Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW3333
2006-03-31 08:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

U.S. NUCLEAR PRIMACY ARTICLE HITS A NERVE

Tags:  PREL PARM MNUC PGOV RS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003333 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC PGOV RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NUCLEAR PRIMACY ARTICLE HITS A NERVE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns per 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003333

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC PGOV RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NUCLEAR PRIMACY ARTICLE HITS A NERVE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns per 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: A Foreign Affairs article asserting the
advent of U.S. nuclear primacy has caused a stir in the
Russian political elite and media and forced Russian leaders
to defend the viability of Russia's deterrent force. The
thesis plays to the belief that the U.S. regards Russia as a
potential enemy, not a partner, and that a U.S. BMD
capability could serve as a shield enabling an American first
strike. We will continue to look for opportunities,
including upcoming visits by high-ranking U.S. officials, to
take on these misperceptions. End Summary.

Defending Russia's Strategic Nuclear Potential
-------------- -


2. (C) The "Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," an article by
academics at Notre Dame and the University of Pennsylvania
that appears in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, has
created a stir in the Russia political elite and media and
touched a nerve in the Russian defense establishment. Deputy
Foreign Minister Karasin raised the article in a March 28
meeting with Ambassador, as did Kremlin Foreign Policy
Advisor Prikhodko on March 30. Ambassador responded that the
article reflected the views of its authors, not the U.S.
government, and said it badly misrepresented U.S. policy.


3. (SBU) Media interest has compelled senior officials to go
on record defending the capacity of Russia's nuclear
deterrent. Defmin Sergey Ivanov has commented that the
article shows that some in the U.S. "must dislike the fact
that we have established good relations with China."
Underlining that Russia maintains "powerful and effective
nuclear forces," Ivanov said the article was "not serious"
and compared it to accusations that Russia had provided
intelligence to Saddam Hussein.


4. (SBU) Colonel General Nikolai Solovstov, Commander of
Russia's strategic rocket forces, focused on the article's
assertion that BMD technology could give the U.S. a shield
for a first strike. He stated in an interview: "We have
always managed to find resources for preserving and renewing

our strategic nuclear potential. Current technologies make
it possible to develop new missiles and other weapons for
outsmarting even the most effective ABM system." Vladimir
Dvorkin, a former MOD official now at an Academy of Sciences
institute, told the press that the Foreign Affairs article
"exaggerated" the incapacity of Russia to ensure continuing
nuclear deterrence, but confirmed that the general
degradation of Russian capabilities described in the article
was closer to the mark. Former MOD liaison office head
Leonid Ivashov described the article as "a political means of
putting pressure on Russia, a warning to Russian
politicians."

Dismay
--------------


5. (C) Aleksey Arbatov, a former Duma Defense Committee
Deputy Chairman, raised the article in a March 28 meeting
with us. He acknowledged that the authors were not
well-known, but said the article's publication in Foreign
Affairs nonetheless gave it the aura of a "semi-official
statement." Arbatov, who chairs an advisory group on
strategic issues at the Security Council, told us officials
there were dismayed. He said some in the Kremlin saw the
article as part of a series of salvos aimed at Russia and
pointed to "demeaning" references to Russia in the U.S.
National Security Strategy, the accusation that Russia passed
military information to Saddam, and the lack of U.S.
recognition for Russia's prerogatives in its neighborhood.



6. (C) Arbatov added that the idea that the U.S. might seek
to use nuclear blackmail against Russia resonates strongly in
Moscow, especially in the MOD, and an attempt to intimidate
Russia through efforts to develop nuclear primacy would spur
Russia to be invest more in its own nuclear arsenal. Arbatov
said the Foreign Affairs article would be the prime subject
at a Conference at which he will speak at the Carnegie Moscow
Center April 4.


7. (SBU) Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar also joined the
chorus of lamentation in the March 29 Financial Times, noting
that the Foreign Affairs article had had "an explosive
effect...Even Russian journalists and analysts not inclined
to hysteria or anti-Americanism have viewed the article as an
expression of the U.S. official stance." Gaydar argued that
"if someone had wanted to provoke Russia and China into close
cooperation over missile and nuclear technologies, it would
have been difficult to find a more skillful and elegant way

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of doing so."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The article's forecast of U.S. nuclear primacy plays
to deep-seated Russian fears and undermines efforts to build
confidence that our BMD efforts do not come at the expense of
Russian security. While official and expert Russians
recognize that the article does not formally represent the
views of the U.S. government, there is wide suspicion that
its appearance in a prestigious journal, especially in the
context of other recent strains in our relationship, may
nonetheless have had some official sponsorship, or at least
accurately reflect influential views within our government.
High-ranking U.S. officials who will be visiting Russia in
the near future (including STRATCOM's General Cartwright, ISN
Assistant Secretary Rademaker, and U/S Burns) should expect
questions from Russian interlocutors and the media for
clarification of whether the U.S. is seeking, or at least
expecting, to be in a position of nuclear primacy vis-a-vis
Russia in coming years.

BURNS