Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW5375
2006-05-19 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
LETTER FROM U/S BURNS TO DFM KARASIN ON SOUTH
how-toVZCZCXRO0970 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #5375 1391423 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191423Z MAY 06 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6186 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3752 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6718 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005375
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM U/S BURNS TO DFM KARASIN ON SOUTH
OSSETIA
REF: STATE 80906
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reason 1.4 (b, d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005375
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM U/S BURNS TO DFM KARASIN ON SOUTH
OSSETIA
REF: STATE 80906
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) PolMinCouns delivered reftel letter May 19 to MFA IV
CIS Director Andrey Kelin. Kelin said he would immediately
pass the letter to DFM Karasin and DFM Kislyak. The latter
needed to see it because, Kelin said, the letter makes an
"overstatement" in asserting that "the G8 has decided to
include" discussion of Belarus and frozen conflicts on the
agenda for the G8 Ministerial. "There has been no G8
decision on this," he said flatly. PolMinCouns questioned
him closely on the issue, saying that the U.S. believed it
was clear such a decision had been taken at the April G8
Political Directors Meeting in Moscow. Kelin stuck to his
denial, saying that the agreement had been only to put
Nagorno-Karabakh on the agenda, and only if there was
progress when the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents meet on
June 5. He added that letters from the various G8 members
did not support the U.S. position. (Note: Kelin
acknowledged that he is not responsible for G8 issues and
cannot speak authoritatively for the GOR on them. He
expected, however, that Kislyak would be "very surprised" by
the U.S. assertion. End Note.)
2. (C) On South Ossetia, Kelin said he was "surprised" and
"disappointed" at the "one-sided" position of the U.S. The
letter indicated, he said, that the U.S. had "taken sides"
with Georgia against Russia. He found it "strange" that the
letter makes no mention of the recent JCC in Tskhinvali and
its achievements, which he enumerated and emphasized. Since
the letter mentioned similar U.S. concerns on Abkhazia, he
also found it strange that there was no mention of the
"breakthrough" meeting of the Coordinating Commission in
Sukhumi May 18. PolMinCouns said the U.S. was well-informed
about both meetings.
3. (C) Kelin largely dismissed the letter's charges on
Russian activities in South Ossetia as a "compilation of
press statements from the Georgian MFA," and disputed their
accuracy. Initially, he said he would not comment on the
charge that Russian officials have posts in the "government"
of South Ossetia; that was "just a reproduction of the
Georgian line." Later, he said none of the named "officials"
concurrently hold Russian posts, although he did not dispute
that they might be Russian citizens. He claimed the economic
projects listed in the letter were decided in a public
meeting of the North and South Ossetian governments in March,
who have "every right" to engage in such cooperation, which
was "no secret." PolMinCouns noted that at that very meeting
an assistant to Russian PM Fradkov had said he looked forward
to the unification of North and South Ossetia in Russia.
Kelin replied that the official had "apologized profusely"
for his "imprudent statements," and that Russia had no
intention of incorporating South Ossetia.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Kelin's immediate reaction after a quick reading of
the letter -- stressing that it was "one-sided," disputing
the accuracy of some of its specifics, downplaying others,
and ignoring the rest -- is not a definitive GOR response,
which will come from Karasin (and perhaps Kislyak). We
expect, however, that Kelin probably accurately foreshadowed
the contours of what we will hear from higher GOR levels.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM U/S BURNS TO DFM KARASIN ON SOUTH
OSSETIA
REF: STATE 80906
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) PolMinCouns delivered reftel letter May 19 to MFA IV
CIS Director Andrey Kelin. Kelin said he would immediately
pass the letter to DFM Karasin and DFM Kislyak. The latter
needed to see it because, Kelin said, the letter makes an
"overstatement" in asserting that "the G8 has decided to
include" discussion of Belarus and frozen conflicts on the
agenda for the G8 Ministerial. "There has been no G8
decision on this," he said flatly. PolMinCouns questioned
him closely on the issue, saying that the U.S. believed it
was clear such a decision had been taken at the April G8
Political Directors Meeting in Moscow. Kelin stuck to his
denial, saying that the agreement had been only to put
Nagorno-Karabakh on the agenda, and only if there was
progress when the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents meet on
June 5. He added that letters from the various G8 members
did not support the U.S. position. (Note: Kelin
acknowledged that he is not responsible for G8 issues and
cannot speak authoritatively for the GOR on them. He
expected, however, that Kislyak would be "very surprised" by
the U.S. assertion. End Note.)
2. (C) On South Ossetia, Kelin said he was "surprised" and
"disappointed" at the "one-sided" position of the U.S. The
letter indicated, he said, that the U.S. had "taken sides"
with Georgia against Russia. He found it "strange" that the
letter makes no mention of the recent JCC in Tskhinvali and
its achievements, which he enumerated and emphasized. Since
the letter mentioned similar U.S. concerns on Abkhazia, he
also found it strange that there was no mention of the
"breakthrough" meeting of the Coordinating Commission in
Sukhumi May 18. PolMinCouns said the U.S. was well-informed
about both meetings.
3. (C) Kelin largely dismissed the letter's charges on
Russian activities in South Ossetia as a "compilation of
press statements from the Georgian MFA," and disputed their
accuracy. Initially, he said he would not comment on the
charge that Russian officials have posts in the "government"
of South Ossetia; that was "just a reproduction of the
Georgian line." Later, he said none of the named "officials"
concurrently hold Russian posts, although he did not dispute
that they might be Russian citizens. He claimed the economic
projects listed in the letter were decided in a public
meeting of the North and South Ossetian governments in March,
who have "every right" to engage in such cooperation, which
was "no secret." PolMinCouns noted that at that very meeting
an assistant to Russian PM Fradkov had said he looked forward
to the unification of North and South Ossetia in Russia.
Kelin replied that the official had "apologized profusely"
for his "imprudent statements," and that Russia had no
intention of incorporating South Ossetia.
COMMENT
--------------
4. (C) Kelin's immediate reaction after a quick reading of
the letter -- stressing that it was "one-sided," disputing
the accuracy of some of its specifics, downplaying others,
and ignoring the rest -- is not a definitive GOR response,
which will come from Karasin (and perhaps Kislyak). We
expect, however, that Kelin probably accurately foreshadowed
the contours of what we will hear from higher GOR levels.
BURNS