Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW12666
2006-11-28 16:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S APPROACH TO POST-ORANGE UKRAINE

Tags:  PREL PGOV UP RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0381
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2666/01 3321630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281630Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5486
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012666 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S APPROACH TO POST-ORANGE UKRAINE

REF: MOSCOW 9018

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UP RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S APPROACH TO POST-ORANGE UKRAINE

REF: MOSCOW 9018

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia has reinvigorated its engagement
with Ukraine, focusing on practical cooperation. Last
month's Fradkov-Yanukovich meeting, which yielded a gas deal,
set the stage for the December 23 Putin-Yushchenko Summit.
Russian attitudes, however, still seem to lack an
appreciation for Ukraine's continuing interest in European
integration and of its developing national identity. End
Summary.

A Turn for the Better
--------------


2. (C) From Moscow's perspective, while transitory political
changes in Kyiv have clearly affected its interests, there
are deeper, underlying factors that drive Russia to seek
close ties with its most important neighbor. In an early
November conversation, MFA Director of the Second CIS
Department (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) Viktor Sorokin
insisted that a stable, unified Ukraine was important for
Russia, particularly for the "survival" of the Russian
economy. Sorokin listed three critical factors:

-- over 10 million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, and more
than 50 percent of the population considers Russian its
native language;

-- the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based in Ukraine;

-- energy security, in particular Ukraine's dependence on
Russian energy and Russia's dependence on Ukraine's transit
routes (eighty percent of Russian gas and fifty percent of
Russian oil transit Ukraine on its way to Europe).

These and other reasons have helped Russia and Ukraine
"de-link" politics and economics, Sorokin added.


3. (C) Moscow Carnegie Center's Nikolay Petrov agreed that
both countries are now putting business before politics. Now
that "Orange" emotions have subsided and a
mutually-acceptable price for gas has been reached, the
relationship was less political, and both countries are
focused on pragmatic cooperation. Petrov termed Ukraine the
most important partner for Russia among its neighbors.
Andrey Ryabov, a scholar at the Institute for World Economy
and International Relations (IMEMO),claimed that Ukraine's
most important asset was its location on the European Union's

frontier. Ukraine's strategic position made it impossible
for Russia to ignore Ukraine's drift to Europe. The
Ukrainian Embassy's Political Counselor Myroslava Scherbatyuk
noted that with that realization, unhelpful rhetoric had
abated, and both parties were eager to put the relationship
back on track.

After a Busy Round of Meetings, Putin to Kyiv
--------------


4. (C) Scherbatyuk noted that the uncertainty over the
formation of the Ukrainian government had slowed bilateral
contacts to a crawl. However, since the August meetings in
Sochi between Putin and Yanukovich, the tempo had picked up.
All but two sub-commissions of the Putin-Yushchenko
Commission have now met. The October meeting between Prime
Ministers Fradkov and Yanukovich produced a Russian agreement
to sell gas to Ukraine for USD 130 per 1,000 cubic meters,
which Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin
termed a "gift." Black Sea Fleet talks took place on October
27-28 in Sevastopol. The November 7-8 meeting between
Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Tarasyuk was considered by
Moscow observers as the real launch of a renewed political
dialogue.


5. (C) Two remaining sub-commissions -- humanitarian issues
(chaired by Education Ministers Fursenko and Nikolayenko) and
security issues (chaired by Defense Ministers Ivanov and
Hrytsenko) -- will meet in early December. At the conclusion
of the Security Council sub-commission in November between
Igor Ivanov and Vitaliy Hayduk, the two parties announced
that Putin would visit Kyiv on December 23 for the
long-awaited Putin-Yushchenko Commission Summit.

