CHECHNYA: DEATH OF SADULLAYEV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006515

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV MARR MOPS PINR RS
SUBJECT: CHECHNYA: DEATH OF SADULLAYEV

Classified By: A/POL Bruce Donahue. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Accounts of the June 17 killing of Chechen
rebel "President" Sadullayev vary, but it was probably a
chance firefight. Reaction has been low-key. Sadullayev's
relevance was more political than military, and his death
will probably have little effect on the rebels' military or
terrorist operations. End Summary.


2. (C) Chechen police killed rebel "President" Abdulhalim
Sadullayev June 17 in a suburb of Argun, in Chechnya.
Accounts of the operation vary widely. Chechen Prime
Minister Ramzan Kadyrov claimed in the press that one of
Sadullayev's companions sold him out for 1500 rubles to buy
narcotics. Kadyrov claimed that Sadullayev had been outside
Chechnya until the previous week and had returned to plan a
terrorist operation. "Kommersant" gave a more believable
account: a construction worker had tipped police off that
there were suspicious-looking bearded men hiding in the house
next to his site. The police, suspecting a cell of fighters
-- but without a clue as to their identity -- sent a large
force which quickly got into a firefight with the men in the
house. Two of the militants succeeded in escaping. When the
firing ended, a body found in the basement was soon
identified as Sadullayev's.


3. (C) Local press commentary has been low-key, with
commentators pointing out that Shamil Basayev wields the real
power among the fighters. Indeed, the fact that Sadullayev
was hiding in Argun is indicative of his irrelevance to the
armed conflict. Argun is where Sadullayev might feel safest
-- it is his home town as well as the seat of his "teyp," or
clan. However, it is in the lowlands and firmly in the
control of Chechen government security forces. Sadullayev's
communication with fighters would have been tenuous.


4. (C) Russian nationalist pundit Sergey Markedonov pointed
out two significant differences between Sadullayev's killing
and that of his predecessor, Aslan Maskhadov, in 2005. When
Maskhadov was killed, he told us, the Western press played it
up. This time, the West was silent: "they are no longer
interested." When Maskhadov was killed the Kremlin also
played it up, and took credit for a great victory. This
time, the only person taking the credit was Ramzan Kadyrov.
In Markedonov's view, the killing represents only further
evidence of the split in the ranks of the separatists:
between those who remain loyal to the rebellion and those who
have pursued separatism by making a deal with the Kremlin --
i.e., Kadyrov.


5. (C) An official of the Presidential Administration told us
that Sadullayev was respected among the fighters because he
never engaged in the factional fighting that characterized
rebel politics. However, he was little known in the rest of
Chechen society. The official said that whoever replaced
Sadullayev would be from Maskhadov's faction, but that would
be irrelevant: "Basayev considers himself the lord of
Chechnya, and will kill Sadullayev's successor the moment he
gets in Basayev's way." More in sorrow than in anger, the
official noted that the desperation of the population and the
"stupidity" of the security services were combining to
strengthen armed Islamic jihadism throughout the North
Caucasus. The Chechen people, he thought, were on the verge
of destruction. Owing to Kremlin policies, they were caught
between Ramzan Kadyrov with his "repellent" cult of
personality and Basayev's murderous radicalism.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) The effects of Sadullayev's death will be more
political than military. Sadullayev's function seems to have
been no more than hortatory -- appearing on the Kavkaz-Tsentr
website and communicating with Chechens promoting the rebel
cause in the West, such as "Foreign Minister" Akhmad Zakayev.
Sadullayev's actual presidential powers appear to have been
minimal and his command of rebel forces theoretical at best.
Sadullayev's "legal" successor is the field commander Doku
Umarov, last seen in a camera-phone video touring the
Caucasian hills with Shamil Basayev. Basayev will continue
to exercise real power through his leadership of the Defense
Council. Umarov will probably continue his operations as
field commander as before. The minimal political role that
Sadullayev played will either lapse or gravitate to Chechens
abroad such as Zakayev and Movladi Udugov.


7. (C) Sadullayev's death may have one other effect. The
rebels have pulled off no spectacular military or terrorist
acts in over a year. This failure has had a negative effect
on their fundraising abilities, especially as they are
competing for funds with Jihadist insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan. On a recent visit to Chechnya, we were told

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that the security services there expect a major terrorist
operation; the insurgents' goal would be to prove they are
still a potent force "and earn their money," as the
Presidential Administration official put it. Our
interlocutors agreed that a spectacular terrorist operation
outside Chechnya would be easier for the rebels to pull off
than a military attack inside Chechnya.
BURNS