KOSOVO: RUSSIAN POSITION ON UNSC VETO HARDENING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012819

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEV UNMIK SR YI RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN POSITION ON UNSC VETO HARDENING

REF: A. MOSCOW 12549

B. MOSCOW 12351

C. MOSCOW 10438

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In late-November meetings in Moscow, Kosovo
Prime Minister Ceku failed to get assurances that Russia
would not use its veto when the Security Council takes up the
status issue early next year. Russian officials have
signaled that they might ultimately deploy a veto to block a
UN Security Council resolution that implicitly endorses an
independent Kosovo. The MFA told us that Ceku made it clear
that Kosovo was intent on independence, but pledged he would
continue to act within the Contact Group as long as that
framework existed. A veto could be motivated by Moscow's
desire to avoid a precedent for recognition of other
separatist regions, domestic politics, and Russia's need to
demonstrate that its views must be taken into account by the
international community. Former PM Gaidar warned the
Ambassador that the U.S. and EU should not underestimate
Kosovo's corrosiveness in Russia's overall relationship with
the West. At this point, it's hard to say how much of
Russia's veto talk is bluff and how much is real -- but it's
clear that the Russian position has hardened over the past
few months. END SUMMARY.
.
PM CEKU'S VISIT YIELDS NO CONCESSIONS FROM MOSCOW
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In the first official visit to Moscow by Kosovar
representatives, Prime Minister Agim Ceku sought but failed
to get assurances that the GOR would not use its veto in the
UN Security Council when Kosovo's status is taken up early
next year. Viktoria Prokhorovo, who assists GOR Special
Envoy on Kosovo Botsan-Kharchenko, told us that Deputy
Foreign Minister Titov advised Ceku during his late November
visit that "it's far too early to start talking about a
veto." Instead, Ceku was informed by his Russian
interlocutors that the GOR would not make a public or private
commitment regarding a veto until after UN Special Envoy
Ahtisaari released his proposed Kosovo status package
sometime after the January 21 Serbian elections.


3. (C) Taking into account Serbian sensitivities, the GOR
had billed the Ceku visit as "unofficial" and "low-key,"
Prokhorovo said. In fact, Serbian Political Counselor Boris
Sekulic told us, Moscow consulted closely with Belgrade
before the visit. Sekulic told us Belgrade was not happy
about Ceku's visit, but did not raise objections. In
addition to Titov, Ceku met with Duma Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachev and Federation Council
International Affairs Committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov.


4. (C) According to Prokhorovo, Ceku made it clear that
Kosovo would pursue independence and a seat in the United
Nations. However, Ceku also assured the GOR that the
Kosovars would continue to act within the Contact Group as
long as that framework existed. Ceku told his Russian
interlocutors that he wanted UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's
report to be made public several days after the January
Serbian elections. GOR officials told Ceku that, regardless
of the status issue, Moscow expected Kosovar authorities to
uphold international standards regarding the treatment of
ethnic minorities in Kosovo, including the protection of
religious sites and the return of Serb refugees to the
province.
.
WHERE IS THE GOR ON A VETO?
--------------


5. (C) There are increasing signs that a veto could be in
the cards. President Putin's September announcement that the
GOR might use its veto if the Kosovo final status package was
not in Russia's interests was followed by statements in the
G-8 Political Directors gathering in Moscow in November and
in discussions between DFM Titov and Assistant Secretary
Fried (reftels A and B) that represented a hardening of
Russia views. While underlining that the MFA had not yet
made any final decisions, the MFA's Prokhorovo speculated
that a unilateral declaration of independence by Pristina
might act as a trigger for a Russian veto. The MFA continues
to push for a Kosovo package that has the approval of both
Belgrade and Pristina. The MFA sees Ahtisaari's report as a
starting point for negotiations between Pristina and
Belgrade, not the final act, Prokhorovo said. FM Lavrov
reiterated in his OSCE bilateral with Serbian FM Draskovic
that Russia did not support any "artificial" time frame for a
resolution of the status question.

