BLACK SEA FLEET RELOCATION: A PORT TOO FAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 013074

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP RS UP
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA FLEET RELOCATION: A PORT TOO FAR


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 b an
d d.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Nearly ten years after the 1997 bilateral
agreement with Ukraine to use Sevastopol as a base for its
Black Sea Fleet, Russia is doing little to plan for the
Fleet's possible relocation after the agreement expires in

2017. While the Black Sea Fleet will be on the agenda for
the Putin-Yushchenko summit December 22 in Kyiv, it will be a
low priority. The Russian government's overall approach to
the fleet's future seems simply to wait and see if improving
bilateral relations will allow the fleet to remain in
Sevastopol. The only credible option appears to be
Novorossiisk, but its modest naval facilities and growing
commercial importance make it a poor choice. END SUMMARY.
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BSF: LOW ON GOR-GOU AGENDA
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2. (C) Ambassador Vladimir Dorokhin, MFA's Special Advisor
on the Black Sea, confirmed to us that, officially, in 2017
the GOR will be prepared to vacate Sevastopol and relocate
the BSF to a Russian port as per the 1997 bilateral agreement
with Ukraine. While the BSF will be on the agenda of the
December 22 Putin-Yushchenko summit, Dorokhin told us the BSF
negotiations were a low priority. Dorokhin said Ukrainians
dramatized Black Sea negotiations, citing two recent
incidents -- demands on the GOR to pay higher rent in
Sevastopol and increased fees for ecological damage caused by
the BSF. Though these issues were not spelled out in the
1997 agreement, Dorokhin emphasized that Russia was working
with Ukraine in good faith to resolve these differences and
had consistently met its financial obligations.


3. (C) Dorokhin, however, condemned the seizure of
lighthouses based on local Ukrainian court decisions.
(Russia has staffed and operated twenty-two lighthouses in
the Crimea since the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Stewardship of these lighthouses was not addressed in the
1997 agreement.) Dorokhin claimed that a judicial decision
on the lighthouses was not within the competency of local
courts -- the issue must be resolved between the GOR and GOU.
Dorokhin feared Ukraine would use ambiguities in the 1997
agreement to gain leverage on other Russia-Ukraine bilateral
issues. (NOTE: The Ukrainian Embassy rebutted this analysis,
noting that under international law, Ukraine must properly
maintain (and staff) such facilities, since they are located
on Ukrainian territory.)
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2017 TOO FAR AWAY: NO DECISION YET
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4. (C) Alla Yazkova, specialist on the Mediterranean and
Black Seas at the Institute of Europe, said 2017 was too far
away to predict whether the BSF would pull out of Sevastopol.
She cited recent contradictory statements by Yushchenko and
Yanukovych -- the former declared that in 2017 there would be
no legal grounds for the continued presence of the BSF on
Ukrainian territory, while the latter suggested it might be
possible for the BSF to remain beyond that date. Yazkova
opined that such uncertainty encouraged Russia not to take
action and to wait for an opportunity either to extend or
modify the 1997 agreement. The GOR sees BSF relocation as a
last resort; only when other options are exhausted will the
process of relocating the BSF start. Sergey Markov,
pro-Kremlin Director of the Center for Political Studies,
recently told us that the GOR fully expected the BSF to
remain in Sevastopol after 2017.
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FROM FLEET TO FLOTILLA ?
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5. (C) Aleksandr Golts, editor of the on-line "Weekly
Gazette," told us that the BSF has no future - the BSF will
become a flotilla like the Caspian Sea Fleet. Golts
dismissed Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov's recent comments
that Russia intends to upgrade the BSF and adapt it for
combat missions in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans as
"rubbish." Golts pointed out that most BSF warships are old
and in desperate need of repair and upgrade; moreover, there
currently are not any ocean-going naval ships under
construction earmarked for the BSF -- the few blue-water
warships now under construction for the Russian Navy are
slated to go to the Pacific or Baltic Fleets.
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A TALE OF TWO CITIES

MOSCOW 00013074 002 OF 002


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6. (C) The naval facility in Sevastopol is one of the city's
largest employers, and BSF activities contribute
significantly to the local economy. Sevastopol is also home
to many BSF personnel, who maintain deep roots in the city
which has been home to the fleet for over 200 years. During
his October 25 interactive call-in show, President Putin
promised that Moscow would provide for the relocation of
sailors and their families to Novorossiisk or elsewhere in
Russia. Institute of Europe Director Sergey Karaganov
identified this as the toughest domestic political issue
related to the BSF. Putin also reminded Ukraine of the
negative economic impact that departure of the BSF and its
personnel would have on the Crimean economy. Yazkova said
that as 2017 approached, the GOR would increasingly emphasize
the economic impact on the region of the BSF's withdrawal.


7. (C) While Novorossiisk's commercial facilities are
well-developed, its naval facilities are modest and would
require major investment to host the BSF. Embassy's Naval
Attache estimated that, at a minimum, Novorossiisk would need
seven years to prepare for the Fleet's relocation. Golts
noted that Novorossiisk, upgraded with the proper naval
facilities, would still be too small to support the
complement of ships currently in the BSF. The Russian Navy
has a limited presence -- several coastal patrol boats and a
destroyer. Competition for space is also keen because
Novorossiisk is one of Russia's two main ports for oil
exports. With nearly a million barrels a day leaving the
port now and a likely increase in seaborne energy exports via
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, displacing commercial
facilities to make room for the BSF makes little economic
sense.
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COMMENT
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8. (C) While 2017 seems a long way off, the Russian
government and military appear to be doing little to
modernize the Black Sea Fleet or to plan for a possible new
home port. While the fleet (and the Crimea) will continue to
be populist hot buttons for Russian politicians, fiery
rhetoric alone is not going to maintain the Black Sea Fleet's
blue water capability in the future.
RUSSELL