SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA ON HEIGHTENED TENSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PBTS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN MFA ON HEIGHTENED TENSIONS

REF: MOSCOW 5532 AND PREV.

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: The Russian MFA negotiator on South Ossetia
assured us June 2 that Russia supports Georgia's territorial
integrity and borders, despite a June 1 public statement
implying otherwise. He denied that Russia intends a
"creeping annexation" of South Ossetia. In a separate June 2
discussion, MFA Georgia Office director detailed a hardening
Russian position on visas for Russian peacekeepers in
Georgia. Putin may agree to a telephone conversation with
Saakashvili, and the Russians and Ossetians may agree to hold
the next South Ossetia JCC in Tbilisi. End Summary.

Russians Serving in South Ossetia
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2. (C) We noted to Ambassador Yuriy Popov, negotiator on
South Ossetia, that Washington was surprised by DFM Karasin's
answer (reftel) to U/S Burns' concern that Russians were
serving in the South Ossetian government. Some officials
seemed to have concurrent positions in the Russian or North
Ossetian governments and in the South Ossetian government.
Popov suggested that they might be in economic positions or
just advisors. When we rejected that, he referred to the
former Georgian foreign minister, a serving French diplomat;
he suggested that the whole issue was trivial. We noted that
each fact in itself -- for example, the announcements of
appointments to the "government" of South Ossetia appearing
in the official newspaper "Yuzhnyy Federalnyy" -- might be
just a small dot. But Washington was concerned with the
pattern that emerged when connecting the dots, a pattern that
much resembled creeping annexation. Popov strenuously
rejected the notion, saying Russia had no desire whatever for
the "wasteland" territory of South Ossetia.

Territorial Integrity
--------------


3. (C) The June 1 MFA Spokesperson's statement calling
Georgian territorial integrity a "potential condition" and
not a "political-legal reality" was a dangerous precedent, we
stressed. The international community recognizes Georgia's
de jure territorial integrity. De facto it could not now
exercise this legal right on parts of its territory, but it
was not in Russia's interests to muddle this distinction.
Popov asserted that Russia is "not trying to question
Georgia's territorial integrity in principle. We absolutely
support it, and are not trying to challenge or disrupt it."
When asked about Russia's attitude towards Georgia's 1991
borders, Popov said that Russia is not retreating from its
support for Georgia's borders. We said that tone is not
reflected in the statement, and he answered that the
statement's tone reflects Russian frustration at constant
Georgian rhetoric. We suggested that Georgian rhetoric,
while brash, could also be a reaction to real Russian
actions, for example the bans on wine and mineral water.

Visas for PKO
--------------


4. (C) Popov said the only agreements with Georgia on visas
concerned Russian military personnel at bases in Georgia, not
peacekeepers. South Ossetia was a zone of conflict, and this
imposed a special regime. We noted that there is no
equivalent of a SOFA or UNSCR governing the status of
peacekeepers, and as long as Georgia was offering visas, it
would reduce tensions to accept them. There was always a
danger that when undocumented peacekeepers patrolled the
areas of the Zone of Conflict (ZOC) that remained under
Georgian control, they risked a confrontation with Georgian
security forces. Popov said he did not believe the
peacekeepers would patrol outside the South Ossetian part of
the ZOC. In any case, he said, Russia feared that Georgia
would deny visas to the peacekeepers as a way of harassing or
eliminating the PKO.


5. (C) In a separate conversation, MFA Georgia Office
director Semyon Grigoryev told us the Russian position had
hardened on the visa issue. In April, when it first arose,
he was scheduled to fly to Tbilisi to discuss it with the
Georgians. He had hoped to negotiate some sort of an
arrangement short of a visa regime. Just before departure,
the Georgians sent a note to the Russians rejecting all
possibilities except a visa regime. Grigoryev's superiors
had then canceled his trip. By now, he said, the Russians
categorically rejected the idea of a visa regime and would
not even talk about it -- while understanding that there is
no written legal basis for the undocumented status of the
peacekeepers. Grigoryev thought no progress could be made on

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this through bilateral talks, but only through the JCC.

Overall Relations and Some Overtures
--------------


6. (C) Popov said Russia, for all its clumsiness, genuinely
wanted stability on its southern borders. He asked why the
U.S. was concentrating on relatively minor visa matters
instead of the progress being made through the JCC and the
more important issues of an overall peace settlement. We
said that irritants such as the visa issue are underbrush
that Russia needs to clear away before it can make real
progress, and the Georgians seemed to be open to a solution.
Asked whether he had talked bilaterally with the Georgians,
he replied that he had not yet done so. But he said the
Russians were planning some conciliatory moves, including
agreeing to Khaindrava's proposal to hold an extraordinary
JCC meeting in Tbilisi (though Khaindrava proposed June 2, 3,
or 5, dates which may slip). The North Ossetians were on
board with that proposal, and though the South Ossetians were
still reluctant, Popov believed the Russians could "coax"
them to Tbilisi. He hoped the U.S. would "leak" this
information to our Georgian friends.


7. (C) Grigoryev said he was optimistic that there would be a
Putin-Saakashvili telephone conversation, though there was no
official word on this yet. Popov noted, however, that
frustration with Georgia was still strong. Russia was fed up
with the "disrespect" it received from Georgia, he said, and
there was a growing school of thought in Russia that
Georgia's provocative rhetoric was instigated in Washington
as an indirect way of goading Russia. He denied that he
adhered to this school, and we noted that those who believed
such absurdities would hardly be convinced otherwise by
American rebuttals. It was clear, however, that the
flashpoints in Russian-Georgian relations were well on their
way to becoming irritants in U.S.-Russian relations. The
U.S. exerted a strong restraining influence on Georgian
rhetoric and actions, but there were real issues that Russia
and Georgia needed to resolve, and without Russian acceptance
of its share of responsibility to resolve them, the irritants
would only grow. Popov summed up by saying the basic problem
was one of distrust: it was clear that the U.S. distrusted
Russia's intentions, Russia distrusted U.S. intentions,
Russia distrusted Georgia and vice versa, and the Georgians
and South Ossetians completely distrusted one another. We
replied that one needed to start somewhere to unravel this
knot, and building Russian-Georgian confidence on South
Ossetia would be an important start.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Popov, who is still new, was non-committal on issues,
e.g., visas, on which Grigoryev more openly expressed
Russia's hard line (Grigoryev is in his last days before
leaving Moscow to become DCM at Moscow's embassy in Kabul).
Popov's assertions on territorial integrity should not be
taken as the MFA's last word on the issue, which will require
close attention and engagement. Both Popov and Grigoryev
believed the recurrent worsening of relations between Russia
and Georgia was unsustainable. While Grigoryev recognized
that direct Russian-Georgian talks would be indispensable to
reverse this trend, Popov appeared to believe that the U.S.
could serve as an intermediary for communicating with
Georgia. We agree with Grigoryev: Russia and Georgia must
engage directly to resolve their problems. The U.S. can urge
restraint on both, but should not be a message carrier --
that would only lead the two sides to believe that they can
avoid direct contact, and would diminish their sense of
responsibility for promoting a settlement.
BURNS