RUSSIA-GEORGIA: HARD RUSSIAN LINE ON SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001536

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: HARD RUSSIAN LINE ON SOUTH OSSETIA

REF: TBILISI 282

Classified By: Acting DCM Kirk Augustine. Reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Both the Russians (4th CIS Department
Director Kelin) and Georgians (State Minister for Conflict
Resolution Khaindrava) gave us separate readouts of their
February 16 talks in Moscow. The talks focused on South
Ossetia in the wake of the Georgian Parliamentary resolution
calling for a replacement of the Russian Peacekeeping Force.
Kelin called for an immediate JCC meeting, but not in Vienna.
Khaindrava told us the Russians had demanded that the JCC
meet in Moscow; he had refused. Kelin warned that armed
confrontations are an imminent threat and said the atmosphere
is not right for unilateral Russian gestures on
demilitarization, including with regard to the enclave of 12
Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali. Khaindrava said
Georgia has started undertaking all ten demilitarization
measures recommended by the Quad ambassadors in Tbilisi, and
warned that Russia is working to build a road that will deny
the Georgian villages access to Georgian-controlled
territory. We pressed the Russians hard to reciprocate
Georgian gestures, but there appeared to be little appetite
to do so; we also pressed Khaindrava to moderate Georgian
rhetoric, and he restrained comments he made to the press in
our presence. End summary.

The Next JCC
--------------


2. (C) A/DCM called on Kelin February 16 to note the
restraint in the resolution Georgia's Parliament adopted
February 15. He said we had been working hard with the
Georgians. He noted that the tone of the Russian MFA
statement had been relatively restrained. Kelin replied that
the Georgian resolution could be interpreted in different
ways. Moderates could point out that it set no deadline.
Hardliners (such as Georgia's Minister of Defense) could
point to its demand to the GOG to eliminate the Russian
peacekeepers. Russia envisaged a meeting of the Joint
Control Commission (JCC) as soon as possible, but not in
Vienna as previously planned; it should rather take place
"much closer to the scene." Asked whether that meant Moscow,
he said he would not exclude Moscow or any other site. The
matter was "under discussion" among the parties.


3. (C) In a subsequent conversation with poloff, Khaindrava
said the Russians had demanded that the JCC take place in
Moscow so that FM Lavrov could preside over it. Noting that
both the Russians and South Ossetians had previously agreed
to Vienna, Khaindrava said he had categorically rejected that
proposed change. His analysis was that Russia wanted to show
that it was in control of the process. During our
conversation, Khaindrava received calls from Tbilisi
(including from PM Noghaideli) and tried to get the GOG to
enlist the support of the OSCE Mission to oppose the change
of JCC venue.

Demilitarization
--------------


4. (C) Kelin said that Khaindrava had concentrated on
demilitarization, and in particular the outer (South
Ossetian) trenches surrounding an enclave of 12 Georgian
villages north of Tskhinvali. Kelin said the current
atmosphere did not allow progress on this issue. To Russia,
demilitarization meant in the first instance the withdrawal
of Georgian MPs who were illegally in the zone of conflict,
and the elimination of unofficial armed formations supporting
the Georgian cause. A/DCM asked who would be responsible for
civil order if the Georgian MPs were withdrawn; Kelin replied
that the PKF was mandated to carry out that task. A/DCM
asked whether Russia would respond to unilateral Georgian
demilitarization with any steps of its own, noting that there
had been talk of having international observers monitor the
Roki Tunnel and a withdrawal of Russian personnel and
equipment that did not belong in the zone of conflict. Would
Russia help respond to Georgian moves to encourage a positive
dynamic?


5. (C) Kelin said he did not believe the time was right to
discuss such moves. The main effort had to be to avoid
confrontations on the ground. Georgia was on the verge of
increasing the staff of its peacekeepers (their 600-person
battalion was now only half-staffed),and it had a brigade
deployed nearby in Gori. Kelin said we should bear in mind
that there was disagreement in Tbilisi between those who
favor a "mild" approach and those who favored more radical
action. He said Khaindrava had asked the Russians to take
some steps so he could report back to the GOG that Russia had
made some moves, and therefore the peacekeepers could stay.
Kelin did not believe that any drawdown of Russian forces

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could be made in light of current tensions, including recent
"provocative" incidents staged by Georgian forces.


6. (C) A/DCM pressed Kelin on whether there were not Russian
forces and equipment present in the zone of conflict beyond
what was allowed for the PKF. Could there be no withdrawals
of such forces and equipment if the Georgians first took
confidence-building steps? Kelin responded only that Russia
had just received an appeal from the South Ossetian
"Parliament" to remain. With regard to the Roki Tunnel, that
was an economic issue that should be discussed along with
other economic CBMs when there was a "normal climate." He
noted that the issue was the placement of border and customs
posts, and the late Georgian PM Zhvania had agreed to place
those south of Tskhinvali. Kelin stated several times that
the threat of armed confrontation on the ground was immediate
and had first priority. As to a peace plan, he regretted
that the support for a peace process in South Ossetia by the
U.S. Secretary of State and Russian Foreign Minister at
Ljubljana, and the endorsement of that support by the OSCE
Ministerial, was interpreted by some to mean support for a
particular peace proposal (i.e., Saakashvili's plan). The
JCC would need to develop a workplan drawing from both
Saakashvili's and Kokoity's plans.


