NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GRAHAM'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000018

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GRAHAM'S MEETING WITH
KREMLIN'S MODEST KOLEROV

REF: A. 05 MOSCOW 5588

B. 05 MOSCOW 3317

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Kirk Augustine.
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham met
December 21 with Modest Kolerov, who was named several months
ago to run a new Kremlin directorate dealing with Russia's
ties to its neighbors. Kolerov rejected the notion that the
U.S. and Russia should engage in a dialogue on Russia's
neighborhood. He saw the U.S. role in the region in largely
negative terms, noting that the practical results of U.S.
diplomacy potentially included greater extremism in Central
Asia, tacit support for Georgian efforts to ethnically
cleanse South Ossetia, and a ruined Ukrainian economy. He
said the USG uses the region as a laboratory to promote our
global agenda, but missteps could have tragic results for
Russia while they little affect the U.S. Kolerov, a
self-described "isolationist," saw only negative effects of
globalization for Russia and thought the consequences of
instability in the post-Soviet space were largely Russia's
business. He rebuffed Graham's arguments that the lessons of
9/11 were clear, that terrorism and extremism anywhere in the
world were a problem for all nations, including the U.S.
Kolerov described Russia's global interests, beyond its own
region, as largely commercial. Kolerov, who comes from an
academic and journalistic background, clearly represents
those in the GOR who believe Russia should solve Russia's
problems -- including with her neighbors -- without outside
"interference." End Summary.


2. (C) Modest Kolerov, Head of the Presidential
Administration's Directorate for Interregional and Cultural
Ties with Foreign Countries -- a unit created in March 2005,
and widely viewed as an attempt to reverse the Kremlin's
missteps in Ukraine and elsewhere in the CIS -- met December
21 with NSC Senior Director Thomas Graham in Moscow. Kolerov
told Graham he thought Russia and the U.S. have the same main
goal in the former Soviet space, namely to combat the spread
of extremism and terrorism. But ever since the U.S. decided
to widen the list to include our "global priorities," he
personally believed, we began to run into conflict with
Russia. While Graham encouraged Kolerov to recognize the
importance of the U.S. and Russia understanding each others'
interests in the region, Kolerov asked Graham to imagine how
the U.S. would react if Moscow demanded the U.S. and Russia
come to a common understanding of our respective interests in
Mexico.


3. (C) Kolerov accused the U.S. of involvement in the region
to use it as a laboratory for U.S. "experiments." The
consequences of mistakes the U.S. may make in performing
those experiments were only theoretical to us, he said, while
to Russia they could be tragic. Russia suffers -- either
immediately or down the road -- by the imposition of Western
modes and solutions, be they imposed in Afghanistan or in the
Baltics. Graham disputed the notion that Russia's
neighborhood is its own business or that its ills have no
consequences for the rest of the world. September 11 proved
that the U.S. had to follow and react to events worldwide.
While Graham argued for the value of a U.S.-Russia dialogue
on the region, Kolerov insisted the only thing to discuss was
the "limits on your activities."


4. (C) Kolerov firmly rejected any consideration of global
interests in the CIS and called himself an "isolationist."
He said the region was still encumbered by a Soviet mentality
and constituted a burden for Russia, but it was Russia that
had to solve the problems. Graham said globalization was a
fact that would continue to impact on Russia,s neighborhood.
Kolerov, saying he was "not a diplomat," called
globalization a "huge burden" for Russia because it had
brought with it uncontrollable illegal migration. He said
Russia needed to find a legal basis for dealing with the
inflow of people from other former Soviet republics, and
insisted it was not a political issue. Regarding how Russia
should interact in the world, Kolerov said "we were weak, we
took a day off; now in the twenty-first century we must
protect our own house."


5. (C) Kolerov called potential Ukrainian entry into NATO
"death for Ukrainian industry," which Russia did not want.
European integration offered no great benefits for Ukraine,
only negative consequences. He said only the western oblasts
of Ukraine were ready for European integration, and only
because they have no industry. Graham argued that Russia
itself bore some responsibility for the fate of Ukrainian
industry, by using the leverage of gas deliveries. Kolerov,
who pointedly noted that he had played no role at all in the
events of fall 2004 in Ukraine, said that the psychology of

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the authorities there had not changed at all. On Belarus,
Kolerov insisted Russia does not consider its neighbor
through an imperial lens, but rather exactly as the U.S.
views Mexico and Canada.


