Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW6173
2006-06-08 11:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

NGO REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS 
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VZCZCXRO2038
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #6173/01 1591118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081118Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7356
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 006173 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS
SUBJECT: NGO REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION
OF NEW LAW


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4
(b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 006173

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID KDEM RS
SUBJECT: NGO REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION
OF NEW LAW


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4
(b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. DRL Deputy Assistant Secretary Erica
Barks-Ruggles discussed the controversial NGO law and the
broader human rights and democracy situation in Russia with a
range of NGO representatives on May 30-31. She expressed
support for NGOs in Russia and asked about current trends for
civil society in light of the new law. The universally
worried NGO representatives expressed concern about the
vagueness of the law, particularly with regard to groups
perceived to be involved in "political activities," and
believed that it would be used selectively against
organizations to which the Kremlin objected. They agreed
that such a crackdown would likely begin only after the G-8
Summit and that several groups would likely be targeted as
examples to increase pressure on others to self-censor. Some
representatives said that involving the Public Chamber more
in their activities would strengthen their organizations'
ability to survive in the current environment, while others
were wary of working with that Kremlin-sponsored institution.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During a May 30-31 visit to Moscow, DRL Deputy
Assistant Secretary Erica Barks-Ruggles held meetings with a
range of NGO representatives to discuss the controversial NGO
law as well as the broader human rights and democracy
challenges in Russia. Participants included:

Yelena Abrosimova, IREX
Manana Aslamazyan, Internews
Allison Gill, Human Rights Watch
Joe Johnson, International Republican Institute (IRI)
Gillian McCormak, Internews
Mary O'Hagan, National Democratic Institute (NDI)
Tatyana Raguzina, American Chamber of Commerce
Grigoriy Shvedov, Memorial
Aleksey Simonov, Glasnost Defense Foundation


3. (C) Barks-Ruggles emphasized throughout the visit that a
healthy civil society was important to strengthen Russia and
was also in U.S. interests. Her meetings represented a wider
effort by the USG to assist civil society in Russia.

Barks-Ruggles said the U.S. and European partners are
coordinating efforts to support NGOs in Russia as well as to
respond to the harassment of NGOs in that and other
countries. She said the USG wanted to help NGOs in Russia in
a constructive manner and asked about the current atmosphere
in the wake of the passage of the NGO law.

NGO LAW - SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION
-------------- --


4. (C) Raguzina told Barks-Ruggles that in a May 25 meeting
with foreign NGOs, Aleksey Zhafyarov from the Federal
Registration Service (FRS) stated that NGOs would be fine as
long as they stayed away from "politics." Raguzina noted,
however, that Zhafyarov had not defined what constituted
"politics" and that the FRS likely had not defined "political
activity." O'Hagan added that when asked by one of NDI's
employees after the May 25 meeting what Zhafyarov meant by
"politics," he had not given a clear answer. Abrosimova
noted that in a separate meeting with Russian NGOs, Zhafyarov
stated that "political activity" involved support for
political parties or certain types of electoral activity,
such as campaigning for candidates. The concept was so vague
that it was open to wide interpretation, giving authorities
latitude to restrict any NGOs engaged in activities not to
the government's liking.


5. (C) O'Hagan suggested the authorities would not target
specific activities, but specific organizations. Aslamazyan
believed that the NGO law would be used selectively against
organizations to which the Kremlin objected. The unofficial
message that she had received in discussions with the
authorities was that an organization would be in trouble if
it was on a "target list" of NGOs. There was general
agreement from all the representatives on this point, as well
as the sense that such a crackdown will only begin after the
G-8 Summit concludes. Aslamazyan noted that the new law
would make it easy for the Kremlin to shut down any
organization it did not like. All representatives noted that
it was likely the government would target a few select NGOs,
with the expectation that this would pressure others to
self-censor. The government, they believed, was correct in
this assessment.


6. (C) Gill expressed concern that specific NGOs would be
targeted for political reasons, while some organizations
would run into difficulties simply due to the chaos
surrounding the implementing process. Additionally, the law

MOSCOW 00006173 002 OF 003


might be used against small NGOs that ran afoul of local and
regional authorities. Shvedov noted that many NGOs could
also run into problems with corrupt officials using the law
to harass NGOs as well as purely bureaucratic issues, which
would be difficult to differentiate from political
harassment.


