RUSSIAN VIEWS ON POST-ELECTION UKRAINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003510

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG RS UP
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON POST-ELECTION UKRAINE

REF: A. MOSCOW 3202

B. MOSCOW 1934

C. MOSCOW 930

D. MOSCOW 3388

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary. A week after the Ukrainian election results
were announced, reactions in Russia vary widely. Officially,
Moscow has been neutral, while the media has buzzed with
speculation about the new government's formation and
especially Tymoshenko's possible role. Russian pundits are
concerned that Ukraine remains on a path toward accession to
NATO. Unofficial contacts underscored the view that Russia
lacks a cogent policy toward Ukraine, outside of energy
politics and short-term business interests (which, they
argued, often amount to the same thing). After the new
government's formation, we expect Moscow to pursue its
economic interests pragmatically while trying to stymie
Kiev's NATO aspirations and casting about for more effective
ways to salvage its own eroding influence in Ukraine.
Underlying Russia's policy will be a continued propensity to
see Ukrainian developments through an East-West prism and a
continued reluctance to recognize the birth of an independent
Ukrainian national consciousness. End Summary.

Views on the Elections
--------------


2. (C) In a phone call to Yushchenko on March 29, Putin spun
the elections as having reflected "Ukrainian citizens' desire
to develop relations with Russia in all areas." The MFA had
spoken in a similar tone March 28, saying that the citizens
of Ukraine "made their choice" and made clear their desire to
"develop and deepen relations of good neighborliness and
partnership with Russia." In a meeting with the Ambassador
March 29 (ref A),DFM Karasin called the election process
"normal" and said it had resulted in no clear winner and
considerable unknowns in how a government could be formed.
Yushchenko had suffered from economic developments since the
Orange Revolution and political infighting, Karasin said,
while Yanukovich's Party of Regions had demonstrated it was a
force to reckon with. Tymoshenko's strong showing put the
ball in her court for forming a government, but that would
take time. Karasin added that Russia was in any event
looking for a serious partnership with Ukraine and predicted
the Putin-Yushchenko Commission would soon be more active.


3. (C) Ukraine Desk Senior Counselor Vyacheslav Yelagin also
highlighted to us Russia's "strategic partnership" with
Ukraine and explained the MFA's bland statement by claiming
that 12 percent of Ukraine's registered voters had not been
permitted to cast a ballot. Would the West have overlooked
that irregularity, he asked, had the election taken place in
Russia? In contrast, Ukrainian Charge in Moscow Leonid
Osavolyuk told the DCM March 29 that the Russian MFA's
official reaction to Ukraine's parliamentary election was not
satisfactory: "Practically the entire rest of the world
congratulated Ukraine on its electoral process, and all
Russia can say is, 'Elections took place'?" Osavolyuk also
cast derision on the election-related comments of Duma Deputy
Konstantin Zatulin and other Russian parliamentary observers.
(Alluding to "secret information," Zatulin had asserted
before the election that the GOU would attempt to falsify the
voting.)

Coalition Prospects
--------------


4. (U) Media coverage has centered on government formation
and avoiding issues such as Black Sea Fleet basing or
Transnistria. Carnegie Center's Dmitriy Trenin noted in
Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the election, the freest in
Ukraine's history, had brought no surprises but was a step in
the right direction, although there would probably be a weak
and perhaps short-lived coalition and a continuation of
inter-clan infighting. Yanukovich, though entitled to feel
"moral vindication" after his 2004 defeat, had not won.
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy head Sergey Karaganov
similarly noted in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that Ukraine's movement
toward democracy was among the few in the post-Soviet area.
Some newspapers predicted that Tymoshenko would emerge as PM
following "palace intrigues," but others expected that
neither Yanukovich nor Yushchenko would permit that.


5. (C) Public Chamber member Andranik Migranyan told the
Ambassador March 29 that, having returned from Kiev where he
had met with Yanukovich and members of Tymoshenko's
entourage, he felt Ukraine remained deeply divided into East
and South against West and Kiev. His conclusion was that a
"Blue-Orange" (Yushchenko-Yanukovich-Morozov) coalition would
be best for Ukraine's integrity, although he was not certain

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it was realistic. In a realpolitik sense, an Orange
coalition in Kiev might be best for Russia, since it would be
riven with personal antagonisms, making it fragile and
probably not long-lasting. He thought Tymoshenko would be
best placed as head of the Rada, where she could use her
negotiating skills to try to put parliamentary majorities
together. Union of Right Forces (SPS) leader Boris Nemtsov,
a sometime advisor to Yushchenko, told the Ambassador (ref D)
that negotiations to establish a new government would be
prolonged and arduous, that most leading Ukrainian
politicians were "criminal or corrupt," and that under any
new government Ukraine's movement toward NATO would slow,
because most Ukrainians (not only those in the East) were not
enthusiastic about joining the Alliance.

