SEARCH FOR NEW RUSSIAN PROCURATOR GENERAL OVERLAID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 006268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INL/PRAHAR
DOJ FOR OPDAT (LEHMANN) AND OIA (BURKE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KCRM RS
SUBJECT: SEARCH FOR NEW RUSSIAN PROCURATOR GENERAL OVERLAID
BY KREMLIN POLITICS

REF: MOSCOW 5934

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Over the past week analysts have tried to
read the tea leaves swirling around Vladimir Ustinov's abrupt
June 2 dismissal as Procurator General. Speculation has
largely shifted from the reasons behind his departure to
educated guessing about the effects the choice of his
replacement may have on presidential succession and the
balance of power between competing Kremlin factions. The
dominant view at present is that Ustinov's departure has
weakened the position of Presidential Administration Deputy
head Igor Sechin, who is regarded as the leader of the
so-called "siloviki" faction. Whether the appointment of the
new Procurator General will be intended to establish a "new
balance" in the President's entourage, or will be accompanied
by other substantial firings and appointments, is being hotly
debated in the absence of reliable information. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Observers continue to assess the motivations behind
last week's sudden dismissal of former Procurator General
(PG) Vladimir Ustinov. Among the frequently discussed
theories now being given currency is that Ustinov's departure
was the opening salvo in what could be a broader shake-up of
the GOR cabinet reflecting fault lines within the Kremlin.
That scenario posits that Putin had been unhappy with
Presidential Administration (PA) Deputy Chief Igor Sechin and
the "siloviki" faction, comprised of current and former
security service officials and nominally headed by Sechin.
Most analysts have thought that the siloviki were in the
ascendancy within the Kremlin, gaining greater influence
relative to economic liberalizers. Putin in this view chose
to dismiss Ustinov, a close Sechin ally, to demonstrate
displeasure with silovik overreaching and check the
Sechin-Ustinov tandem before it gained more momentum. Media
reports also speculate that at least four ministers -- Yuriy
Chayka (Justice),German Gref (Economic Development and
Trade),Andrey Fursenko (Education and Science),and Yuriy
Trutnev (Natural Resources) -- could lose their jobs by the
end of the summer as part of an effort to re-balance the
alignment of power between the Kremlin's "liberal" wing,
loosely associated with First Deputy Prime Minister (and
former PA Chief) Dmitriy Medvedev, and Sechin's "siloviki."


3. (C) Some contacts have told us that Ustinov's removal
represents a setback for Sechin and the "siloviki," at least
in the near-term. In this view Medvedev and, perhaps to a
lesser extent, fellow unofficial presidential contender and
Deputy Prime Minister/Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov were
principal beneficiaries of the development, in part because a
clipping of Sechin's wings would limit his ability to
undermine their presidential chances. (Some analysts believe
Sechin has been working against both Sergey Ivanov and
Medvedev as presidential succession candidates in order to
convince Putin that he has "no choice" but to remain in power
beyond 2008. Any weakening of Sechin's influence, in this
analysis, reinforces the notion that Putin genuinely intends
to step down in 2008.) Our contacts explained that Putin had
become concerned with the growing influence of the
"siloviki," citing their role, e.g., in last month's transfer
of the Federal Customs Service from Gref's ministry to the
office of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, a member of the
"siloviki" wing. Our contacts were not sure to whether
Ustinov's removal was also tied to the government's recently
announced anti-corruption campaign.


4. (C) The selection of Ustinov's successor will also have
direct implications for Kremlin politics. Dmitriy Kozak and
Aleksandr Konovalov, PolPreds for the Southern and Volga
Districts respectively, are still considered front-runners,
but "Kommersant" has quoted unidentified sources as
indicating that those two are not in fact on Putin's
shortlist. However that may be, Kozak's appointment as
Procurator General (PG) would bring him back to Moscow and
undoubtedly lead many to conclude that he had joined Medvedev
and Sergey Ivanov as succession front-runners. Meanwhile,
Duma Deputy Aleksandr Lebedev speculated to the Ambassador
that Viktor Cherkesov, Director of the Federal
Counter-Narcotics Service, is another possible contender.
According to Lebedev, Cherkesov has close ties to Putin, is
not associated with Sechin or the "siloviki," and is "due for
a change" in position, Lebedev said.


5. (C) Other names being floated as possible successors
include Chayka, who previously held the job in an acting

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capacity, Acting PG Yuriy Biryukov, and two Deputy PG's --
Yuriy Zolotov in the Urals Federal District and Valentin
Simuchenkov in the Siberian Federal District. The latter two
are considered politically neutral. Some predict that Putin
will announce the new PG personally a few days before the
next session of the Federation Council on June 23, when the
chosen candidate can be confirmed by that body.


6. (C) COMMENT. The choice of Ustinov's successor will be
seen first and foremost through the prism of succession
politics. If Kozak -- or Cherkesov -- were selected as the
new PG, observers would regard either as having been jumped
into the running for the presidency, with reform of the
procuracy a test he must handle successfully, just as
Medvedev is seen as being tested by his handling of the
national priority projects and Ivanov by his management of
the military and military-industrial complex. Konovalov is
identified by many as "Medvedev's man," and his appointment
would be read as a sign Medvedev is in the ascendancy.
Appointment of a technocratic figure not known to be linked
to any of the perceived succession "heavyweights" would spur
speculation about whether the Procuracy was being taken out
of politics or simply made more responsive to direct
management by Putin. With the President's proclivity to make
unexpected personnel decisions (e.g., the appointment of
Fradkov as Prime Minister in 2004),no one is confident which
way Putin will choose to tilt the gameboard.
BURNS