Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW2070
2006-03-02 14:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

SOUTH OSSETIA: DEALING WITH A DYSFUNCTIONAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5417
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2070/01 0611433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021433Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1615
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002070 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: DEALING WITH A DYSFUNCTIONAL
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONSHIP

REF: A) TBILISI 399 AND PREV. B) MOSCOW 1934 AND PREV.

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002070

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: DEALING WITH A DYSFUNCTIONAL
RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONSHIP

REF: A) TBILISI 399 AND PREV. B) MOSCOW 1934 AND PREV.

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Moscow's approach to Georgia is driven by
frustration with Tbilisi's defiant attitude to Russian
interests, reflected in its pursuit of NATO membership, its
championing of anti-Russian alliances in the neighborhood,
its strategy of trying to compensate for Georgia's weakness
in one-on-one bargaining with Russia by bringing in the U.S.
and the Europeans to level what Moscow sees as a playing
field tilted by nature itself in Russia's favor, and
Saakashvili's incendiary rhetoric. The resultant GOR policy
is stick-heavy and, at best, carrot-lite. Russians see
little benefit in facilitating an incorporation of South
Ossetia or Abkhazia into Georgia at this time, and find it
hard to take seriously Western calls for them to surrender
the leverage that the status quo gives them. The constant
GOR message is that any resolution of those conflicts can
occur only over time and will depend on an "improvement in
Georgian-Russian relations," which decodes as demonstrated
Georgian deference to key Russian interests.


2. (C) The U.S. needs to continue to deliver the message
that Russia is overestimating its ability to keep a lid on
unstable situations and showing recklessness in playing with
fire in a region where it cannot afford a conflagration. We
must equally keep Georgia focused on the unacceptability --
as well as the dangers -- of any recourse to force. Most
immediately, we should press for a re-launch of contacts at
all levels between Georgia and Russia, including a
rescheduled visit by PM Noghaideli and a renewal of JCC
meetings, as well as progress on demilitarization CBMs and
economic links. Any expectation of a "quick fix" would be
unrealistic, and our stress should be on promoting concrete
steps -- and mutual civility -- that point in a constructive
direction. A candid discussion by the Secretary with FM

Lavrov next week on the need for Russia to show results, and
not just injured national sensibilities, could contribute to
the process. We also need to ensure that our voice is not
the only one Moscow hears on this issue as the G-8 process
moves ahead. END SUMMARY.

Russia to Georgia: You Can,t Impugn with Impunity
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Russian policy towards Georgia is based on a
near-consensus in the political class that Russia is
historically a Great Power entitled to expect -- and, if
necessary, to enforce -- a substantial degree of deference to
its interests from weaker neighboring countries. The Kremlin
feels little need to apologize for an approach that others
may see as heavy-handed, but that it sees as vital to
Russia's future. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the
Soviet Union stripped Russia of protective cocoons that have
been progressively occupied by NATO. To forestall further
strategic retreat and encirclement, Moscow has not shrunk
from direct interference in the internal affairs of its
neighbors, including in Georgia through support of separatist
movements and internal rebellions.


4. (C) Moscow,s feelings of Great Power entitlement and
concern about strategic encirclement find nourishment in the
actions of the Georgian government. Russia,s political
class -- not just Putin and the "siloviki" -- regard
Saakashvili,s defiantly non-deferential policies as
unacceptable. Seen from Moscow, his championing of
implicitly anti-Russian alliances within the neighborhood and
his headlong pursuit of accession to NATO are gauntlets flung
as a challenge. Russians are also deeply alienated by
Saakashvili,s anti-Russian rhetoric, as in his "piling on"
during the recent Georgia gas crisis, taking advantage of
Russia,s self-inflicted wounds in the earlier Ukraine fiasco.


5. (C) Most galling of all to Moscow is the Georgian
strategy of trying to compensate for the consequences of
being weaker than Russia in any one-on-one bargaining by
internationalizing the process, bringing in the U.S. and the
Europeans wherever possible to level what Moscow sees as a
playing field tilted by nature itself in Russia's favor. MFA
4th CIS Director Kelin told PolMinCouns March 1 that any U.S.
effort to "mediate" between Russia and Georgia would not be
productive. "We need to settle our differences between
ourselves, and will do so when the Georgians realize that the
key to the problems does not lie in Washington or Brussels,
but in Moscow." This desire to control the playing field was
reflected in the GOR,s recent refusal to hold a JCC meeting
originally scheduled in Vienna, insisting that Moscow was the
only proper venue.


6. (C) While Saakashvili has sown irritation with him

MOSCOW 00002070 002 OF 004


personally across the entire political spectrum in Russia,
his policies in many regards (e.g., with regard to NATO and
in the neighborhood) show strong continuity with those of
Shevardnadze. At bottom, the Russians have a Georgia
problem, not a Saakashvili problem.

