CIS SUMMITS: GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012711

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PINR BY RS
SUBJECT: CIS SUMMITS: GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS?

REF: A. MOSCOW 12695

B. MOSCOW 8841

C. MOSCOW 12264

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: After a series of low-impact/low-turnout
meetings, CIS Heads of State gathered again in Minsk on
November 28. The meeting -- billed as a "working" summit --
will be followed by another, more formal gathering in Astana
in December to commemorate the CIS's fifteenth anniversary.
From Moscow's perspective, the Minsk meeting was more notable
for bilaterals between President Putin and Presidents Voronin
and Lukashenko than for any attempt to revive the faltering
organization. Growing differences among CIS members and a
persistent failure to implement CIS decisions have called
into question the group's continuing relevance. Although
members have agreed on the need for reform, there is a lack
of consensus about the group's direction. No drastic changes
in either the format or membership are expected until at
least 2008. End Summary.
.
Low Expectations Summit
--------------


2. (C) While President Putin called the CIS summit
"productive and businesslike," the most useful work was done
on the summit margins or at separate bilateral meetings. In
a press briefing following the summit, Putin stressed that he
had spoken at the summit table with Georgian President
Saakashvili, and had had extended discussions with Lukashenko
about outstanding energy issues, including the valuation of
gas firm Beltransgaz. Talks with Voronin led to the lifting
of the ban on Moldovan wine and meat products (ref A) and a
pledge to step up Transnistrian talks. The Moscow Carnegie
Center's Nikolay Petrov told us that these were real
accomplishments, given the low expectations before the
summit. However, on the critical question of CIS reform, the
leaders agreed to put off any decision until the foreign
ministers provide consensus recommendations by a July
deadline. Petrov said that Moscow was pleased with this
outcome because it wanted to avoid contentious discussions on
the organization's future.
.
CIS: Broken Tea Cup or Graveyard for Soviet Dreams?
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Russia's caution in dealing with changes to the CIS
status quo was reflected in pre-summit comments by the
Director of the MFA's Third CIS Department (Central Asia)
Maksim Peshkov. He likened the CIS to a cracked tea cup. It
does not produce a clear resonating sound when tapped, he
told us, but one can use it forever if it is held gently. If
handled roughly, it will break. Others in Moscow compare the
CIS to a divorce agreement, a simile first used by
then-President of Ukraine Kravchuk and repeated by Putin last
year. In this view, the CIS was an artificially created
arrangement designed to ease the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. With that divorce finalized, the CIS had no useful
purpose. For Director of the CIS Institute Vladimir
Pomanenko, the CIS is where Soviet legacies are interred. He
lamented the "unnecessary" break up of the Union and insisted
that the desire to unite had not disappeared completely.
Peshkov agreed: "For over seventy years, we were together; we
cannot dispense with those ties."
.
The CIS Atrophies
--------------


4. (C) Experts we spoke to argued that the CIS's ill-defined
raison d'etre had led to organizational atrophy. Also
contributing to organizational weakness were the growing
differences among member states. Carnegie's Petrov told us
that some of the CIS countries tended to be isolationist,
while others were much more outward-looking. The same
organization encompasses Georgia and Ukraine as well as
Turkmenistan (albeit as an "associate" member). Leonid
Vardomskiy, head of the Center of the CIS and the Baltic
States at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of
Economy, claimed that CIS members had already drifted too far
apart to be shoehorned into a coherent organization. Russia,
despite its "primitively defined" political ambitions, did
not really consider the CIS a viable organization, Vardomskiy
claimed. The outmoded technologies and economies of many CIS
countries reduced economic relations to barter trade in raw
materials. The economic disparity among the countries --
Russia and Kazakhstan at the top; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
bringing up the rear -- made the development of a common
economic agenda a virtual impossibility. Russia's main
economic interests lay outside the CIS, Vardomskiy said. The
disconnect between Russia's interests and those of other CIS
states acted as an impediment to Russia's ambitions to lead

MOSCOW 00012711 002 OF 003


the CIS.


