NO SURPRISES IN RUSSIA'S "SUPER SUNDAY" REGIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002446

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR RS
SUBJECT: NO SURPRISES IN RUSSIA'S "SUPER SUNDAY" REGIONAL
ELECTIONS

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk
Augustine. For reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. In regional legislative elections in eight
of Russia's regions on March 12, the pro-Kremlin United
Russia party appears to have scored a clear victory. Four
political parties ran in all eight elections, while Rodina
and some smaller parties were kept off the ballot in some of
those regions. Preliminary reports indicate that voter
turnout was low, with a significant "against all" vote. The
administration's active role in removing parties from the
electoral races and its use of administrative resources
indicate its continued efforts to limit opposition gains and
control the membership of regional legislatures, which
recently have been granted the right to nominate governors.
END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (U) On March 12 regional legislative elections took place
in the Adygeya and Altay Republics, the Kaliningrad, Kursk,
Kirov, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Orenburg Oblasts, and
Khanty-Mansy Autonomous Okrug. Two State Duma by-elections
were also held, as were local self-government elections in 60
regions. This "super Sunday" of regional races resulted from
last year's amendment to federal election legislation
consolidating regional and municipal elections to two voting
days, the second Sunday in March and the second Sunday in
October. Most regions require 20-25 percent voter turnout in
order to validate an election, and parties must exceed a 5-7
percent threshold (depending on the region) to gain
representation in a regional legislature. Only four parties,
United Russia (YR),the Communist Party (KPRF),the
Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR),and the Russian Party of
Pensioners, succeeded in registering for all eight
legislative elections.


3. (SBU) Regional legislative races long drew minimal
attention, given that governors were directly elected and
usually controlled their legislatures. With the elimination
of direct gubernatorial elections, however, those
legislatures gained the power to vote on whether to approve
of the president's gubernatorial nomination, giving the
regional legislative races more at least formal significance.
The latest change, giving regional legislatures the power to
nominate governors, further enhances the significance, or at
least the profile, of the regional races.

RESULTS
--------------


4. (U) According to preliminary results from the elections,
United Russia (YR) received a plurality of votes in all eight
regions where legislative races were held, with results
ranging from a high of 58 percent in Khantiy-Mansy Autonomous
Okrug to a low of 27 percent in Altay Republic. KPRF placed
a strong second in six of the eight regions, receiving
between 11 and 18 percent of the vote. LDPR passed the
voting threshold in five of the eight regions. The Party of
Pensioners, although competing in all eight regions, passed
the threshold in only three of them. The Union of Right
Forces (SPS) and Yabloko failed to pass the threshold in any
of the regions. The "against all" option was widely used,
garnering 13 percent in Khanty-Mansy Autonomous Okrug and
over eight percent in Orenburg Oblast. Rodina was kept off
the ballot in all but one of the races; in Altay Republic it
captured over ten percent of the vote, finishing second after
YR.


5. (U) Aleksandr Veshnyakov, the Chairman of the Central
Election Commission (CEC),announced the results at a March
13 press conference, stating that despite the "convincing
victory" of YR, all regional legislatures would have
representation of three to six parties. This, Veshnyakov
argued, precluded the emergence of a one-party political
system in Russia.

UNITED RUSSIA'S SUCCESS
--------------


6. (C) Preliminary results demonstrated YR's continuing
strength as the country's ruling party. One of the biggest
complaints by smaller parties against YR was its widespread
use of "administrative resources" in the regions. Many YR
party lists in the regions were headed by governors, who
could throw the resources at their disposal behind YR
candidates to more effectively gather financing and
advertise. In Kaliningrad Oblast, for instance, Consulate
St. Petersburg noted that Governor Georgiy Boos exerted
considerable influence during election preparations to ensure

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a YR victory and to prevent Kremlin-unfriendly figures from
winning seats. Lilya Shibanova of the Golos election
monitoring organization told us that she expects YR to
continue to strengthen during this year's regional elections.
As more YR candidates succeed in reaching the regional
legislatures, no strong opposition will be able to develop,
Shibanova predicted.