The Ossetian Occasion
--------------


7. (C) Against this backdrop, Russia's heel-dragging in
efforts to resolve the South Ossetia problem comes as no
surprise. The Kremlin sees zero benefit to its interests --
either politically within Russia or internationally -- coming
from steps it is called on to take to facilitate the
incorporation of South Ossetia into Georgia in the near term.
The Russians tell us consistently that the problem can be
resolved only over time and in the context of "improved
Georgian-Russian relations." By improved relations, Russia
appears to mean that Georgia must generally defer more to
Russian interests, and specifically to defer both NATO
membership and any NATO/U.S. military bases in Georgia. The
hardball message is that Russia can ensure that Georgia will
for an indefinite period have unresolved territorial issues
that would make NATO membership at best problematic from the
Alliance,s perspective, and should foreswear such intentions
as a first step to gaining sway over its entire territory.


8. (C) This is all stick, no carrot. In our view, Russia
has strong domestic reasons (along with general support for a
tough line) for its failure to offer any real incentives to
the Georgians and for its continued support of the South
Ossetians. North Ossetia, with its Christian majority, is
the traditional bulwark of Russia in the North Caucasus and
the one North Caucasus republic not threatened with an
Islamic insurgency. It will continue to demand rewards from
Moscow for playing that role. In addition, any steps towards
Georgia would be viewed with at least suspicion by the
already unstable Kabardians, Cherkess, and Adyge -- all
ethnic cousins of the Abkhaz. This leaves aside the issue of
particular Russians interests not wanting to give up profits
from criminal activities carried out in South Ossetia.


9. (C) Recognizing that Saakashvili (and perhaps any
Georgian leader) will not make a capitulatory deal, the
Russians find a prolongation of the status quo to be the next
best option. They find it hard to take at face value U.S.
calls for them to give up their present leverage on Georgia
for (in their view) no real benefit. The main drawback that
they see in the status quo is the possibility of a Georgian
attempt to overturn it by force. The proper U.S. role, in
Moscow's view, is to suppress any such effort, as we have
done in the past. Believing that they -- and we -- can swat
Georgia like a fly, they are impervious to arguments that
Saakashvili has to "show progress" to "calm the radicals" in
his administration or protect his own political interests.


10. (C) While the GOR appreciated our efforts to tone down
the Georgian Parliament's recent call for the removal of
Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia, it saw the Georgian
move as a major provocation, the thinly disguised end of a
wedge intended to lead to the replacement of Russian troops
with an international (perhaps even NATO) force. It also
sees a need to head off a further step in July, when the
Georgian Parliament will receive and act on a report on
Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. In Moscow,s view, those
threats require a response with blunt instruments:
Saakashvili and the Georgian Parliament had to be shown that
if they stick their fingers in Moscow's eye, there will be a
price to pay. For every further step the Georgians may take
(e.g., denying visas to Russian peacekeepers, calling in July
for Russian peacekeepers to leave Abkhazia),Moscow will
again respond to raise the price to Tbilisi. In our March 1
meeting with 4th CIS director Kelin, he predicted "big
trouble" -- he would not qualify that further -- if the
current dispute with Georgia over visas for Russian military
personnel deployed there is not resolved -- and said (equally
without specification) that a satisfactory outcome on the
visas could lead to "positive" results.


11. (C) Russia's calculations presume that the pot can be
kept permanently simmering in South Ossetia, but never boil
over. If mutual provocations were to spill over into
full-fledged conflict, however, the consequences in a highly
unstable region would be unpredictable and could change the
calculations of the parties and of the international
community. Such a development would highlight the failure of
Russia's 14-year-old peacemaking activities and lead to
greatly increased pressure to take the "peace process" out of
Russian hands. To date, however, Russia has shown the same
refusal to tamper with the short-term status quo in South
Ossetia that it displays in Belarus and Uzbekistan.

MOSCOW 00002070 003 OF 004



The U.S. Role
--------------


12. (C) In these conditions, the U.S. must continue to work
actively on both sides of the quarrel. With respect to
Russia, we are continuing to make clear that the GOR is
playing with fire, and that Georgia may become a greater
focus of the international community's dealings with Russia
unless Moscow takes near-term steps to ensure there is a
process in play that holds promise for leading to a
settlement. Immediate steps in that direction would include
rescheduling the Noghaideli visit, agreement to a follow-on
JCC meeting, and some modest CBMs. The Ambassador has
already told DFM Karasin that Russia would be wiser to set
such steps in motion over the next week (before FM Lavrov's
March 6-7 visit to Washington). PolMinCouns made the same
point to Kelin March 1 (provoking Kelin's sharp rejection of
"U.S. mediation," para 5 above, and an insistence that
positive steps were first needed from Georgia, starting with
a resolution of the visa issue). We will continue to press
the Russians hard on these issues.


