Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW12600
2006-11-24 10:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON BO RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7648
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #2600/01 3281038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241038Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5398
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012600 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS

REF: MINSK 1184

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reasons:
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012600

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH BELARUS

REF: MINSK 1184

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.
4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. Another Putin-Lukashenko meeting has come
and gone with few evident results. It occurred against a
widespread perception here that Putin would like to rein in
Lukashenko as part of Russia's growing assertiveness.
Unresolved problems, most notably those related to energy,
plague the bilateral relationship, while after nearly a
decade of posturing, a "Union State" remains only a distant
possibility. Lukashenko's populism resonates among Russia's
disenfranchised rural dwellers which, some believe, creates
low-grade anxiety in the Kremlin, where senior officials do
not hide Putin's dislike of the Belarusian President.
Gazprom's new, more market-oriented approach to Belarus is
seen here as an inevitable, if painful phase in the bilateral
economic relationship. End Summary.

Putin-Lukashenko: Tug of War
--------------


2. (C) The popular Moscow daily newspaper Kommersant
characterized the November 10 three hour Lukashenko-Putin
meeting as a "waste of time." Reportedly on the agenda were
Belarus re-exports of Russian oil to Europe and gas price
increases. Putin has publicly threatened to terminate
current oil delivery arrangements, which allow Belarus to
import crude oil without paying duties, refine the crude for
export to third countries and then pocket the resulting
export duties. On gas, Russia wants significant increases
over current prices for 2007 while demanding an interest in
Beltransgaz, the Belarusian gas transport system. The sides
continue to wrangle over an appraisal of Beltransgaz's market
value. Belarus watchers told us that the discussions were
inconclusive.

Russia's Cold Feet, Belarus' Cold Winter?
--------------


3. (C) Carnegie Moscow Center's Nikolay Petrov argued that
the new dynamic between Belarus and Russia, in which Moscow
had put more pressure on Minsk, was fueled by changes within
-- not outside -- Russia. Russia's growing wealth had caused
it to become more assertive. At the same time, in his view,

the color revolutions had made Russia feel vulnerable and
spawned Moscow's efforts to exert more influence over its
neighbors. Gazprom's new approach -- raising gas prices for
former Soviet states to market rates -- was a clear
reflection of this, as was Russia's pressure on oil export
duties. Petrov thought that for Lukashenko, this change of
heart on energy subsidies on Russia's part was unacceptable.
Aleksandr Fadeyev of the CIS Institute claimed that
Lukashenko continued to believe that Putin could simply order
Gazprom to set a gas price at a certain level. With ten
percent of its national outlays spent on gas, the GOB
considered further price increases as an attempt to drive
Belarus to bankruptcy. The experts we spoke to believed that
Belarus' attempts to find another energy supplier -- Iran,
Venezuela -- would be unavailing, but, as in the past, it
would somehow manage to strike a deal with Russia.

How to Deal with Luka?
--------------


4. (C) MFA Deputy Director Victor Sorokin told us after the
November 10 meeting that there were two ways to deal with a
regime like Lukashenko's: 1) isolation in an effort to impose
European standards; 2) or a dialogue designed to edge Belarus
closer to those same standards. He argued that the first
approach, which is preferred by the EU and the U.S., would
produce no results, while Russia's patient engagement will
eventually bring change. (Comment: Sorokin had little else
to share about the meeting, which reflects in part the MFA's
marginal role in setting Belarus policy.)


5. (C) Other interlocutors disagreed about the possibilities
for change. Andrey Ryabov of the Institute for World Economy
and International Relations (IMEMO) warned against a
simplified view of Lukashenko. "He is not a marionette which
Russia can easily control. He is a seasoned politician who
knows how to manipulate the media and the public." Aleksandr
Fadeyev of the CIS Institute seconded Ryabov, offering as
evidence a September gathering of Russian regional
journalists in Minsk at Lukashenko's invitation. The
journalists, he said, were entertained by Lukashenko for more
than four hours, showered with gifts, and returned "smitten"
with Lukashenko. The journalists came from Russian regions
where some continued to believe that Lukashenko personified a
social "paternalism" practiced by an ideal leader, a
conserver of Soviet values. Irked by the visibly widening

MOSCOW 00012600 002 OF 002


gap between the rich and the poor in Russia, the journalists
wrote for readers, Fadeyev said, who viewed Belarus with
nostalgia as a place where everyone might be poor but were
all equally poor. For them, dreams of a Union State were part
of the nostalgia for a more just political structure.
Carnegie's Petrov agreed that the Kremlin had good reason to
fear the populist Lukashenko, who would be in power long
after Putin left office, and who could at some point play a
role in Russian politics.

Weak Opposition
--------------


6. (C) While most observers viewed Lukashenko as a
continuing irritant for Putin, they did not think Russia had
any alternatives in Minsk. Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of Russia
in Global Affairs, pointed out two problems with the existing
Belarusian opposition: 1) they were weak and not united and
2) they were too identified with the West. This left Russia
with no option but to stick with Lukashenko. Lukyanov
stressed that the West, too eager for any sign of a
democratic movement, clung to weak opposition figures such as
Milinkevich and Kozulin when they had no meaningful power
base. Lukyanov thought that the EU's biggest mistake in
trying to influence what happened in its neighborhood was to
close the door on further EU expansion. Any talk of future
entry to EU, however unlikely, might have worked as a strong
incentive for Lukashenko.

Union State: Going Nowhere?
--------------


7. (C) Most of the expert community in Moscow saw progress
on the long-planned Union State as halting. Both sides paid
lip service to the goal, but Lukashenko would not accept
Belarus becoming just another Russian region and Putin was
not prepared to consider Belarus Russia's equal. Observers
alleged that there was a clear divide in Russia between city
dwellers, who scoff at the concept of a union, and some in
the provinces who supported it. In any event, many Russians
considered Belarus "somehow" part of Russia. Konstantin
Eggert of BBC Moscow saw an opportunity for Putin to create a
legacy for himself by pursuing the Union State idea. He
repeated speculation that Putin could re-create a Soviet
Union-like structure, and perhaps find himself a new job in
the process as head of the new organization when his
presidential term expires in 2008.

Whatever Comes Next, No Conflict with Belarus, Please
-------------- --------------


8. (C) While Russia might push Belarus hard on energy
issue, the observers we spoke to argued that there were
limits to such pressure and that Minsk was aware of this.
Aleksey Vlasov of Moscow State University (MGU) held that
conflicts with Belarus were not beneficial to Russia.
Belarus was a small, isolated, underdeveloped country which,
for its survival, depended on its "transit" function between
Russia and the West. It could not be ignored and abused by
Russia, he said, or there would be negative consequences for
Russia. While a handful of Belarusian "dissidents" in
Moscow, headed by Valeriy Pavlov of the Dionis Club, dream of
overthrowing Lukashenko, we could not find any expert who
thought they had much sway with the Kremlin. While Moscow
kept a watchful eye on them, it did not seem to influence
their activities. Nor would anyone speak to the possibility
that someone in Lukashenko's ruling circle could be turned.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Moscow is clearly trying to redefine the relationship
by exerting growing pressure on Minsk. Beyond the core issue
of energy, there are many levels of political dissonance
between the two, spurred in part by Putin's intense personal
dislike of Lukashenko, which senior Kremlin officials do not
disguise in their conversations with us. At the same time,
Moscow is aware that there are limits to what it can get from
Belarus and is cognizant as well that, from its perspective,
there are no appealing alternatives to Lukashenko's rule.
BURNS