AMBASSADOR'S MAY 23 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005458

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG IR AJ AM GG BO UP RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MAY 23 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

REF: MOSCOW 5375

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) Ambassador met with DFM Karasin May 23. Karasin was
to leave later that day for a Nagorno-Karabakh trip. He
hoped to be pleasantly surprised. With regard to U/S Burns'
letter on South Ossetia, Karasin stressed positive movement
and labeled the rest a matter of interpretation, but argued
that the referendum in Montenegro is "bad news" for Georgia.
He hopes to see U/S Burns at a working lunch/meeting on the
afternoon of June 6.


2. (C) Karasin asked for U.S. thinking on Iran. Ambassador
warned that Iran still believes it can exploit gaps in the
international consensus. Karasin complained that the U.S.
sponsored counter-narcotics conference in Dushanbe had
undercut "existing structures" which must be preserved.
Ambassador warned that if Ahmadi-Najad attends the SCO
summit, statements made there will be even more sharply
scrutinized by the international community. Karasin called
the Iranian attendance an "opportunity." Karasin said he had
made some progress on "overseas Russians" in his recent visit
to Vilnius. He argued for "involvement" with Belarus, not
sanctions. He expected a Ukrainian government to form in
June, followed by ministerial-level meetings in July and a
potential Putin visit in September. End Summary.

Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador met with DFM Grigoriy Karasin May 23, just
before the latter's departure for Baku and Yerevan for a
visit with EUR Assistant Secretary Fried and a French
representative to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh. Karasin said the
most notable feature of the trip is that the U.S., Russia and
France were working together to convince the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan to be flexible and show political
will. He did not want to sound optimistic, but hoped for a
pleasant surprise that would secure the meeting of the
presidents at a separate event in Bucharest. This could
clear the way for an event at the St. Petersburg G8, even
without a breakthrough. One could "spend an entire lifetime"
working on the "jigsaw puzzle" of details, but the whole
exercise provided a positive picture that we, working
together, can have a positive influence on conflict
resolution.

Burns-Karasin Letter
--------------


4. (C) Karasin said he would send a written reply to U/S
Burns. He echoed earlier Russian views (Ref. A),saying
"many things" in the letter were "a bit inaccurate" and
others a matter of interpretation. He said that social and
economic assistance from Russia to South Ossetia via North
Ossetia was agreed between Georgia and Russia in December

2000. He stressed the positive: a "successful" JCC on May
11-12 was important for the specific actions it agreed on.
The June donors' conference in Brussels would be another
step. The important thing was to move slowly and steadily,
avoiding provocations and military action. In this respect,
he said, some statements Khaindrava had made at the JCC were
"a bad sign." But the "logic of moving ahead is prevailing,"
and there had been good news from Abkhazia as well. He
argued that SRSG Tagliavini should stay on.


5. (C) Ambassador replied that our concerns continue. The
specifics in U/S Burns' letter come within a context of
public statements by senior Russian government officials
implying that separatism is a logical, acceptable and even
desirable outcome. People "connect the dots" of Russian
statements and actions, including the insistence of using
Kosovo as a precedent. Karasin broke in to say, "Montenegro
is bad news for Saakashvili. It will change the mentality."
Ambassador continued that Karasin needed to understand the
core of our concerns: economic and other cooperation would
be fine if it were clear that none of Russia's actions were
aimed at undermining Georgia's territorial integrity. That
would also make it easier for the U.S. to be pointed with
Georgia about its sometimes unhelpful rhetoric and actions.
Karasin responded that this was a "chicken-and-egg" problem.


6. (C) Karasin added that he also needed to correct the
impression, given in U/S Burns' letter, that frozen conflicts
and Belarus would be on the G8 Summit agenda. If things go
right on Nagorno-Karabakh, that conflict would be, he said.
Ambassador pointed out that the letter discussed the agenda
for the Ministerial, not the Summit. Karasin gave no direct

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reply. He said he understood that U/S Burns will be arriving
on June 6, and proposed a working lunch and meeting that
afternoon. He thought he might not be in Moscow June 7.