NATO/EU
--------------


6. (C) While there are solid reasons to believe that a focus
on practical cooperation could propel the relationship
forward, experts we spoke to underlined that Ukraine's
potential membership in NATO remained a potential flash
point. The MFA's Sorokin succinctly described the Russian

MOSCOW 00012666 002 OF 003


position on Ukraine and NATO as: "Cooperation yes, entry no."
Ukraine's entry into NATO would indicate to Russia that
Ukraine felt threatened and Moscow wanted Kyiv to spell out
what specific threats were posed to Ukrainian security. NATO
for Russia, Sorokin said, was a "destabilizing" force.
Ukrainian Embassy Political Counselor Scherbatyuk said that
NATO membership was an inevitable geopolitical choice for
Ukraine; a necessary part of its effort to move out of the
Russian orbit and establish a balance of forces in the
region. However, Scherbatyuk acknowledged the low level of
support NATO enjoyed in Ukraine, and that Russia was using
this factor to argue against Ukraine's entry.


7. (C) Ukraine's continued interest in pursuing integration
into Euro-Atlantic institutions produced a sense of
bewilderment among some of our Russian interlocutors.
Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS Institute characterized
Ukrainian leaders as "naive" and "provincial," prone to
corruption and clan politics. He added contemptuously that
Ukraine entertained aspirations for the EU that were not
reciprocated. IMEMO's Alexey Bogaturov described many in the
Russian elite as almost indifferent to Ukraine's European
aspirations. "If Ukraine wanted to be with Europe, then let
Europe pay for it," Bogaturov concluded dismissively. Yet,
some experts expressed envy for Ukraine's thriving media and
freer political movements.

Ukraine: Handle with Care?
--------------


8. (C) When the conflict between Tbilisi and Moscow was at
its sharpest this past fall, several of our contacts
predicted that the "Ukrainians would be next." However, in
the aftermath of the dispute, IMEMO's Ryabov suggested that
Georgia had unexpectedly helped Ukraine. Embarrassed by the
negative reaction to its handling of Georgia, he thought
Russia might be trying harder to avoid a conflict with its
western neighbor. All interlocutors agreed that the ties
between the two countries were too strong to allow efforts to
create artificial barriers to succeed. Still, old
stereotypes abound. Sorokin advised that special care be
used in dealing with the "young" government in Kyiv because
it was bound to exhibit contradictory behavior.

Language and Religion: Ties that Bind
--------------


9. (C) Experts we talked to flagged the use of the Russian
language and the shared heritage of the Orthodox Church as
cross-cutting issues that would gain prominence in bilateral
relations. Scherbatyuk saw Moscow's relentless efforts to
have Russian become the second official language of Ukraine
as "ominous." She noted that the issue was again raised at
the November 7 Lavrov-Tarasyuk meeting. IMEMO's Ryabov
suggested that there were many regional-level projects to
promote "Russification" -- particularly in the Donetsk region
and Crimea -- where the government in Kyiv had failed to
"Ukranianize" populations. He claimed that the Ukrainian
government lacked the political will to fight Russian efforts
at "integration." The BBC's Konstantin Eggert told us that
in the future, Moscow could create trouble for a weakened
Ukrainian government in these regions; only money and
organization were needed to stir up pre-existing separatist
tendencies. However, while most observers agreed that there
were fault lines in Ukraine that the GOR could readily
exploit, no one believed there was strong support for a move
in this direction from top decision-makers. For now, Russia
seems to be pleased with the turn in relations since
Yanukovich's return and has no reason to pressure him in this
manner.


10. (C) Religion poses other challenges. Informed
observers we talked to, including Scherbatyuk, said Moscow
was strongly resisting Yushchenko's plan -- endorsed by the
Constantinople Patriarchate -- to unify Orthodox Ukrainians
in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate). Russia
backs the Moscow Patriarchate (MP) of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church, which has special ties to religious communities in
Kharkiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Odesa.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) Now that the Yanukovich government is in place,
Russia is focused on resuming active engagement. The energy
deal has put one of the most contentious issues in the
relationship on hold for another year. Difficult issues lie
ahead, however, with Ukraine's continued interest in NATO
membership. While no one seems to think the relationship can
return to its cozy, pre-Orange Revolution days, the improved
tone and a focus on practical issues should help lay the
groundwork for a productive Putin-Yushchenko Summit.

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BURNS