RUSSIAN MFA ON BELARUS, UKRAINE ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003687

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV BO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON BELARUS, UKRAINE ELECTIONS

REF: A. STATE 51992


B. MOSCOW 3510

Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: Charge d'Affaires delivered demarche on
Belarus elections (ref A) April 7 to Vyacheslav Kovalenko,
who was acting for Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin on CIS
affairs. Charge urged Russia to use its influence to help
secure release of peaceful protesters who had been detained
by the Lukashenko regime and to join the U.S. and EU in
supporting the development of democracy in Belarus.
Kovalenko responded that the U.S. should show flexibility and
begin talking to Lukashenko; that would be the quickest path
to democracy in Belarus. Kovalenko reiterated that, despite
some irregularities, Lukashenko's reelection was legitimate.
He expressed some concern about the post-election crackdown,
but gave Minsk the benefit of the doubt in upholding its
laws. Kovalenko made a point of commenting on opposition
leader Milinkevich's anti-Russian views, most notably his
stated opposition to the Union State Treaty. On Ukraine,
Kovalenko said that Russia supported the creation of a stable
coalition government, but recognized that that would take
time. End Summary.


2. (C) On April 7, Charge d'Affaires met to discuss Belarus
with MFA Second CIS Department Director Vyacheslav Kovalenko,
who was responsible for CIS affairs while Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin was acting Foreign Minister. Drawing upon
reftel points, Charge underscored that the March 19
presidential election in Belarus was fundamentally flawed and
not in accordance with OSCE principles and standards. He
expressed serious concern about the detention of several
hundred peaceful demonstrators including opposition leader
Kazulin and the former Polish Ambassador. Charge urged
Russia to use its considerable influence with the Lukashenko
regime to help secure their release. Noting that Russia, the
EU and the U.S. should share the objective of a peaceful,
prosperous and democratic Belarus, he urged that Russia join
in supporting the development of democracy in that country.


3. (C) Kovalenko agreed that there were points of
convergence in U.S. and Russian views on Belarus. He
welcomed the opportunity for continued dialogue with the U.S.
and EU on Belarus, and acknowledged the latter's "democracy
deficit". Kovalenko, however, argued that, although
democratization was an inevitable process, if accelerated too
quickly, it could lead to unpredictable results. He cited
Russia in the early 1990s and contemporary Ukraine and
Georgia as examples.


4. (C) Kovalenko acknowledged that there had been electoral
violations in Belarus, but flatly stated that Lukashenko's
election was not illegitimate as the West claimed. Scattered
irregularities did not make the election illegitimate.
Kovalenko compared the Belarusian election favorably to the
recent election in Ukraine, which he claimed had featured
electoral violations, most notably in Crimea.


5. (C) On the Lukashenko regime's crackdown on the
opposition, Kovalenko stated that the situation "worries the
Russian government." But he pointed out that Belarus had
laws -- for example, requiring permits for mass
demonstrations -- and the opposition had broken those laws.
Kovalenko commented on the anti-Russian sentiments of some in
the Belarusian opposition, singling out Milinkevich for
special mention. He claimed that Milinkevich harbors a
fundamentally anti-Russian worldview and had only softened
his position to win favor as the unified opposition
candidate. That said, Kovalenko did note that Milinkevich
had been received in Moscow and given the opportunity to
exchange views.


6. (C) On the way forward, Kovalenko agreed that the U.S.,
EU, and Russia all want to see a more democratic Belarus, but
Western tactics needed to be "smarter and more flexible."
For at least ten years, the U.S. has been pushing to
democratize Belarus and yet the result has not been achieved.
Kovalenko suggested the U.S. should try talking to
Lukashenko. "Patient dialogue" would help Belarus
democratize most quickly, he insisted. CDA reiterated our
hope that Russia would work to secure the release of those
detained in Minsk and to support development of a more
democratic Belarus.

Ukraine
--------------


7. (C) Charge and Kovalenko briefly exchanged views on
post-election developments in Ukraine. Kovalenko was
downbeat about the current situation. The Russian MFA's
neutral statement in the immediate aftermath of the

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parliamentary election (ref B),he said, was indicative of
Russia's willingness not to politicize the electoral
irregularities there. Kovalenko stated that Russia strongly
supported Ukraine's territorial integrity and hoped that a
stable coalition government would soon be formed. Putin had
told Yushchenko in their most recent phone conversation that
he could count on Russia's support. Referring to
Tymoshenko's campaign pledge to reopen the January 4 gas
deal, Kovalenko said that Russia could not remain indifferent
to such a scenario. He gloomily predicted a lengthy process
of government formation in Kiev and worried about the effect
on bilateral trade and overall relations.


8. (C) Charge coordinated the delivery of the demarche on
Belarus with the Austrian Ambassador and other members of the
EU. The Austrian Ambassador plans to deliver the parallel EU
demarche with other EU Troika representatives early next
week.

BURNS