RODINA AND OTHERS REMOVED FROM BALLOTS
--------------


7. (C) Perhaps the most noteworthy development of this set of
elections was regional election commissions' refusal to
register parties that the Kremlin appeared to see as a
potential threat. Most strikingly, regional election
commissions banned Rodina in 7 out of 8 of the legislative
elections. The only exception came in Altay, where Rodina
successfully appealed the electoral commission's decision and
was reinstalled on the ballot. Regional election commissions
removed parties based on alleged violations, such as
campaigning before the designated start date and technical
violations on signature lists. Rodina was not the only
target of the election commissions, with several commissions
removing a record number of parties. Nizhniy Novgorod's
commission disallowed six parties, while Adygeya disallowed
four.


8. (C) Rodina's absence from almost all of the May 12 races
led many observers to note that the Kremlin is showing its
dissatisfaction with Dmitriy Rogozin, the party's leader.
Moscow Carnegie Center analyst Nikolay Petrov told us that
although initially created to help the Kremlin, Rodina had
become too independent and popular. Rogozin began to express
his own views, rather than those scripted by the Kremlin.
The Kremlin needed an "opposition" party that it could
control. Many believe that if Rodina replaces Rogozin at its
March 25 party congress, it will have a chance to regain the
Kremlin's favor. Likewise, Consulate St. Petersburg noted to
us that the People's Party in Kaliningrad was not allowed on
the ballot, likely due to its party leader, Igor Rudnikov,
who had boosted his party's popularity in the oblast to 15
percent while ignoring the regional administration and the
Kremlin.

KPRF AND LDPR
--------------


9. (C) Some observers had predicted that KPRF and LDPR would
receive the benefits of Rodina's absence from the ballot.
Indeed, the Communists took a strong second to YR in several
of the March 12 races. Maksim Dianov of the Institute of
Regional Problems suggested that the new schedule of regional
elections would also help those two parties. On the one
hand, he argued, it would gradually funnel "Presidential
opposition" into the KPRF camp. It was also a gift to LDPR,
in Dianov's view, likely boosting that party close to or over
the voting threshold in many regions by allowing it to pick
up votes that would otherwise have gone to Rodina. LDPR did
manage to gain representation in at least five regional
legislatures in the March 12 races, although it is too early
to tell the extent to which Rodina's exclusion affected the
outcome.

FATE OF DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
--------------


10. (C) The March 12 races were also closely watched with
regard to the democratic parties, particularly given the
relatively successful alliance of SPS and Yabloko in the
December Moscow election. While neither SPS nor Yabloko met
the voting threshold in any of the regional elections, their
decision to split the regions up - only running against one
another in one region in order not to harm each other's
chances - signaled increased coordination. Petrov commented
to us that the democrats had demonstrated pragmatism, which
he saw as an encouraging sign. Shibanova, however, told us
the democrats still did not look strong enough to effectively
compete in the 2007 parliamentary elections.

LOW TURNOUT SIGNIFICANT?
--------------


11. (C) To many observers, the low turnout and the relatively
high percentage of "against all" votes (which, according to
press reports, averaged 10 percent in the eight regions)
suggest continued voter dissatisfaction. The absence of
Rodina may have enhanced that unhappiness. Consulate
Yekaterinburg noted that in Khantiy-Mansy Autonomous Okrug,
the "against all" option garnered over 13 percent, putting it
in second place behind YR. Petrov predicted that voter
disappointment, reflected in the high "against all" vote on

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March 12, could eventually translate into some form of social
protest. According to Petrov, local electoral commissions
never before played such an active role in eliminating
parties from the ballot, and that result in a backlash among
voters.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The March 12 elections produced no surprises and
consolidated United Russia's control of regional
legislatures. Prior elections had featured other forms of
"administrative resources." This time around, to an
unprecedented extent they took the form of regional election
commissions eliminating parties perceived as unfriendly to
the Kremlin from running, with Rodina being the hardest hit.
That may have evoked some popular discontent, but if the
Kremlin saw regional elections as a trial run for the 2007-08
national election cycle, it must be generally satisfied with
the results.
BURNS