Iran
--------------


7. (C) Karasin asked for Ambassador's perspective on Iran.
Ambassador replied that it is crucial to send a strong,
unified, international signal to Tehran; otherwise, the
Iranians will continue to think they can exploit gaps in the
international consensus. Karasin agreed it is important that
the Iranians understand that we are listening to one another
and that they cannot play off the "major players" against one
another. He added, however, that "we should exclude all
thought and plans of use of force." He noted that Azerbaijan
is concerned about the prospect of use of force against Iran.


8. (C) Karasin took the opportunity to complain about the
U.S.-organized Central and South Asian Counter-Narcotics and
Security Working Group meeting (Ref. B) that took place in
Dushanbe earlier this month (to which Iran was not invited).
It would duplicate existing structures, exclude major players
such as Russia and China, and turn Central Asia into a Great
Power battleground. The Ambassador rebutted Karasin's
concerns, emphasizing that counter-narcotics was an important
practical concern for all of us.


9. (C) Ambassador indicated that Iranian President
Ahmadi-Najad's presence would be a very negative factor at
the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. With
him there, what gets said and done will be watched extremely
carefully. If, for example, the SCO again made statements
about U.S. bases, those statements would be "sharpened" by
his presence, especially given his propensity for dangerous
and offensive public statements. We would prefer that
members would avoid bilateral contacts. Karasin replied that
"your concerns are duly noted," but hoped that the U.S. has a
"level of confidence" that the participants will influence
the proceedings in a positive way. No one is interested in
turning South Asia and Central Asia into a conflict zone.
Karasin believed the opportunity for Asian states to
communicate with Ahmadi-Najad was positive.

Baltics-Belarus-Ukraine
--------------


10. (C) Karasin thought he had made some headway in his
recent meeting in Vilnius with 60 ethnic Russian
organizations from throughout the Baltics. He had proposed
to the Latvians that they make a gesture by waiving the
Latvian language requirement for citizenship for those over

60. He had also proposed steps to promote the Russian
language, since it was the "lingua franca" of the Baltics.
He hoped the U.S. might "gently press" the Baltics to create
a "more positive" atmosphere in their relations with Russia.
Ambassador noted that where there have been valid specific
concerns, the U.S. has done so.


11. (C) Asked about Belarus, Karasin said he believed
engagement is the best strategy. Sanctions would only
strengthen the "moral and political unity of the people
around the leader," to quote a Soviet saying. Karasin
doubted that democracy could be imposed from outside. Russia
would continue its contacts and help Belarus understand why
the international community is unhappy with it. Ambassador
suggested that Russia might propose to Belarus specific steps
it needs to take, now that the election is history.
Lukashenko's reputation is well known. Karasin responded
that that is the fault of Western "information authorities."
Ambassador said that Lukashenko's reputation is well beyond
the power of even the most artful public diplomacy to
improve. Russia, which has influence, should persuade
Belarus to take concrete steps to open up political space and
respond to international concerns. Karasin proposed that the
U.S. and Russia understand where each stands. He fretted
that Belarus has taken on the mentality of a cornered nation,
which makes progress problematic.


12. (C) At the same time, Karasin continued, it was important
that "market rules" apply in Russia's relations with all its
neighbors, including in the field of energy. There could be
"compensation packages" in deals with RAO UES and Gazprom to
make the pill easier to swallow, but "the price of gas and
oil must be predictable and market-priced." There could be
no exceptions among Russia's neighbors. Special relations
and deals might make this goal difficult, but it was
important for the sake of Russia's relations with its
neighbors.


13. (C) Karasin had little to report on Ukraine. He hoped
there would be a government in June. That meant the

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ministerial-level sub-groups of the "Putin-Yushchenko
Commission" could meet in July, with participation of the new
Ukrainian interlocutors for the Prime, Defense and Foreign
Affairs Ministers. August would be "silly season," but
enough work might be done before then to justify a
well-prepared Putin visit to Kiev in September. Karasin
stressed, however, that the decision on timing was a Kremlin
call.

BURNS