7. (C) On those issues Khaindrava told us that Georgia has
already started implementing all ten of the demilitarization
CBMs proposed by the Quad Ambassadors in Tbilisi. One of
those was filling out Georgia's quota of the PKF battalion.
Khaindrava noted that with so many of Georgia's troops
deployed to Iraq, Georgia would be able to raise its PKF
staffing only to 400 (of the 600 allowed). With regard to
the enclave villages, Khaindrava said Russia was hard at work
building a road west of the villages, "with money provided by
Luzhkov," that would, if controlled by Ossetians, allow the
villagers to be denied access to the rest of Georgia.
Nonetheless, Georgia would carry out all ten demilitarization
recommendations. Asked whether Georgia had made an
announcement to that effect, Khaindrava replied, "No. We
will announce them after we have carried them out."

Avoiding Confrontations, Provocations
--------------


8. (C) A/DCM noted to Kelin the emphasis the Russian
statement had put on preserving "existing mechanisms," and
asked whether there were specific steps that Russia was
looking for from Georgia now to improve the atmosphere.
Kelin replied that the JCC would establish what needed to be
done. A/DCM said we believed the efforts of Ambassador Tefft
and other USG officials had had an effect in moderating the
parliamentary resolution and restraining Georgian rhetoric.
We had found our dialogues with Special Envoy Kenyaikin
useful. Kelin said Russia appreciated the U.S. and European
efforts, but was not convinced that the excesses had in fact
been reined in. There had been serious provocations on the
ground. "Our people will not stand idle if there is an
outbreak of violence." He hoped that the U.S. would warn the
Georgian side of the dangers of the situation. A/DCM
reiterated that we were urging moderation to all parties, but
we understood the Georgian sense of frustration with the lack
of progress on ending the conflict. Russia needed to
identify those forces within the Georgian government who
favored a constructive resolution and provide them arguments
they could use to oppose more militant approaches. The U.S.
would continue to do everything possible to tone down the
rhetoric and encourage a peaceful resolution.


9. (C) Poloff later reiterated the need for restraint to
Khaindrava, and when he received a call from a Russian press
agency he answered it, in our presence, in an extremely
restrained way. He said he expected that there would be
provocations -- specifically, that the Ossetians would start
to demarcate their border with electric wire. Georgia could
not stand idly by if there were attacks on Georgian citizens
in the enclave within South Ossetia, but other than that he
would work to see that Georgia was not lured into reacting to
provocations. His final analysis, though, was that the
Russians would do anything to protect the status quo.

Further Talks?
--------------


10. (C) Khaindrava said he was scheduled to meet DFM Karasin
February 17, but doubted the meeting would take place after
his refusal to accept a Moscow venue for the JCC. Likewise,
he said the Russians had told him that PM Noghaideli's visit
to Moscow, scheduled for February 27, would be doubtful if
the JCC meeting did not take place in Moscow.


11. (C) When A/DCM asked Kelin about the current
responsibilities of MFA envoys dealing with Georgia, Kelin

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confirmed that Special Envoy Kenyaikin had taken over
Ambassador Savolskiy's portfolio of military negotiations
(including some with Ukraine) and supervising special
ambassadors. He also confirmed that Ambassador Lev Mironov,
who suffered a stroke during the Ljubljana OSCE Ministerial,
had returned to Moscow but remained in a medicial institute.
The process of nominating successors to realign all relevant
responsibilities, he said, was not complete. Khaindrava said
he had been introduced to Kenyaikin's successor, but "forgot
his name." (He promised to get us the name on February 17.)

Comment
--------------


12. (C) We read the Russian move to change the venue of the
JCC as being in the first instance a reaction to the "threat"
that the composition of the JCC -- or the PKF -- might be
changed to include more westerners. Kelin's warnings about
the immediate danger of armed confrontations appeared
intended to justify the need to maintain current Russian
force levels. In its demand to host the next JCC meeting in
Moscow, Russia is performing a bit of diplomatic ju jitsu to
use the force of Georgia's parliamentary resolution against
Georgia itself, and ideally to come out of it with even
greater Russian control over the process. We would recommend
the the U.S. remind the Moscow that there was substanial
debate about the venue for the JCC meeting, and Vienna was
chosen as a result of delicate negotiations led by Russia
itself. Russia and Georgia should concentrate on the issues
at hand: demilitarization, renunciation of the use of force,
economic rehabilitation, and a workplan over which both
Georgians and Ossetians can take ownership.
BURNS