Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW3507
2006-04-04 10:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GEORGIA-RUSSIA: SOME POSITIVE STEPS -- AND SOME

Tags:  PREL MARR PBTS ETRD OSCE GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1489
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #3507/01 0941051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041051Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3579
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003507 

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS ETRD OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: SOME POSITIVE STEPS -- AND SOME
RED LINES

REF: MOSCOW 3202

Classified By: A/DCM Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003507

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS ETRD OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA-RUSSIA: SOME POSITIVE STEPS -- AND SOME
RED LINES

REF: MOSCOW 3202

Classified By: A/DCM Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. Russian MFA Fourth CIS Department Director
Andrey Kelin told A/DCM April 4 that he was pleased with the
"good cooperative spirit" he had met in Tbilisi when
finalizing the agreement on withdrawing Russian bases by 2008
that was signed in Sochi March 31. The March 27 South
Ossetia JCC meeting in Vladikavkaz had also been "positive,"
and would be followed by an early-May JCC meeting in
Tskhinvali. An "accumulation" of positive experiences could,

SIPDIS
if proved to be "stable," lead to rescheduling the visit of
Georgian PM Noghaideli for late spring/early summer.
However, Russia had two red lines that, if crossed, would
undercut any positive scenario: 1) a Georgian demand that
Russian peacekeepers have visas -- Kelin used Kosovo as a
precedent for rejecting that demand; and 2) seeking to revise
the 1994 agreement setting up the peace process and
peacekeeping mechanisms for South Ossetia. On the current
ban on imports of wine from Georgia and Moldova, Kelin said
technical talks could begin with Georgia as early as next
week, once the Ministry of Health finished talks with the
Moldovans and the Georgians sent a delegation from Tbilisi.
End Summary.

--------------
The Positive Signs...
--------------


2. (C) A/DCM sought a readout from Kelin, the DAS-equivalent
who heads the Caucasus directorate, after Kelin's visit to
the region last week. Kelin said the base withdrawal
agreement (based on a May 30, 2005 bilateral declaration) was
finalized in Tbilisi in a "good cooperative spirit." The
agreement was signed March 31, but the Russians
"understandably did not give it much attention in the media."
Kelin continued to Baku to negotiate an agreement to
withdraw equipment by rail through Azerbaijan. That gave the
logisticians the option of using sea or rail shipping to
withdraw the equipment returning to Russia, and Kelin

expected both to be used. Kelin said Russia hoped there
would be no problems with Georgian observance of the
agreement's condition that until the withdrawal is completed
Georgia provide, as a March 31 MFA statement put it, "normal
conditions for the functioning of the military bases" (e.g.,
in terms of visas and movement). There had been no incidents
in that regard since early February, Kelin said.


3. (U) Note. A "Krasnaya Zvezda" article of April 4 set out
some of the provisions of the agreement, noting that a joint
Russian-Georgian commission working in Tbilisi would oversee
fulfillment of the agreement's obligations and resolve
contentious issues. The agreement is to be in effect until
the end of 2008, unless one of the parties gives notice
through diplomatic channels of a substantial breach of its
terms by the other side, in which case implementation would
cease within 30 days. The article concluded that,
"especially taking into account the experience of the first
stage of Russian troop withdrawal, the process of withdrawal
from bases in Georgia will hardly be easy." End Note


4. (C) The March 27 South Ossetia Joint Coordination Council
(JCC) meeting in Tskhinvali was similarly constructive, Kelin
said. It produced positive results "for the first time:" an
agreement to create a working group to draw up a 3-stage
workplan based on the Saakashvili plan and the Kokoity
initiative. The Georgian refusal to approve a statement on
the non-use of force was "less positive." Kelin expected
another meeting of the JCC to take place in Tskhinvali in
early May.


5. (C) An "accumulation" of positive experiences could lead
to the rescheduling of a visit by Georgian PM Noghaideli for
late spring or early summer, Kelin said. The Georgians had
proposed an early April date for such a visit, but that was
"too early." It would first be necessary to confirm that the
positive trend was "stable," and a visit at the PM level
would require good preparation to ensure that it was
productive, rather than a step backward. Noghaideli could
discuss regional economic integration in the South Ossetia
conflict, the topic on which his aborted visit was to have
focused. A visit by someone on a slightly lower level might
lead up to the PM's visit.


6. (C) Kelin also hoped that Georgia's new Abkhazia
negotiator, Irakli Alasania, would visit Moscow in the near
future; the Russians considered his new function, his meeting
with Abkhaz leader Bagapsh, and their agreement to revive the
Georgian-Abkhaz Coordination Council to be positive steps.


MOSCOW 00003507 002 OF 002


--------------
...And the Less Positive
--------------


7. (C) Kelin foresaw two potential problems that could
derail relations once again. The first was the Georgian
demand that Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia obtain visas. Georgian DFM Antadze, during his
late-February discussions with the MFA on the visa issue, had
assured the GOR that the demand for PKF visas was off the
table, but a a diplomatic note from the Georgian MFA had just
revived the issue. Kelin insisted that Russian peacekeepers
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia should have the same status as
peacekeepers in Kosovo: exemption from visas and from local
jurisdiction. Russia was prepared to discuss certain
questions pertaining to the status of the peacekeepers with
Georgia, but "we feel very strongly that we cannot allow the
introduction of a visa regime."


8. (C) Russia's other red line, according to Kelin, was the
1994 agreement setting up the JCC process for resolving the
South Ossetia conflict and establishing the Joint
Peacekeeping Force. Any move by Georgia to revise that would
be unacceptable to Russia.

--------------
What About That Toast to Friendship?
--------------


9. (C) A/DCM recalled that DFM Karasin had told Ambassador
Burns March 29 (reftel) that Russia was prepared to hold
expert-level talks on Russia's ban of wine imports from
Georgia (and Moldova) before the ban went into effect. But
Chief Sanitary Doctor Onnishchenko had announced the ban and
then gone on vacation. No talks had taken place, and the ban
was in effect.


10. (C) Kelin reiterated the Russian position that the ban
was technical, not political. He blamed the lack of talks
with Georgia on the fact that the Georgians had been "slower
off the mark" than the Moldovans, who had immediately sent a
delegation that now was engaged in talks with appropriate
expert counterparts. (Note: The Moldovan delegation, headed
by Economy Minister Lazar, arrived in Moscow March 28, the
day after the ban started; their talks began a week later.)
The Georgians, however, had not send a delegation from
Tbilisi, and had wanted instead to address the issue through
diplomatic contacts by the Georgian Embassy here. Russian
health authorities would be prepared to hold talks with a
delegation from Tbilisi once the current discussions with
Moldova are finished, probably by the end of this week.
Kelin said he had received that information late on April 3
from the Health Ministry and had passed it on to Russian
Ambassador Chkhikvishvili in Tbilisi. Echoing a frequent
theme, Kelin said Georgia's problems with Russia could be
dealt with more readily if Georgian authorities were as quick
to pursue contacts with Moscow as they were to "appeal to Mr.
Bryza or Ambassador Tefft."

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Kelin made clear that Russia is willing to pursue
improved relations with Georgia -- on its own terms and on a
step-by-step basis. Its terms include Georgian restraint not
only on "anti-Russian" rhetoric, but also on pressing on
sensitive issues, central as they may be to Georgian goals.
The wine import ban -- which all observers agree is
politically motivated -- appears to be a message that Russia
has means available to enforce its terms.
RUSSELL