6. (C) Continuing his discussion of Russia's neighbors,
Kolerov decried "Georgian radicals" who could in the future
advocate ethnic cleansing of South Ossetians. Asking
rhetorically where South Ossetians would flee, he noted that
Russia would end up with a more complicated situation in
North Ossetia. He accused the U.S. of exacerbating the
situation through its close ties to Georgia. Kolerov raised
the issue of U.S. bases in Georgia and said U.S. bases in
Georgia did not constitute "cooperation." When Graham firmly
denied that the U.S. had plans to base troops in Georgia,
Kolerov pointed to the planned presence of U.S. troops in
Romania and called it "a matter of definition."


7. (C) Graham raised Central Asia, asking how Russia would
react to an explosion in the Ferghana Valley, and arguing
that the U.S. and Russia have much to contribute to stability
through cooperation. In response, Kolerov blamed the U.S.
and the West for tensions in the region and suggested that
Western grants helped fund extremism. He called "external
influences" in Central Asia destructive and said the
"so-called" democratic movements in Central Asia are only
fronts for narco-trafficking. Kolerov again accused the U.S.
of having no basis for being involved in the region; in
contrast, he said, Russia views Central Asian nations like
family. There were, for instance, 500,000 Kyrgyz living in
Russia. Graham noted the large number of Russians living in
the U.S. Kolerov complained that emigres from the CIS to the
U.S. were talented and smart; they left behind the less
educated and poor.


8. (C) On Chechnya, Kolerov accused the U.S. of a double
standard in demanding that Russia solve an internal problem
in the way we preferred, and asked whether we demanded the
same of Spain in its conflict with the Basques and of France
as it dealt with the Corsicans. Graham said that we of
course encourage others to solve their problems, but said the
international community could help with the conflict in
Chechnya. He offered that the U.S. might even have useful
suggestions, based on our experience in Iraq.


9. (C) Kolerov narrowly defined Russia's global interests.
He saw Russian interests in Africa, and Latin and South
America, for example, as largely commercial. He did allow,
however, that, in Russia, politics and business are more
closely connected than in the U.S. Kolerov decried the
"Anglo-Saxon tradition" of seeking to legitimize political
positions through whatever means available. He said most
Russians do not understand that that is the way the U.S.
tries to seek political advantage, but he understands. He
said he had been invited many times to speak at seminars or
attend other events in the U.S., and he always refuses.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Since Kolerov's directorate was created, it has been
unclear to us exactly what he does. References to him in the
Russian press this fall -- his trip to Latvia to articulate
Russian impatience with the term "occupation" and to keep up
the drumbeat about violations of ethnic Russians' rights, and
his keynoting November's "Parallel CIS" (South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Transniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh) conference in
Moscow -- reinforce the notion that the Kremlin sees him as
an advocate for Russia and Russians in the CIS region -- and
not as a negotiator, problem-solver, or a key decision-maker.



11. (C) Besides his disdain for participating in discussions
in the U.S., Kolerov apparently has no use for Russian
critics either. When asked if he had found a quotation
(which he cited at the beginning of the meeting) from one of
Graham's speeches in a recent article by Moscow Carnegie
Center scholar Liliya Shevtsova, he said dismissively that he
did not read anything she wrote. Kolerov embodies the view,
not uncommon in today's Russia, that Russia can solve its own
problems and that U.S. and Western "interference" in Russia
or the broader region on its borders works against Russian
interests, creating instability, drug trafficking, and
extremism that threaten the Russian body politic.


12. (C) In parting, Kolerov gave Graham a selection of
literature, which he said he helped publish. The books
included: "Georgia: Ethnic Cleansing in Relation to Ossetia,"
"Non-citizens in Estonia," "The Setu People: Between Russia
and Estonia," "Around Chechnya: Is Russia's Rear Secure in
the North Caucasus?" "The Lusatian Question and

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Czechoslovakia, 1945-48," and "The Russian Guide to
Historical Research on Russia in the 19th and 20th
Centuries." The titles reflect the thrust of the outreach
effort that Kolerov and his office are trying to intensify.


13. (U) Senior Director Graham has cleared this cable.
BURNS