RUSSIAN NATIONALIST DMITRIY ROGOZIN GOING ...

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003815

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PINR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN NATIONALIST DMITRIY ROGOZIN GOING ...
GOING ... BUT NOT QUITE GONE

REF: MOSCOW 1974

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Rodina Party chairman Dmitriy Rogozin
resigned from that position March 25, as observers expected,
and also stepped down from his position as Rodina faction
chairman in the State Duma April 4. The departure of the
mercurial Rogozin has done nothing to mend internal rifts
within the party and raises questions about its future
direction and status. New Rodina leader Aleksandr Babakov is
trying to restore party discipline and is widely expected to
hew more closely to the Kremlin line. Some members of the
broader Rodina movement hope to bring together its various
organizations under a "social democratic" banner without
invoking the nationalist plank that characterized the party
under Rogozin's leadership. Rogozin, meanwhile, plans to
spend the next six months fine-tuning his program, "Securing
the Nation," which he hopes to use as the foundation for a
new Rodina-like political formation. The result is that
Rodina has become further splintered, with the pro-Kremlin
United Russia Party (YR) the major beneficiary. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The anticipated resignation of Rodina Party Chairman
Dmitriy Rogozin March 25 set in motion a chain of events that
will likely increase party discipline in the short-term but
also raise questions about the longer-term direction and
viability of the controversial organization. Yuriy Skokov,
considered one of Rogozin's mentors and rumored to be a
conduit between the party and the Kremlin, told us prior to
the March 25 party congress that there had been significant
concern among members about Rogozin's tactics and leadership
style. He described Rogozin as "energetic and articulate"
but also "more populist" than necessary. Skokov acknowledged
that controversy surrounding Rogozin had resulted in
dissatisfaction within the Kremlin, especially from Deputy
Chief of the Presidential Administration (PA) Vladislav
Surkov, who had been pressing for "tactical changes" within
the party. In spite of Rogozin's then-imminent departure,
Skokov said he was certain that Rodina would be able to
survive his resignation due to its strong "corporate
structure" and collective leadership approach.


3. (SBU) Aleksandr Babakov inherited the Rodina mantle with
almost unanimous support; the vote among congress delegates
was 170-3, and Rogozin himself spoke in favor of Babakov's
accession. The new Rodina Party Chairman is an economist and
businessman who, among other activities, is the owner of one
of Russia's premier soccer teams. He is also regarded as a
major financial backer of Rodina. Babakov promised that the
party would remain in opposition but underscored that it
should not be a "hostile opposition." He called for
constructive criticism of official policies and dialogue with
authorities. Most political observers interpreted Babakov's
initial comments as an indication that Rodina would hew more
closely to the Kremlin line from which it had strayed on
Rogozin's watch, especially over the past year. Some pundits
believe that Babakov is only a transitional leader until a
more appealing figure emerges. On April 4 Rogozin ceded his
position as Rodina faction chairman in the State Duma, which
Babakov also assumed.


4. (C) Rogozin's departure left Rodina uncertain of its
future. Some members of the broader Rodina movement hope to
shape its various organizations and associations into a
social democratic bloc without emphasizing the nationalist
plank that characterized Rodina under Rogozin's leadership.
Oleg Denisov, a Rodina Deputy in the State Duma, expressed to
us his frustration with Rogozin's leadership style. Denisov
mentioned, in particular, that Rogozin's emphasis on
nationalism and illegal migrants had distracted supporters
and prospective members from Rodina's long-term goal, which
was to build a society based on equal opportunity and social
protection for all citizens, with the state lending strong
guiding support when needed.


5. (C) Nikolay Novichkov, another social democrat and
current deputy secretary of the Rodina faction in the State
Duma, offered much the same message, though he conceded that
Rogozin's personality and nationalist themes had broadened
Rodina's appeal and attracted numerous supporters. Saying
that Rodina would be better served without Rogozin's divisive
approach, Novichkov added that he hoped eventually the main
Rodina faction would be re-united with the breakaway faction
led by Sergey Baburin. However, he was unable to suggest
specific goals and objectives for the social democratic wing
of the movement or to explain how its platform would differ
from other political parties like YR or the communists.


6. (C) Mikhail Demurin, a member of the party's political

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council, told us that Rogozin planned to spend the next six
months fine-tuning his program, "Securing the Nation."
Demurin, who had previously outlined that program for us
(reftel),said it would focus on various proposals aimed at
improving the country's socio-economic situation, including
explaining the economic rationale for hiring workers from
underdeveloped regions of Russia rather than importing
illegal migrant labor from Central Asia and elsewhere. The
program would also highlight suggestions for turning around
Russia's worsening demographics. Rogozin's goal, he added,
was to use the program as the foundation for a new
Rodina-like political formation.


7. (C) Demurin said Rogozin still had considerable personal
support throughout the country and even within the PA. He
identified Surkov as being most responsible for engineering
both internal turmoil within Rodina and Rogozin's resignation
from the party. He observed that Surkov had wanted not only
to get rid of Rogozin but to humiliate him to the maximum
extent so that he would not be able to become a political
force in the future. Demurin added, however, that Rogozin
still had allies within the PA and elsewhere in the
government and speculated that Rogozin would rely on such
support, along with his prominent name-recognition among
voters throughout the country, to launch a new campaign in
time for the 2007 parliamentary election.


8. (C) COMMENT: It will be another few months before the
full effects of Rogozin's resignation from the Rodina Party
become clear. We doubt that either Novichkov's social
democrats or the pro-Rogozin nationalists will be able,
individually, to generate the mass support and loyalty
necessary to pose a credible electoral challenge. A
Babakov-led Rodina Party is also unlikely to pose a threat to
the ruling authorities. In this sense, the Kremlin's
divide-and-conquer tactics have succeeded in undermining and
unraveling what had become an increasingly effective and
popular, although also in the eyes of many potentially
dangerous, political movement that had the capability to win
significant numbers of votes throughout the country. The
result is that yet another opposition party has been beaten
into submission, with the pro-Kremlin YR the most likely
beneficiary of Rodina's disintegration.
BURNS