Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW3335
2006-03-31 09:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION MANEUVERING: EARLY STIRRINGS

Tags:  PGOV ECON PINR RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8344
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #3335/01 0900906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 310906Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3312
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003335 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION MANEUVERING: EARLY
STIRRINGS

REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 14734
B. MOSCOW 1082
C. MOSCOW 1434
D. 05 MOSCOW 15735
E. MOSCOW 3218

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003335

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, RS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION MANEUVERING: EARLY
STIRRINGS

REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 14734
B. MOSCOW 1082
C. MOSCOW 1434
D. 05 MOSCOW 15735
E. MOSCOW 3218

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. In the months since President Putin's
November 14 personnel reshuffle that moved Dmitriy Medvedev
and Sergey Ivanov into succession spotlight, political
discussion has centered on how that move is playing out.
Most observers continue to accept Putin's word that he will
step down at the end of his term. They are divided over
whether Medvedev will ultimately benefit from having been
assigned to oversee Putin's national priority projects.
While Sergey Ivanov has taken some serious hits (on, e.g.,
military "hazing" excesses),he is fighting back, and most
observers do not rule him out as a potential successor.
Discussion also includes other possible contenders, with
Dmitriy Kozak and Sergey Sobyanin appearing more frequently
than previously. The general view is that all those
considered even potential contenders face enough serious
pitfalls to preclude confident predictions about who will
ultimately grab the brass ring. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is
working in overkill mode to neutralize any threats to its
succession scenario, notably from Dmitriy Rogozin and Mikhail
Kasyanov. The preoccupation with succession politics, and an
attendant increase in infighting over politics and assets,
leaves less Kremlin time and energy for policymaking. END
SUMMARY.

2. (C) On November 14 Putin shook up the political scene
with a major personnel reshuffle in the Presidential
Administration (PA) and government (ref A). Over the past
four months, that reshuffle has been the primary point of
reference in discussions of the succession, as that issue
increasingly dominates the domestic political scene.
.
PUTIN, MEDVEDEV AND SERGEY IVANOV
--------------

3. (C) Most observers continue to see the November reshuffle
as confirming Putin's commitment to step down at the end of
his current term. In a meeting with the Ambassador, Norilsk
Nickel owner Vladimir Potanin said Putin remains determined
to leave office in 2008. Ekho Moskvy radio s
tation head
Aleksey Venediktov shared that view, telling us Putin is
increasingly tired of the presidency. Venediktov believes
Putin's heavy focus on energy issues reflects a plan to
transition to a lucrative position in the energy sector once
he departs the Kremlin, leaving himself the option of running
for president again in 2012. (Note. The Constitution bans
more than two successive terms as President, but would not
ban a non-consecutive third term. End Note) Other scenarios
-- all equally speculative -- continue to circulate about
Putin's post-presidency plans. No one is entirely sure Putin
will step down, however, with Moscow Carnegie Center's
Aleksey Arbatov, for instance, casting doubt on the reports
that Putin is tired of his position and predicting that Putin
will find a way to stay on.

4. (C) Dmitriy Medvedev was initially seen as the big winner
in the November reshuffle. By moving him from PA chief to
First Deputy Prime Minister and above all by placing him in
charge of the national priority projects, Putin appeared
motivated by a desire to give Medvedev a higher public
profile and to increase his popularity as a way to lay the
groundwork for presidential anointment. Over the last few
months, Medvedev has sought to take advantage of the
opportunity, seemingly trying to cast himself as a
president-in-waiting. When PM Mikhail Fradkov has been away
from Moscow, Medvedev has made a point of running the Cabinet
and ensuring that the media covers his activities. A Center
for Political Technologies (CPT) study noted that Medvedev
has tried to adopt Putin's leadership style, brusquely giving
orders to Cabinet members to demonstrate that he is in
charge, although he has not always done so persuasively.
With the trappings of office, including an honor guard,
Medvedev attempted to "look presidential" when he recently
welcomed visiting Energy Secretary Bodman to the Kremlin.
(Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist specializing in elite
politics, has recently written that Medvedev's televison
appearances have left the impression of weakness and
indecisiveness, while Sergey Ivanov has more successfully
captured the "presidential" style that reminds viewers of
Putin.) In meetings with the Ambassador, Medvedev has been
very down-to-earth and focused on tangible progress on the
national priority projects.

