Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW2974
2006-03-24 06:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA-GEORGIA: LOOKING AHEAD

Tags:  PREL MARR ETRD PBTS NATO GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0095
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2974/01 0830629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 240629Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2871
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002974 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD PBTS NATO GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: LOOKING AHEAD

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns; reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002974

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD PBTS NATO GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: LOOKING AHEAD

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns; reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Emotions seem to be cooling (at least
temporarily) between Russia and Georgia, and we are seeing a
return to low-level business. Statements that would have
caused an uproar just a few weeks ago are being dismissed
with good humor. But that is a long way from making real
progress, especially on Georgia's immediate goal of a peace
settlement on South Ossetia. Rather, both sides appear to be
girding for what they see as the major struggle -- Georgia's
prospects for NATO membership and the irreversibility of its
external orientation. The U.S. should continue to try to
keep emotions dampened on both sides and push hard for
advancing economic aspects of the South Ossetia settlement on
which the U.S., Russia, and Europe can cooperate. End
summary.

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The Atmosphere Improves...
--------------


2. (C) At separate meetings with MFA Georgia Office Director
Semyon Grigoryev and visiting Georgian Deputy Speaker of
Parliament Mikheil Machavariani, we tried to piece together
the state of Russian-Georgian relations and their likely
course over the next few months. Grigoryev told us March 13
that relations were in a "pause" that would go on until
emotions on both sides cooled.


3. (C) Emotions in fact seem to be cooling sooner than
expected. Machavariani was cautiously upbeat about his March
20-22 visit ("We expected much worse" is the way Georgian DCM
Shugarov put it),saying atmospherics were relatively good
with all interlocutors, even when there was disagreement over
substance. To be sure, provocative rhetoric has not
disappeared. Georgian President Saakashvili unveiled plans
for a "Museum of Occupation," provoking Grigoryev to muse on
exactly whom Stalin, Beria and Ordzhonikidze were
"occupying." South Ossetian "President" Kokoity has declared
that on the basis of a 1774 document, South Ossetia has never
ceased being a part of Russia -- under the unique legal

reasoning that while the laws of the defunct Soviet Union are
null and void, the laws of the even more defunct Russian
Empire remain in full force. The Georgians did not rise to
the bait this time: the press reported March 23 that Georgian
Minister for Conflict Resolution Khaindrava doubted anyone
would take Kokoity's words seriously. Injudicious rhetoric
has characterized the relationship all along; only the
emotional reactions vary in pitch.


4. (C) In a March 23 discussion, the Ambassador raised
Kokoity's latest intended provocation with DFM Karasin,
urging that Russia not let the considerable efforts expended
to organize a Joint Control Commission meeting be undermined
by such unproductive rhetoric. Karasin noted that the
Georgians were also not innocent of injudicious remarks, but
he agreed that all concerned should try to arrange a
successful JCC. Although neither Russia's nor South
Ossetia's positions had changed, he said, Russia would try to
moderate Kokoity's statements.

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...But Will Results Follow?
--------------


5. (C) Meanwhile, business is resuming, although with ups
and downs. President Putin signed the decree on withdrawing
Russian troops and bases from Georgia. The Russian Embassy
in Tbilisi is now issuing visas to Georgians, while Russia's
military personnel in Georgia have started receiving one-year
multiple-entry visas. A JCC meeting on South Ossetia looks
likely to take place next week in Vladikavkaz, and Grigoryev
assured us that Russia would not even mind discussing a
replacement for the Peace Keeping Force -- provided
discussion took place in an appropriate context such as the
JCC, and not in the press. On the other hand, Russia widened
its ban on the import of plants from Georgia, and is
discussing a ban on wine (which would probably not affect
availability, thus helping wine lovers confirm what they
suspected all along: that many of the "Georgian" wines they
drink here are counterfeit).


6. (C) Machavariani (joined at our March 22 meeting by his
predecessor Gigi Tsereteli, Ambassador Chubinishvili and DCM
Shugarov) said that his main aim in Moscow was to persuade
Russia to move ahead on the South Ossetia peace process. He
feared that if the momentum were to fade, it would appear
that the peace plan endorsed in Ljubljana was "stale."
Tsereteli noted that the Georgian electoral cycle -- local

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elections this September and parliamentary elections in 2008
-- would have a hardening effect on Georgian rhetoric.


