Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW5264
2006-05-18 12:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB

Tags:  PREL PTER KTFN UN AF RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5264 1381200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181200Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5978
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0394
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005264 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KTFN UN AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB

REF: STATE 70950

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons: 1.4(B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005264

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KTFN UN AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIANS AGAINST DELISTING MONIB

REF: STATE 70950

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) On May 12 poloff delivered reftel demarche to MFA
Afghanistan Section Chief Yuriy Khokhlov, and followed up on
the issue with him in a May 15 discussion. On May 17 econoff
double-tracked the demarche with Aleksandr Ubilava and
Nikolay Ostrokhov from the MFA New Threats and Challenges
Department. Khokhlov termed Monib a "bad guy" who had been
involved in military training camps in Chechnya and
Kazakhstan, according to GOR intelligence. While Monib was
not known to have been guilty of "war crimes," Khokhlov
insisted that Karzai's characterization of Monib as
rehabilitated was not accurate. Khokhlov provided us a
written response suggesting there was insufficient evidence
to delist Monib and asking the USG to provide more detailed
arguments in support of that action. That response has been
faxed to EUR/RUS. An informal Embassy translation follows in
paragraph 3.


2. (C) New Threats and Challenge's Ubilava acknowledged
Monib's case deserved particular attention, but also said the
GOR needed more detailed evidence that: a) Monib had truly
renounced all ties to terrorism and the Taliban in
Afghanistan; b) he was cooperating actively with the GOA and
international community on counterterrorism; and c) he had
not been involved in serious terrorist activity while a
supporter of the Taliban. (According to Ubilava, the GOR had
used a similar integrity test in granting amnesty to certain
Chechens and regarded that standard as reasonable to apply
here.) Ubilava added that the MFA had shared the U.S.
delisting request with the Federal Security Service (FSB),
and the GOR could provide additional background on Monib
through separate channels.


3. (U) An informal Embassy translation of the Russian
nonpaper follows below:

Begin Text:

Thank you for the appeal of the U.S. side with respect to
removing mulavi Abdul Hakim Monib from the UNSC 1267
Committee's sanction list that you sent to us by fax.

I would like to note that the arguments set out in this
appeal certainly deserve the closest attention and clearly
indicate how much the United States is interested in a
peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Afghanistan and in the
earliest possible stabilization of this long-suffering
country.

At the same time, as we have repeatedly told our colleagues,
the arguments in favor of A.H. Monib's delisting presented to
the 1267 Committee by the Afghan side are not sufficiently
substantive or concrete. We believe that A.H. Monib's oath
of allegiance to the Government of Afghanistan, reports about
his participation in the Loya Jirga, as well as reference to
the fact that A.H. Monib has gone through a national
reconciliation program and provided information that helped
to capture undisclosed terrorists are absolutely insufficient
for us to take a decision to remove him from the sanctions
list. We are very interested in detailed information about
A.H. Monib's functional responsibilities as deputy minister
for borders and tribes for the Taliban regime, his
participation or non-participation in the war crimes of that
terrorist organization, and his political activities since
December 2001, including his role in the split of the Taliban
Movement and his contacts with present high-ranking Taliban
functionaries. In addition, we need substantially more
concrete details, possibly through special services channels,
about the value of the information provided by A.H. Monib for
the capture of terrorists and the prevention of terrorist
attacks.

Unfortunately, the information available to us about A.H.
Monib does not allow us to draw an unambiguous conclusion in
favor of his delisting. This relates primarily to his work
in the Taliban Administration, his involvement in attracting
new recruits to the Taliban Movement, and his involvement in
the organization of training camps for fighters, including
foreign fighters, in the Afghan-Pakistani border area.

In this connection we would appreciate if the U.S. side would
provide more detailed argumentation in favor of A.H. Monib's
delisting. The above undoubtedly applies equally to any
future appeals with respect to former and active members of
terrorist groups in Afghanistan. End Text.

BURNS