LOOKING AHEAD TO PUTIN'S ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004839

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: LOOKING AHEAD TO PUTIN'S ADDRESS TO THE FEDERAL
ASSEMBLY

REF: MOSCOW 3218

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ending lengthy speculation, the Kremlin
announced on May 2 that President Putin will present his
annual Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10. Delays in
its delivery, which some had expected to take place in early
April, fueled rumors that Putin had been dissatisfied with
early drafts and that disagreements flared within the Kremlin
about what the address should contain. Russian Security
Council Deputy Secretary Spasskiy told the Ambassador on
April 27 that the address would include a substantial focus
on Russia's role in the world. With Spasskiy and other
senior GOR officials, the Ambassador underscored the
opportunity the address offered to present a more positive
image of Russia abroad, outline long-term plans for economic
and political modernization, and send a strong signal against
ethnic violence and extremism to the domestic audience. The
upcoming address is likely to restate recent pronouncements
by Kremlin and other GOR officials about a more confident
Russia committed to cooperation with the West but on what it
would view as more equal terms. END SUMMARY.
.
FINALLY, A DATE...
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2. (U) Kremlin press spokesman Aleksey Gromov's May 2
announcement that Putin would make his Address to the Federal
Assembly on May 10 ended weeks of speculation. Expectations
that the address might take place in early April did not pan
out, and rumors circulated about several dates later that
month. Most recently, some observers had predicted Putin
would make his address in St. Petersburg on April 28 during
celebrations of the Duma's centennial. The press noted,
however, that the current address was within the normal
timeframe for such speeches; among the six Putin has
presented, the earliest was on April 3 and the latest on July

8.
.
...FOLLOWING MANY RUMORS
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3. (SBU) Rumors also swirled about the cause of the delays.
Those rumors centered on Putin's reported dissatisfaction
with early drafts of the text. Vedemosti reported that in an
April 12 meeting with State Duma leaders, Putin expressed
unhappiness with an initial draft. Kommersant reported that
Putin rejected an initial draft written by a team headed by
G-8 Sherpa Igor Shuvalov and Kremlin chief speech writer
Dzhakhan Pollyyeva. By one unconfirmed report, Pollyyeva was
even forced to take a vacation to remove her from the
drafting process. Kremlin economic advisor Arkadiy
Dvorkovich (the principle drafter of last year's address)
reportedly was involved in at least one draft text.
According to Kommersant, the Kremlin called in Higher School
of Economics head Yaroslav Kuzminov and others from that
university to help with the drafting. Other reports
attributed much of the delay to dissatisfaction by new
Presidential Administration (PA) head Sergey Sobyanin with
the influence that "liberal economists" had had on the draft.



4. (C) Observers hypothesized various reasons for Putin's
dissatisfaction with the early drafts. Moscow Carnegie
Center scholar Andrey Ryabov speculated to us that the delays
resulted from Putin's failure to define a central message in
the address due to his lack of a clear vision for the future.
A Center for Political Technologies (CPT) analysis said that
the address was delayed because Putin was frustrated that,
while Russia had the resources to wield its influence, it did
not know how to use them or for what goals. That view was
shared by independent radio station Ekho Moskvy chief editor
Aleksey Venediktov, who told us that Putin felt that the
early drafts were wishy-washy, reflecting a lack of dynamism
that he also perceived in his Cabinet lately. Putin wanted
the address to present a vigorous and well-defined vision of
Russia's future, Venediktov said, and pressed his team to do
extensive redrafting, which produced the delays.
.
FOCUSING ON RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD
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5. (C) In an April 27 conversation with the Ambassador,
Security Council Deputy Secretary Nikolay Spasskiy said the
address had been delayed by disagreements about what it
should contain. Holidays in the first two weeks of May
created further delays, with Putin wanting to present his
address only after the Victory Day celebrations. Spasskiy
confirmed that Pollyyeva had a lead role in drafting, with
Presidential Administration (PA) Head Sergey Sobyanin and

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Deputy Head Vladislav Surkov also contributing. Sobyanin's
role was proving greater than expected, Spasskiy commented.
PA Aide Sergey Prikhodko and Security Council head Igor
Ivanov had been involved in the drafting process as well.


6. (C) Spasskiy confirmed reports that the address would
focus to a significant extent on Russia's proper place in the
world. Having laid out the challenges on the international
scene, Putin would highlight the need to strengthen Russia's
ability to compete in the global economy, including the
improvements to be effected by the national priority
projects. The address would include discussion of energy
issues, military doctrine, and the war on terrorism.
Prikhodko and State Duma International Relations Committee
Chair Konstantin Kosachev separately confirmed to the
Ambassador the thrust of Spasskiy's prediction that a central
theme of the speech would be Russia's place in the world.


7. (C) In all three meetings and in a meeting with PA Aide
Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, the Ambassador highlighted that the
address offered Putin an opportunity to underscore Russia's
interest in playing an active and responsible role on the
international scene. It was also an opportunity to lay out a
clear vision for how Russia intends to modernize economically
and politically to compete effectively in a changing world.
Given signs of growing xenophobia in Russia, the Ambassador
stressed, the address also allowed Putin to send a clear
message that such behavior was unacceptable. Such high-level
signals could have a major impact in countering xenophobic
trends in Russia, the Ambassador noted to his interlocutors.
.
COMMENT
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8. (C) In recent months, those inside or closely associated
with the Kremlin have sought to define Russia's current
ideological direction. Most significantly, in his "February
theses" (reftel),Surkov elaborated on his idea of
strengthening Russia's "sovereignty." On the foreign policy
side, that meant ensuring that Russia would be competitive
and among the major decisionmakers on the international
scene. Surkov stressed that Russia sought to cooperate with
the international community, but on more equal terms than in
the 1990s. Domestically, it meant that Russia would make its
own decisions, without undue influence from outside. Surkov
argued that achieving such sovereignty required that Russia
make changes to confront the challenges posed by the
realities of the 21st century.


9. (C) Putin's previous six addresses to the Federal Assembly
centered on specific priorities, with a particular focus on
the economy and domestic scene. The upcoming address, by
contrast, is expected to raise issues involved in a broader
clarification of Russia's ideological direction that many see
as especially important in the context of the expected
presidential succession in 2008. The address will also be
scanned avidly for any possible hints as to whether Putin is
"leaning" toward Dmitriy Medvedev, Sergey Ivanov, or any
other candidate for that succession.


10. (C) Putin may also use the address to send messages about
the issues of the day, including Iran, and perhaps to lay the
groundwork for the upcoming G-8 Summit. It would be odd, as
well, if Putin did not use the address to reprise some of his
recent remarks on Gazprom and its international expansion
plans. It bears mention that while Putin's addresses to the
Federal Assembly have been important occasions at which he
has set out key directions of action for the government, they
have also frequently been left with inadequate follow-up and
done little to change realities on the ground.
BURNS