7. (C) Gill said the law was similar to one passed in
Uzbekistan a few years ago and constituted a breach of
Russia's commitment to the European Convention. Under the
new law, reporting requirements for NGOs were particularly
burdensome. Organizations were required to fill out annual
reports, quarterly financial reports, and a separate yearly
report for planned activities. If there were changes in
their activities, NGOs were required to inform the FRS. This
requirement could be particularly problematic when making
adjustments for events like lectures that were difficult to
plan in advance. In addition, Gill believed it would be
difficult for Human Rights Watch (HRW) to conduct human
rights monitoring in Chechnya, since authorities might
determine such activity to be objectionable and accuse HRW of
threatening the national security of Russia.


8. (C) Looking more broadly at the state of civil society,
Shvedov believed that the law served to legitimize pressure
and harassment that some NGOs, particularly those working in
the North Caucasus, already faced. In responding to this
pressure, it was important to go beyond simply making public
statements. Greater emphasis should be placed on building
the technical and legal expertise of NGOs. Shvedov noted
that it would be easy to close many Russian NGOs since most
did not have strong management that was able to meet previous
legal requirements, let alone those under the new law. If
there was a substantial increase in pressure after the G8
summit, as many NGO leaders expected, Russian NGOs would be
unprepared. In addition, NGOs operating in Russia needed to
build links with NGOs that operated in other countries and
learn from their experience.


9. (C) Abrosimova agreed that it was important to share
experiences with NGOs from other countries. She added that
in response to the new law, IREX's USG-funded civil society
program was working on creating an association of NGO lawyers
to provide legal expertise and monitor court cases. They
were also working on coordinating NGOs that do networking in
the regions. IREX had already held USG-sponsored roundtable
discussions on the transparency and accountability of NGOs
throughout Russia.

MOSTLY NEGATIVE VIEWS ON PUBLIC CHAMBER ROLE
--------------


10. (C) O'Hagan stressed the need for civil society to
monitor the impact of the law on NGOs. Raguzina suggested
that the Public Chamber could play a significant role in the
monitoring process, but O'Hagan doubted the usefulness of
independent NGOs giving a Kremlin-created body like the
Public Chamber a major role in that process. While O'Hagan
said it was important to have a dialogue with the Public
Chamber, she criticized its performance during the
development of the NGO law. Shvedov also expressed doubts
about how much the Public Chamber could help civil society.
Shvedov did not rule out working with the Public Chamber if
it developed good programs, but he believed that it would be
a mistake for independent NGOs to work with the Chamber to
develop mechanisms to monitor the law. Simonov said the
Public Chamber was part of a larger pattern of the Kremlin
trying to impose top down control on civil society through
Government Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, (GONGOs).


11. (C) Abrosimova thought it would be useful for NGOs to
create links with the Public Chamber by working on issues
related to the Kremlin's National Priority Projects. Johnson
agreed that it was important for NGOs to involve
state-supported organizations like the Public Chamber.
Johnson added that in his experience the key to having good
relations with authorities was to avoid publicly embarrassing
them. Johnson asserted that while the NGO law was vague and
burdensome, the FRS had so far been responsive to IRI's
inquires. By not "picking fights" with officials and trying
to involve the business community, Johnson said IRI had been
successful in working in a number of different regions in
Russia. Shvedov responded that Memorial did not try to pick
fights with authorities, but he believed his organization
would be targeted regardless of its approach. He noted that
Memorial had already received warnings from the authorities
about publishing information about Hizb-ut-Tahrir on its
website and had undergone a number of tax inspections.

WHAT SHOULD THE USG DO TO HELP?
--------------

MOSCOW 00006173 003 OF 003




12. (C) Responding to Barks-Ruggles' question about what the
USG could do to help civil society in Russia, Aslamazyan
responded that the situation in the country was complicated
and urged a careful approach. It was not constructive to
publicly cast GOR actions in black-and-white terms. McCormak
noted that vocal public criticism from senior foreign
officials on democracy and human rights affected NGOs in
Russia since the authorities used it as an excuse to blame
them for giving the country a bad reputation.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) The tone of resignation amongst NGOs was striking in
these conversations. They clearly view the new law as just
one salvo in a long-term effort by the government to control
their activities. They are working - some more rapidly than
others - on strategies to survive and endure. It is clear
that Russian NGOs feel more vulnerable than international
NGOs as they will have both national and local pressure
brought to bear on them, and have fewer resources and more
limited capacity to deal with the onerous new requirements in
the regulations. It will be important for the USG and other
donors to continue to support NGO work - both financially and
diplomatically - as the pressure increases. Suggestions by
these groups for capacity building, pooled "back-office"
resources, and strengthening networks of indigenous and
international NGOs merit increased attention. End Comment.


14. (U) DAS Barks-Ruggles has cleared on the text of this
cable.
BURNS