MOSCOW 00002974 002 OF 003



7. (C) Machavariani claimed that all his interlocutors --
both in Parliament and the MFA -- supported Georgian
territorial integrity, and all now recognized that there was,
indeed, a peace plan (the Russian MFA previously denied its
existence). However, he admitted, no Russian interlocutor
was in a rush to implement it. "We're not in a hurry," he
said the Russians repeatedly told him. "You Georgians are the
ones in a hurry. But the idea of resolving this conflict in
the next two or three years is unrealistic." Machavariani
noted that the prospects for Kosovo independence were a brake
on progress on South Ossetia and Abkhazia -- all the
separatists were waiting to see what the Kosovars got rather
than settling now for what could turn out to be less. All
the Russians with whom he spoke played up support for Russian
citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but reacted
impassively when he described the unilateral
confidence-building measures Georgia was taking, such as
adopting a law on restitution.

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The Looming Precipice: NATO
--------------


8. (C) The big anxiety for Russia is the prospect of Georgia
joining NATO. Grigoryev said that while Russia's official
line is that joining an alliance is "a country's own
business," in reality Georgia's NATO aspirations are the
single greatest spoiler -- present and potential -- in the
relationship. Russia's concern is all the more, he said,
because Georgia's new National Security Strategy identifies
Russia as the main source of threats to Georgia's security.


9. (C) Machavariani confirmed that he heard both the
official and the unofficial line in his various
conversations, and that there was sometimes an implicit
linkage to the frozen conflicts. Machavariani said his
interlocutors' arguments boiled down to this: "Of course,
it's your choice. But the choice is this: are you with us,
or are you with the Americans? The Americans are not our
enemy, but they are our competitor. If you are joining the
competition, we will be in no hurry to help you with your
conflicts."


10. (C) Grigoryev feared that the NATO factor would come to
a head this year. Georgia appeared to be on the NATO
"escalator." Its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)
review had earned high marks, and it might get a Membership
Action Plan (MAP) this year -- which to Grigoryev meant
"automatic" membership in about two years. A MAP would cause
an immediate escalation of tensions between Russia and
Georgia. Asked what could be done to improve relations in
the long run, Grigoryev called for a unilateral Georgian
renunciation of foreign bases or NATO membership.

--------------
Tackling the Dilemma
--------------


11. (C) Machavariani stressed the importance of creating
conditions in which Russia would be willing to move forward
on South Ossetia. Given Russian fears, we asked how we could
foster such an atmosphere. How could Russia be induced to
see it as worth its while to move forward? That stumped
Machavariani, but Chubinishvili listed three factors:

-- Toned-down rhetoric, eliminating all ad hominem attacks
("We can't stop our rhetoric entirely," Machavariani noted,
"or the Russians will believe Georgia accepts whatever they
do");

-- Working quietly, without fanfare, towards the MAP; and

-- Enlisting international pressure, revolving around the G8
summit.


12. (C) With regard to the summit and the economic issues to
be discussed, Machavariani made clear that Georgia would
stick to its preconditions, all of them economic, for
supporting Russian accession to WTO. The conditions involved
imports, customs, borders and the elimination of smuggling.
Only one condition, a demand for a single Russian visa policy
for all parts of Georgia, could be considered political.
That condition was moot in any case, Tsereteli noted, because
their Russian interlocutors claimed that 95 percent of the
residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia already have Russian
citizenship. Machavariani said that if Russia met those
preconditions, Georgia would support its WTO accession -- he
made no linkage to South Ossetia.

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Comment: The U.S. Role
--------------

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12. (C) Events of the past two weeks have shown that when
emotions are calmed, Georgia and Russia are capable of
negotiations that get business done. But the calm is
unlikely to last. Georgia has a concrete short-term goal:
recovery of South Ossetia, the key to which is in Moscow.
Georgia also has a concrete medium-term goal: recovery of
Abkhazia, the key to which is also in Moscow. And Georgia
has a long-term goal: joining NATO, a prospect that makes
Russia want to throw away both keys.


13. (C) One area in which the U.S. can help is in keeping
the sides from provoking each other, and in urging calm when
irritants appear. Another area in which we can push for
progress -- an area that is also less likely to provoke one
side or the other -- is economics. Most recent peace plans
for South Ossetia -- Georgian and Ossetian alike -- call for
a "Special Economic Zone" linking parts of North Ossetia, all
of South Ossetia and parts of Georgia. In the long run, that
may be the best hope for re-uniting the Ossetian and Georgian
peoples through common interests. We should make a strong
push -- including at the April Donors' Conference in Brussels
-- to set that up independent of all other progress in the
peace process, and maximize our cooperation with Russia and
the EU both to make it come about and provide it with
adequate support.
BURNS