13. (C) We would recommend that the Secretary have a candid
discussion of Georgia with Lavrov in any event. He will
likely raise Russian concerns over Georgian "militarization,"
i.e., the increasing capabilities of Georgia's armed forces
thanks to U.S. assistance and training. He needs to
understand, however, that while Russia may not be ready to
deal on South Ossetia, it cannot dictate the U.S. level of
support for Georgia. If Russia will not even support a
serious process to ease tensions, it will face increasing
attention from the international community. Promoting a
European role in that regard will be key as we head towards
the April 24 South Ossetia Donors' Conference and the July
G-8 Summit. The G-8 process may temper Russian behavior, but
only if the U.S. is not the only G-8 member flagging the
point. So far, the Europeans are virtually invisible in
Moscow on the Georgia issue, and that gives Russia a wide
margin of comfort.


14. (C) In the months between the Lavrov visit and the G8
Summit, we need to push for across-the-board contacts between
Russia and Georgia that enable business to get done. The
cancellation of the Noghaideli visit was a counterproductive
emotional reaction; the Georgian Embassy here in Moscow
believes the decision was taken against the advice of the
Russian MFA. If emotions can be toned down enough on both
sides, the outlines of a compromise package can be seen:
Noghaideli visits Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart but
also with Kokoity to kick off and give impetus to a JCC
meeting that could make serious progress on demilitarization
and on economic issues. Though the Georgians may balk at
holding such a meeting in Moscow, we believe it is a
reasonable investment -- if Russia takes responsibility for
the meeting, it bears more responsibility for showing
results, 4th CIS director Kelin told PolMinCouns that the
Russians will not insist on Moscow as a JCC venue once
emotions cool; he still balked at Vienna, but thought
Brussels might be acceptable.


15. (C) Demilitarization CBMs are in Russia's own interest,
minimzing the likelihood of an outbreak of open warfare. We
should press the Russians hard, stressing that the
consequences of miscalculation are unpredictable but
potentially grave for Russia as well as Georgia. PolMinCouns
made that case March 1 to Kelin in support of a positive
Russian response to the unilateral Georgian actions to
implement its South Ossetian peace plan (ref A). Kelin,s
response was that the GOR was unaware of any such Georgian
actions, which may have been trumpeted to the West but were
not presented to Russia or South Ossetia. (Comment. The
Russian MFA has repeatedly complained about Georgia,s
propensity to plead its case to the West, rather than to the
South Ossetians or Russia. End Comment)


16. (C) The U.S. should foster other Georgian-Russian
working contacts as well. Russian Envoy Kenyaikin suggested
to EUR DAS Bryza that the Interior and Defense Ministers
attend a JCC meeting. A Moscow venue for such a meeting
might work, if the Georgian Ministers came with PM Noghaideli
and were assured of meetings with their Russian counterparts.



17. (C) Economic progress on the South Ossetian front may be
harder to sell to the Russians, however clear its benefits
may be to us and the Georgians. Fortunately, it appears to
be Kokoity's first priority. South Ossetia's economy has
always depended on smuggling, which had disappeared after the
Rose Revolution (Tbilisi 394 quotes PM Noghaideli as saying
the smuggling -- including of narcotics and counterfeit money

MOSCOW 00002070 004 OF 004


-- is now going strong again, which suggests that Georgian
corruption may have reappeared). Several peace proposals to
date have called for a "Special Economic Zone" in effect
linking the economies of North and South Ossetia to Georgia.
(Comment. In our view, such an initiative could create a
major fact on the ground promoting a resolution of the
conflict within Georgia's borders. It should be a priority
through the April 24 Donors' Conference and in the run-up to
the G8 Summit. End Comment)


18. (C) Economic ties between Russia and Georgia are
likewise worth emphasizing and could build constituencies for
a less negative relationship. Russia is the leading
destination for Georgian mineral water and wine; both GGMW
(Borjomi water) and GWS (wine) have enormous positive brand
recognition here. GGMW, especially, is a company that has
shown it can talk to the Russians (its travails used to form
one case studied at the Harvard Business School). A trade
delegation of Georgian exporters to Russia might create some
positive impetus.

Conclusion
--------------


19. (C) We see no quick or easy fix to the South Ossetia
problem or to broader Russian-Georgian dysfunctionality. A
condition for any movement in the right direction will be to
make sure Georgian leaders remain focused on the fact that,
whatever their frustrations, any military "short-cut" on
South Ossetia would be a ride alone into what might quickly
prove to be a harrowing dead end. The Russians need to be
equally forcefully reminded -- by Europeans as well as
Americans -- that they are playing with fire in a region
where they cannot afford a conflagration, and that while the
U.S. and Europe cannot substitute for Moscow in promoting a
resolution, Russia,s claim to be a responsible power depends
on its performance in cases where it has the wherewithal to
bring conflicts to a peaceful end.
BURNS