5. (C) Heading the national projects initiative offers

MOSCOW 00003335 002 OF 004


Medvedev an opportunity to gain popularity, but it comes with
pitfalls, as many observers are underscoring. Mastering the
new bureaucracy emerging around the national projects, as
well as dealing with the old one that is still addressing the
four project areas, is a significant bureaucratic challenge,Qnd Medvedev has already publicly complained about
unjustifiable delays. Potanin told the Ambassador that of
the priority projects, only housing offers any real chance of
demonstrating significant progress. Some think Medvedev was
put in charge of the national projects to limit corruption.
Particularly for that reason, a corruption scandal involving
the projects would be a serious failure, even if Medvedev
himself were not accused of wrongdoing. The National
Strategy Council's Iosif Dyskin, an advisor to presidential
contender Vladimir Yakunin, predicted to us that such
scandals would emerge over the next few months, sullying
Medvedev's reputation even though he would not be directly
implicated in corruption.

6. (C) Meanwhile, Medvedev must deal with political
infighting with potential rivals. Venediktov told us how ill
feelings arose in the Kremlin when Medvedev decided that, by
virtue of being First DPM, he should have almost as large a
staff as Fradkov. Seeking to spite Medvedev and deny him
slots for some trusted staffers, Fradkov pared down his own
apparat, forcing Medvedev to lessen his demands, Venediktov
related. Fradkov has also sought to hinder Medvedev by
assigning him extraneous tasks that distract from his work on
the national projects, such as insisting that Medvedev be put
in charge of the campaign against avian flu, which offers
little political gain if the disease doesn't spread -- but
much room for blame in the event of a serious outbreak.

7. (C) In another example of infighting, reports surfaced
that Boris Kovalchuk, the 28-year-old son of Putin insider
Yuriy Kovalchuk, would be appointed to head the newly formed
department in charge of the national projects. Federation
Council member Vladimir Slutsker echoed to us the view of
many observers that the decision to install a young and
inexperienced person to head a key department was meant to
undercut Medvedev. The older Kovalchuk was not necessarily
opposed to Medvedev but simply wanted to have his son
installed in an important -- and lucrative -- position,
according to Slutsker, who said others encouraged the idea to
damage Medvedev. Venediktov, by contrast, told us that
though the appointment might not encourage efficiency,
Medvedev consciously accepted it to court Putin insiders such
as the older Kovalchuk.

8. (C) In sum, observers agree that Medvedev faces a tough
road ahead, despite being given an early chance to succeed.
Potanin told the Ambassador he thinks Medvedev will likely
become PM, possibly even this year, but the presidential
succession would not necessarily follow. Venediktov believes
Medvedev remains the front runner, and that if he does well,
Putin may call early Duma elections to test Medvedev's
political skills.

9. (C) Although many thought he was advanced only into a
"fall-back" position, Sergey Ivanov also gained from the
November reshuffle, which made him a Deputy Prime Minister
while he retained his position as Defense Minister. He has
had some troubles since then, taking a public relations
beating over a brutal hazing incident in Chelyabinsk (ref B)
and sparring with the Military Prosecutor's Office.
Venediktov told us that the extensive airing of the hazing
story in the Russian media was clearly orchestrated by
Ivanov's opponents. Observers believe Ivanov has fought back
vigorously and effectively, and Putin recently broaden his
control of the military-industrial complex, putting him in
charge of the government commission that oversees that
sector. Potanin told the Ambassador that Ivanov is smart and
remains in contention. Our sense is that most other
observers similarly do not rule him out.
.
OTHER CONTENDERS
--------------

10. (C) Given broad agreement that Medvedev and Sergey
Ivanov could well falter, observers are also watching other
potential contenders. Of late we have heard renewed
discussion about Southern Federal District Presidential
Representative (PolPred) Dmitriy Kozak. That may have been
precipitated by press rumors, which could have been planted
by Kozak's supporters, that Putin is considering installing
him as Justice Minister in the near future. Potanin told the
Ambassador that Putin will bring Kozak back to Moscow before
2008, and he should not be counted out for the succession.
Aleksandr Machevskiy, the well-connected assistant to
Presidential Envoy to the EU Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, noted to
us recently that the Kremlin saw Kozak as having done a good

MOSCOW 00003335 003 OF 004


job in the North Caucasus under extremely difficult
conditions, and he hinted that Kozak's succession prospects
had improved as a result.

11. (C) We also have noted more talk recently about Sergey
Sobyanin, the former Tyumen governor who was appointed to
head the Presidential Administration (PA) in the November
reshuffle, as a possible albeit still dark-horse contender.
Although Venediktov downplayed Sobyanin's abilities in a
conversation with the Ambassador last month (ref C),others
have told us he is performing well and will soon begin to
assert himself in the PA. Some of our reformist economic
contacts express pleasant surprise with Sobyanin's
willingness to consider tough structural reforms and support
the national priority projects. Potanin told the Ambassador
that Sobyanin, despite his low profile, was proving effective
and warranted attention. Andrey Ryabov of the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations told us Sobyanin
was gaining strength in the PA and would soon begin to bring
in officials from Siberia to take over mid-level PA slots
currently dominated by St. Petersburgers.