NATO-EU Accession
--------------


6. (C) Looking beyond government formation, Yelagin of the
MFA Ukraine Desk warned that if Ukraine moved to join NATO,
"Things cannot go on as before." It would be "unrealistic"
for Ukraine to participate in the Single Economic Space with
Russia, for example, while joining Western multilateral
organizations. Many outside analysts see Ukraine's accession
to NATO as very likely. Aleksandr Belkin of the Council for
Foreign and Defense Policy said it was "on track" after the
election, and Karaganov told us he understood a decision on
membership was imminent. Karaganov had warned earlier in the
press that Ukrainian membership in NATO would turn a border
that had never previously served as a dividing line into the
scene of "hundreds or perhaps even thousands of small
conflicts, capable of growing into clashes, and into a
political-military confrontation." He hoped the Ukrainian
elite would display the "wisdom" necessary to avoid the
damage that NATO accession would bring. He told us he hopes
the West can be persuaded to slow down the pace of Ukraine's
movement toward NATO.


7. (C) Whatever the presumed outcome and timeline, even
discussing Ukraine's possible accession to NATO or the EU can
strike a raw nerve. In a March 21 Nezavisimaya Gazeta
article, Politika Foundation's Vyacheslav Nikonov
characterized mention of Ukraine's possible NATO accession as
a campaign tool to consolidate Yushchenko's Orange
electorate. Vitaliy Tretyakov, chief editor of Moscow News,
claimed bitterly that Ukraine's Euro-Atlanticism meant
"anything goes as long as it hurts Russia."

Gas
---


8. (C) A number of analysts and MFA officials told us it
unlikely that Ukraine's new government, whatever its
composition, would revisit the January 4 gas deal, which was
merely a "commercial dispute" (ref B). Trenin, however,
thought that if Tymoshenko came to power, she would push for
a revision. Several contacts believed that, once in a
position of power, Tymoshenko would simply cut a new
insider's deal to secure hydrocarbon revenue for her own
circle. In any event, Vremya Novostey's Artem Dubnov told
us, Ukraine would become more dependent on Russian gas, since
Turkmenistan has over-promised its gas resources and would be
unable to fulfill its commitments.

Moscow's Blind Spot
--------------


9. (C) The BBC's Konstantin Eggert told us that Yanukovich's
Party of Regions was more business-oriented than pro-Russian,
and its eastern Ukrainian base feared an influx of Russian
big capital. Blind to Ukraine's newly emerging national
identity, Eggert said, the Kremlin's maneuvers consistently
backfired. While Russia would gain from simply recognizing
Ukraine's independent path, Eggert predicted the GOR would
continue fishing in murky water, trying to play one bloc off
against the other. He noted a critical absence of CIS
experts attached to the Presidential Administration and said
Russia's foreign policy toward Ukraine was not informed by
deep or comprehensive strategic thinking.


10. (C) Andrey Ryabov, a scholar with the Institute of World
Economic and International Relations (IMEMO),struck similar
themes in a March 31 meeting. He said Russian officials were
telling themselves a fairy tale that there had been a "fatal
crack" in the Orange Revolution; that Ukraine's economy would
never survive in the international market apart from Russia;
that eventually Ukrainians would grow tired of political
confusion and seek simplicity in a strong leader (like in
Belarus). In fact, however, Ryabov said, Ukraine would never
again be a junior partner to Russia. Such wrong-headed
mythologies, in his view, would prevent Russia from
developing a long-term comprehensive policy toward Ukraine

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(as opposed to simply chasing gas revenue). Like Eggert,
Ryabov found fault with Moscow's CIS watchers in and out of
government, calling them "unprofessional."


11. (C) Illustrating Ryabov's point, the CIS Institute's
Kirill Frolov in a March 31 meeting dismissed Orange
supporters as "Fascists," "Nazis," and "Russia-haters."
Frolov wanted to know how America could support such people.
The best course was for America and Russia to sit down and
work out a deal to push for federalism in Ukraine, implying
Western and Russian spheres of influence. Konstantin
Zatulin, Director of the same Institute and a Duma Deputy,
told the press there could be no improvement in relations
with Russia until the idea of an "orange coalition" was
discarded. It could only deepen the split between East and
West in Ukraine.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Before the elections the GOR cultivated relations
with the top three candidates, hoping for a post-election
dividend through pragmatic relations with any coalition
government that might emerge. Pragmatism would likely
include normal trade relations and a continued push for Kiev
to make some accommodation for Russian language, culture and
presence in eastern Ukraine. The GOR appears to expect
Gazprom and RUE to continue to play key roles in Ukraine's
gas transit system and domestic gas market.


13. (C) Russia would like to prevent or at least delay
Ukraine's accession to NATO. Less obvious is how the GOR
will pursue that goal. Some punitive measures against
Ukraine have been floated, but many would entail as much pain
on the Russian side of the border, and might well accelerate
Ukraine's turn to the West.


14. (C) Russian officials remain reluctant to recognize the
birth of an independent Ukrainian national consciousness and
tend to view developments in Ukraine through an East-West
prism. Any Orange success is read as yet another example of
Western -- above all, American -- hostility toward Russia.
More fundamentally, Moscow has been unable to identify a
positive strategy for turning Ukraine back towards Russia.
RUSSELL