RUSSIAN MFA ON PUTIN-SAAKASHVILI TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006535

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PBTS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON PUTIN-SAAKASHVILI TALKS

REF: A) TBILISI 1407 B) TBILISI 1416 C) MOSCOW 6341

Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: The Russian MFA notetaker at the June 13
meeting between Presidents Putin and Saakashvili said the
discussion was a constructive start to dialogue. He stressed
several times that Russia was not a party to any of the
frozen conflicts, and that it was the South Ossetians and
Abkhaz with whom the Georgians needed patiently and
peacefully to work out agreements. The GOR believes,
however, that Georgia is intent upon military action in South
Ossetia. The MFA official noted that unresolved conflicts
could complicate Georgia's bid to join NATO. End Summary.


2. (C) MFA Fourth CIS Department Deputy Director Dmitriy
Tarabrin gave us a readout June 19 of the June 13 meeting
between Putin and Saakashvili, at which Tarabrin was the
Russian notetaker. Tarabrin, a 38-year veteran of the Soviet
and Russian foreign ministries, spent most of his career
working on France and Western Europe. He became deputy for
on Caucasus conflicts and regional issues only six months ago
and will act as director of the Georgia office as well for at
least four months. He confined his readout to sketchy
generalities and platitudes. Russian participants in the
Putin-Saakashvili meeting were President Putin, FM Sergey
Lavrov, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Sergey Prikhodko
and Tarabrin; on the Georgian side were President
Saakashvili, FM Gela Bezhuashvili, Amb. Irakli Chubinishvili
and, taking notes, Presidential Assistant Nato Kancheli.


3. (C) Tarabrin said the meeting was constructive, the
conversation frank but polite. Putin led off by deploring
the current state of Russian-Georgian relations. Saakashvili
responded that Georgia wanted a good neighbor to the north,
not "the sea" (i.e., open space). Putin answered with a list
of ways in which Russia was helping Georgia: as Georgia's
main trading partner, chief energy supplier, origin of USD
1.5 to 2 billion in remittances to Georgia, and participant
in restructuring Georgia's international debt.


4. (C) Saakashvili's main agenda item was frozen conflicts,
Tarabrin said. Most of the discussion was focused on South
Ossetia, with Abkhazia mentioned only briefly. Saakashvili
maintained that the territorial integrity of Georgia was his
main concern. If this issue were resolved, all others would
fall into place. Putin responded that Russia supported the
principle of territorial integrity. However, there was
another principle: self-determination. Any solution would
be a combination of the two principles. Putin called for
patience. "You Georgians want to settle everything all at
once," he said. Instead, Putin counseled taking things step
by step.


5. (C) Tarabrin said Saakashvili maintained Georgia would
grant South Ossetia broad autonomy. Tarabrin added, however,
that public Russian support at this point for Georgian
territorial integrity and South Ossetian autonomy within
Georgia would create big internal problems for Russia. North
Caucasians would consider such a statement a betrayal.
Rather, Tarabrin stressed, Russia was not a party to the
conflict. Only Georgia and South Ossetia were parties to the
conflict, and Russia's role was to help resolve their
differences. Putin, he said, had stressed to Saakashvili
that existing mechanisms were adequate for that task. The
first step must necessarily be the acceptance of a joint
statement on non-use of force to resolve the dispute. This
was needed to create an atmosphere of confidence.


6. (C) To Saakashvili's protests against Russian
annexationist policies Putin gave assurances that Russia had
no claims on Georgian territory. The key to resolution,
Putin reiterated, was patience and renunciation of force.
Tarabrin added that the Russian MFA -- and the "other"
agencies that followed the issue -- believed with absolute
certainty that Georgia was intent upon military action in
South Ossetia. He stressed again that Russia is not a party
to the conflict and that Georgia and South Ossetia must
resolve the dispute between themselves.


7. (C) Tarabrin said that the same held true for Abkhazia.
The Coordinating Council had set up three groups to work on
non-use of force, economic rehabilitation, and return of the
civilian population. Regrettably, these groups had not met.
We noted that Georgia was requesting an international
civilian police contingent to protect the returning civilian
population in Gali. Tarabrin said this was a matter between
Abkhazia and Georgia. Criminality was rife, and the CIS PKF
had begun escorting farmers to market, though this was not
part of its mandate. We reiterated that a permanent solution
needed to be put in place, and Russia should support a CivPol
force. Tarabrin reiterated that the matter was for

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discussion between the Abkhaz and Georgians. If the Abkhaz
accepted such a force, why should Russia object? We noted
that Russia had great influence with the Abkhaz that it could
use to promote the idea. Tarabrin replied that there was
good contact between Georgian negotiator Alasania and Abkhaz
leader Bagapsh; the dialogue must be allowed to work.


8. (C) Tarabrin summed up the meeting as a constructive
beginning to a dialogue to create a new atmosphere. He
maintained that Saakashvili, like Putin, understood that one
meeting could not resolve all outstanding issues between
Russia and Georgia. For example, when Putin pressed
Saakashvili on a counter-terrorism center agreed in the
context of base withdrawals, Saakashvili replied that he was
not against it, but the atmosphere was not yet ripe for such
a move. (Note: Tarabrin did not mention that Saakashvili
agreed to take action to resettle the Meskhetian Turks, and
shook hands with Putin on it. End Note.)


9. (C) We noted to Tarabrin that some Georgians have
concluded that Russia would not help resolve the frozen
conflicts as long as Georgia maintained its aspirations to
join NATO. Tarabrin professed that Russian policy had no
objections to any country choosing its alliances, and
believed that Georgia would be given a MAP after the Riga
Summit. But, he said, the persistence of unresolved
conflicts would surely make Georgia's NATO accession
difficult "from an objective point of view." Exactly so, we
pointed out. Russia might therefore find unresolved
conflicts useful. Tarabrin strenuously denied that. "That
is not the aim of our policy," he maintained. "It is our
desire to have all those problems resolved. The permanent
conservation of frozen conflicts on our frontiers is not in
our interests."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Most Russian official interlocutors used to stress
that Russia was key to the resolution of the frozen
conflicts. Now, however, there is a new line -- stressed by
Tarabrin and apparently by Putin as well: Russia is not
involved and has no effective levers to influence the
separatists, but will oppose Georgia if -- as the GOR expects
-- Georgia resorts to military means. Saakashvili and
Bezhuashvili (refs a and b) apparently concluded from the
meeting that Georgia's NATO ambitions are the factor driving
Russia's reluctance to resolve the frozen conflicts, implying
a possible trade-off -- as indeed FM Lavrov hinted at the
meeting, according to Georgian Ambassador Chubinishvili.
Chubinishvili stressed, however, that Putin made no proposals
and had no suggestions for the Georgians. Chubinishvili
instead got the strong impression that Putin understands that
the current Georgian government will not trade away its NATO
ambitions and knows there is no point in proposing a trade.
Rather, Chubinishvili believes, Putin fully expects Georgia
to resort to military force in South Ossetia, and is
concentrating on a strong Russian reaction to that challenge,
without regard for the consequences to Georgia.
BURNS