12. (C) Sobyanin's impact on the byzantine politics and
power balance inside the PA, and any resulting impact on the
succession, remain unclear. According to Ryabov, Sobyanin's
growing influence will soon pose a threat to PA deputy head
Vladislav Surkov. Putin chose Sobyanin to bolster the
influence of regional leaders, Ryabov continued, and thus to
counter Surkov's Moscow-dominated approach. Slutsker also
told us that Surkov's star is on the wane, with Putin
increasingly disappointed in him. Indeed, by some accounts,
the publication of Surkov's February speech to the United
Russia party (ref E) was aimed at least in part to shore up
his position.

13. (C) Russian Railroads CEO Vladimir Yakunin, a close
friend of Putin, has kept an extremely low profile but
continues to be seen by many observers as in the running.
Dyskin, a close Yakunin advisor, told us Yakunin was keeping
a low profile at present to avoid being attacked by
opponents. At the same time, Yakunin was using his post at
the railroads to build wide regional support and demonstrate
managerial expertise. Dyskin suggested that Yakunin's camp
was discreetly helping undercut potential rivals, including
by helping to develop plans to set off a corruption scandal
involving the national projects that would harm Medvedev.

14. (C) The candiates mentioned above do not necessarily
exhaust the range of possibilities. Kryshtanovskya continues
to predict that still other names (e.g., head of the
government apparat Sergey Naryshkin) will be surfaced as the
process moves forward.
.
NEUTRALIZING THE OUTSIDE OPPOSITION
--------------

15. (SBU) Even as the maneuvering among political insiders
picks up steam, the Kremlin has made significant progress in
recent months in neutralizing outsiders perceived as at least
potential threats to secure Kremlin management of the
succession process. Most recently, at a Rodina party
congress on March 25, Dmitriy Rogozin stepped down as the
party's top leader, being replaced by Aleksandr Babakov.
Rogozin explained his move as a result of Kremlin-driven
intrigues, a claim that virtually no observers doubt. By
most accounts, Rogozin -- although a "Kremlin project" in
2003 to drain votes away from the Communist Party in Duma
elections -- had become too popular and was trying to become
independent of his original Kremlin sponsors. That
precipitated the Rodina's removal from the ballot in the
Moscow city elections and in seven of eight regional
legislative elections on March 12, seen as a clear signal
that the Kremlin would paralyze Rodina unless Rogozin stepped
down. According to a CPT analysis, the Kremlin finds Babakov
a more manageable figure, and will allow the party to
continue functioning now that it no longer represents a
serious political threat.

16. (C) At the same time, the Kremlin has been working on
various fronts to counter the efforts of former PM Mikhail
Kasyanov to mount a presidential bid. Most recently, it was
by all accounts the Kremlin that engineered Kasyanov's
failure to take over the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR),
helping forestall the already remote chance that the
democratic camp as a whole would fall in behind the former PM
(ref D). Indeed, the democrats continue to show meager
prospects of uniting behind anyone. That wound appears to be
largely self-inflicted, with Yabloko and the Union of Right
Forces (SPS) far from showing signs of unifying despite
cooperation in the most recent round of regional elections.
The Kremlin, or at least elements therein, may also be

MOSCOW 00003335 004 OF 004


contributing to the continued disunity, with Ryabov
speculating to us, for instance, that new DPR leader Andrey
Bogdanov had been instructed by the Kremlin to promote a
unification within the democratic camp but without any big
names.
.
COMMENT
--------------

17. (C) The succession process is now fully underway, albeit
in an early stage. The current focus remains on the two
figures seen to have gained from the November reshuffle, but
the prospects of both remain highly uncertain. For that
reason, other political figures are being discussed, and the
list of perceived candidates is likely to change with some
frequency. Although reforms and policy initiatives
considered or proposed in the period ahead may have substance
in their own right, all will be viewed primarily through the
prism of the succession, and many decisions will be taken
primarily with an eye to their anticipated impact (positive
or negative) on contenders for succession. Security Council
head Igor Ivanov may have captured the situation best in a
side conversation with the Ambassador when he said the
Kremlin's preoccupation with 2007-08 distracts it from
pursuing policies on their own terms. While focusing on the
impact of their actions on potential contenders in the
succession, many of the players will also look to feather
their own nests while they know they are in a position to do
so. And, Ivanov stressed, the process is only beginning and
will not get better in the period ahead.
BURNS