MOSCOW 00012819 002 OF 003


.
EXPERT VIEWS ON VETO THREAT
--------------


6. (C) Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, before he fell
ill, warned the Ambassador not to underestimate the emotional
impact of Serbia on Russian society. During a November 22
meeting, Gaidar underscored his concern that -- based on
recent discussions in Washington and New York -- the U.S. was
underestimating Russian resolve and the damage Kosovo could
still inflict on our bilateral relations. The Ambassador
reiterated the case for providing a clear vision of the
future for Kosovars, and noted the dangers posed to the
region by continued delay. Gaidar responded that whether the
U.S. liked it or not, Kosovo would be a precedent, and it was
not a precedent that served Russia's interests. He said that
pushing for a settlement that did not meet with Belgrade's
approval would play into the hands of Russian hard-liners in
an election year. Gaidar urged caution, and a continued
effort to find a solution that Serbia could live with.


7. (C) Other experts we have spoken with are also
increasingly concerned that Moscow will use its veto to
prevent international recognition of a change in Kosovo's
status. Former French Political Director and newly arrived
Ambassador Stanislas de Laboulaye told the Ambassador that in
his initial soundings on the issue, he detected signs that
Russia would try to throw up a roadblock to stop the status
process. We have heard similar concerns from British and
Swedish diplomats.


8. (C) Tatyana Parkhalina, Director of NATO's Center for
European Security in Moscow, cautioned that Russia might
stumble into the use of its veto because of its concerns
about appearing too weak. She argued that Russia was not
motivated out of a sense of duty to Serbia. However, Russia
was eager to show that it could stand up to the West if need
be to protect its interests and that Moscow's views must be
taken into account. Since the GOR had already made clear
that Belgrade needed to be on board with any final status
arrangement for Kosovo, a veto would be seen by the GOR as
less odious than allowing a pro-independence UNSCR to go
forward over Russian objections. Even abstaining from the
vote could be seen as a failure, given Russia's strong public
rhetoric in favor of the Serbs.
.
ORTHODOX CHURCH VIEWS
--------------


9. (C) Despite predictions by Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)
representatives that the Church and like-minded politicians
would seek to raise public awareness about Kosovo, we have
yet to see indications of a public campaign. Father Nikolay
Balashov, in the ROC's External Relations Division, stated
that the interests of the Orthodox community would best be
served if the Serbian minority and Orthodox religious sites
in Kosovo were protected and if Kosovo retained "some form of
ties" to Serbia that reflected the significance that Kosovo
holds for the Serbian (and Orthodox) identity. Balashov
acknowledged that Kosovo might not carry the same emotional
weight with the Russian public that it did in 1999, but those
feelings could be revived if the Serbian Orthodox community
was under threat again. He reiterated that the ROC supported
the position on Kosovo adopted in the Serbian Orthodox
Church's November 2005 Holy Synod of Bishops. Balashov
acknowledged that there were divisions within the Serbian
Church over Kosovo and characterized Bishop Artemije, who had
made a private visit to Moscow in September, as someone who
espoused more radical views.
.
SERBIAN EMBASSY
--------------


10. (C) Despite GOR hints that it might veto a UNSC
resolution on Kosovo if Belgrade was not in agreement, the
Serbian Embassy's Sekulic said he doubted Russia would follow
through. "Russia will put relations with the West before
Serbia," he said. "If they veto, it will not be because they
are looking out for the best interests of Serbia. It will be
because they want to show the West they can be strong."
Kosovo expert Pavel Kandel, of the Russian Academy of
Science's Institute of Europe, agreed. Kosovo and Serbia
were no longer hot political issues in Russia, as they were
in 1999. Though Serbia and Kosovo still resonate among some
of the Russian political elite, the average Russian did not
care much about the issue these days. Public opinion could
be swayed by a Kremlin-sponsored media campaign, but no such
campaign had appeared, Kandel said. Sekulic added that
although a UNSC resolution on Kosovo's independence would be

MOSCOW 00012819 003 OF 003


bad from Belgrade's point of view, a veto would not be much
better in the long run. In the event of a veto, Kosovo would
unilaterally seek recognition with key international players
-- such as the U.S. -- and would eventually be able to cement
its legitimacy as an independent state. "Once that process
begins, it cannot be stopped," he said.
.
COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The GOR is clearly dropping hints that it might veto
a UNSCR on Kosovo independence in order to influence
Ahtisaari's Kosovo package and pressure Contact Group members
to consider a longer negotiating process. It is not yet
clear whether this is a negotiating tactic or whether the GOR
is seriously considering a veto. There is an increasing
danger, however, that the GOR could box itself into a corner
through it public commitments to Serbia, hints of a veto, and
statements linking Kosovo's final status with other frozen
conflicts.
BURNS