5. (C) Flaws in the organization itself have also crippled
its effectiveness. Most CIS observers point to the members'
persistent failure to implement the hundreds of CIS
agreements as evidence of the group's uselessness. Aleksey
Vlasov of Moscow State University (MGU) noted that the CIS's
organizational structure remained skeletal and would likely
stay that way because of the lack of a credible "integration"
philosophy. Andrey Ryabov of the Institute for World Economy
and International Relations (IMEMO) suggested that some of
the fault for the CIS's dysfunctional nature can be laid at
the feet of Russia, which was "ill-equipped to deal with
multilateral organizations." "Russia made efforts but always
failed," he said.
.
Russia Tries to Show Leadership
--------------


6. (C) Given such clear-cut failures, why then does Russia
remain invested in the CIS? FM Lavrov was quick last year to
try to explain away Putin's comment that the CIS was merely a
divorce decree, arguing that a commonality of interests still
tied the former republics together. Aleksey Bogaturov of
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)
suggested that the CIS remained relevant -- at least from the
Russian point of view -- because it continued to provide a
stage for Moscow's ambitions. Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS
Institute echoed Bogaturov, arguing that Russia's continued
struggle for regional leadership was the only reason why the
CIS had been spared "liquidation."
.
One Summit to Many?
--------------


7. (C) With many former Soviet republics celebrating their
15th year of independence this fall, the 15th "jubilee" CIS
summit was scheduled for October 16-17 in Minsk. However,
Putin and Nazarbayev intervened at the last minute to
substitute a CIS Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting
(CFM) for the summit, which was postponed to November. In
the end, only a few ministers attended the CFM (Belarus,
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan). The November 28 Summit
in Minsk will be followed by yet another summit -- in Astana
-- to mark the 15th anniversary of the creation of the CIS.
The experts we spoke to before the Minsk summit unanimously
agreed that not much would be decided at either gathering.
Events in Minsk seemed to bear them out. Other than putting
off any decision on CIS reform until next year, the members
could only agree on the appointment of the head of the CIS
Anti-Terrorist Center and on a joint statement on fighting
illegal immigration. The group was unable to come to a
consensus on demarcating borders between CIS states.
.
Putin, Nazarbayev and Lukashenko
--------------


8. (C) The "dueling" summits in Minsk and Astana are only
one reflection of the tensions within the organization. Many
Moscow experts believed that Putin will need to play a
balancing role between Nazarbayev and Lukashenko. According
to Fadeyev of the CIS Institute, Lukashenko had no patience
for Kazakh reform proposals (that "Asian stuff") that sought
to reduce the areas the CIS acted in while increasing the
possibilities that decisions would be implemented. In
Fadeyev's view, Belarus did not believe that Kazakhstan
should exert influence over CIS processes. MGU's Vlasov told
us after the Minsk summit that the Kazakh President's
proposals were meant to burnish his credentials as a
statesman and had little chance of success because of the
growing differences in interests among members.
.
Beyond the CIS, So Many Groups: SES, EURASEC, BSEC and SCO
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Several of our interlocutors agreed that, as with the
EU, Russia worked better bilaterally than through the CIS.
Reviewing the alphabet soup of regional economic
organizations Moscow sought to lead, experts questioned their
effectiveness or relevance in spurring economic cooperation,
much less integration. The Separate Economic Space (SES:
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan) existed only on paper. Experts
dismissed it as "non-functional" without Ukraine's
participation. Varying levels of economic development
impeded efforts by the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc:
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan) to cooperate effectively, while persistent
economic disputes between Russia and Belarus, and Russia and
Kazakhstan also got in the way (reftel A). Russia and
several CIS countries also belong to the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation organization (BSEC: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey,

MOSCOW 00012711 003 OF 003


Ukraine and Serbia). Despite efforts by Russia to invigorate
this organization, observers also questioned its relevance
(reftel B).


10. (C) In the view of Moscow experts, including Mikhail
Titarenko, Director of the Far Eastern Institute the one
organization that Russia did not lead alone -- the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO: Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) -- had the greatest
potential in both the economic and security fields. He
claimed that a Chinese-led SCO had much more capacity to
further economic integration than did the CIS. IMEMO's
Andrey Ryabov argued that the SCO, although at a rudimentary
stage, could develop into a "NATO 2" given China's political
ambitions and economic power. China will continue to
strengthen the SCO's influence in the region as it reached
for regional political and economic hegemony, Ryabov warned.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) The CIS is suffering from chronic malaise -- lack of
strong direction and of a well-defined agenda -- and
corrosive discontent among its member countries. However,
even if members like Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova left the
organization, it is clear to most observers that without
substantial reforms, the CIS will become even less relevant.
We expect the CIS will limp along -- at least until the 2008
leadership change in Russia -- because Moscow continues to
view the organization as an emblem of Russian leadership in
the post-Soviet space.
BURNS