SCO-Affiliated Bodies
--------------


10. (C) Vorobiyov touched briefly on the SCO Business
Council and Interbank Union -- both formally inaugurated at
the Shanghai summit -- and the Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure (RATS). The Business Council and Interbank Union
were both intended to be nongovernmental bodies that followed
only general official guidelines. The "Scientific-Expert
Forum" launched in Moscow in May (ref B) was meant to operate
the same way. The SCO hoped that the Council and Union would
consult with and make recommendations to member governments
and the Secretariat to fulfill the SCO's 2020 goal of free
movement of capital and technology within the SCO space.
Vorobiyov added that bringing together businessmen and
bankers in an informal but structured format would spur
concrete cooperative projects. He said the Council was
modeled on a similar forum within APEC.


11. (C) Vorobiyov said the summit-approved changes to the
SCO Charter on the role of the Secretariat would affect the
operations of the RATS. Whereas before, the RATS was an
autonomous body, now its overall budget would be approved by
the Secretariat. The RATS Executive will retain authority
for now on how its funds get spent, but the SCO is also
considering making the Executive formally subordinate to the
SYG. Vorobiyov said RATS members have not all agreed on a
common list of terrorists.
BURNS