A/S FRIED'S NOVEMBER 15 MEETING WITH DFM TITOV ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012549

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S NOVEMBER 15 MEETING WITH DFM TITOV ON
KOSOVO

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell. Reasons: 1.
4(B/D).


1. (C) Summary: In a November 15 meeting with DFM Titov,
A/S Fried made clear that the U.S. intended to move forward
on Kosovo quickly after UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari presented
the sides with his proposal after the Serbian parliamentary
elections. He stressed that putting off the status decision
would gain the Contact Group (CG) nothing in Serbia and would
risk losing the credibility the CG had in Kosovo. Fried
stressed that, unlike Russia, the U.S. had troops on the
ground and would not further delay a final status settlement
and thus see U.S. and other NATO forces turn from liberators
to increasingly unwelcome occupiers. He reiterated that a
Kosovo with internationally-supervised independence was the
best alternative available and that waiting for a solution
agreeable to Belgrade, as Russia wanted, risked creating a
chaotic situation for which KFOR, not Russia, would be
responsible. All the positive features of the agreement,
such as minority rights protection by the international
community, would be lost with no corresponding gains.


2. (C) Summary, con't.: Titov was equally direct in
stating repeatedly that Russia would not support any decision
that did not have the agreement of both sides. He said he
understood our analysis of the risks posed by delay, but
argued that Ahtisaari had not fulfilled his role as a
mediator and needed to present a package that Belgrade could
accept. Titov was candid in acknowledging that the process
was now reaching "a decisive point" and that it was likely
that Belgrade would reject the Ahtisaari package soon after
the elections and that the process would quickly move to the
UN Security Council. In discussing action in the Security
Council, Titov said Russia was willing to support a
continuing international presence in Kosovo, including KFOR
and an international civilian presence, but was not ready to
"bless" a status decision that included independence. He
raised familiar arguments about Kosovo's precedential value
and concerns about a Greater Albania. End Summary.


3. (C) Assistant Secretary Fried met with Deputy Foreign
Minister Titov on November 15 for one hour and fifteen
minutes while Fried was in Moscow for the G-8 Political
Director's Meeting (septel). Titov was accompanied by
Russian Kosovo Envoy Botsan-Kharchenko.
.
A/S FRIED: MOVING FORWARD ON STATUS
--------------


4. (C) A/S Fried told Titov that he wanted to explain the
U.S. approach to Kosovo in the clearest possible terms
because the U.S. intended to move forward quickly after UN
Special Envoy Ahtisaari presented the sides with his proposal
after the January 2007 Serbian elections. The Ahtisaari
package provided for decentralization, minority rights and
protection of the Serbs' cultural and religious heritage as
well as international safeguards to restrain majority rule.
The only possible outcome we saw was
internationally-supervised independence for Kosovo. Fried
stressed that putting off this decision would gain the
Contact Group (CG) nothing from Serbia and would risk losing
the credibility the CG had in Kosovo. The U.S. had troops on
the ground and would not accept a permanent stall in the
status process while we waited for Belgrade's agreement,
which would never come. Waiting for a solution agreeable to
Belgrade risked creating a chaotic and violent situation with
no attendant benefits. In that case, all the positive
features of the agreement -- particularly minority rights
protection by the international community -- could be lost
with no corresponding gains. The U.S. and NATO had troops on
the ground; Russia, by its own choice, did not. The U.S. was
serious about resolving the Kosovo problem, more than seven
years after the campaign against Milosevic's forces there,
and would not be deterred.


5. (C) A/S Fried underlined that the U.S. and Russia had
come a long way together on the issue of Kosovo and that
Washington and Moscow needed to bring a satisfactory end to
the situation together. We need to "pull this tooth" so
Serbia can get on with its European future. In order to make
this happen without creating a difficult situation that

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threatened what the CG had accomplished, Russia's support was
needed. The U.S. had not gone public yet with its support
for Kosovo's supervised independence, Fried noted, but at
some point we would.
.
DFM TITOV: NO GOR SUPPORT WITHOUT SERBIAN AGREEMENT
-------------- --------------


6. (C) DFM Titov responded by stressing several times that
Russia would not support any status decision that did not
have the blessing of both sides. Titov criticized Ahtisaari
for not fulfilling his role as mediator, arguing that he
needed to go back to both sides with a revised proposal that
would provide a basis for new negotiations. While the
Serbians would not agree to independence, they could accept
"an absolute degree of autonomy" or some other suitable
designation for Kosovo that would prevent Serbian control
over Kosovo's government, while preserving Serbia's
territorial integrity (perhaps through allowing Serbian
border guards). Titov argued that Kosovo should not in this
case be permitted membership in international organizations.
Fried pushed back that this was not realistic; Serbia would
never agree to independence, no matter what offer was made,
and the U.S. would not accept an unworkable status quo or
impractical autonomy arrangements.
.
THE END GAME
--------------


7. (C) While reiterating well-known Russian views on
status, Titov also acknowledged that the process was reaching
"a decisive point." He forecast that Ahtisaari would present
the package to the sides in January or perhaps early February
and the Serbs would respond negatively. The issue would
quickly move to the Security Council, he predicted, but it
was possible that the Kosovars at that point could
unilaterally declare independence and would be recognized by
various states, with or without a Security Council vote.
Titov accused the Kosovars of "blackmailing" the
international community by threatening violence if they did
not receive independence, even if they were clearly not ready
for it.


8. (C) Turning to Russia's position in the Security
Council, he said that it would be "easy" for Moscow to
approve KFOR and the international community's continued
presence in Kosovo, even though Russia had been disappointed
with UNMIK's performance. However, Russia in the Security
Council could not "bless" any status decision that led to
Kosovo's independence.


9. (C) A/S Fried pointed out that the Serbian position was
not coherent -- Belgrade understood it had lost Kosovo
(witness Serbs in Kosovo being allowed to vote on the
Constitution, while others were not) -- but was unable to
publicly admit this. Serbia did not want to rule in Kosovo,
but would not let the Kosovars rule themselves. Economic
development in Kosovo was a necessity, but Kosovo could not
become an IFI member without international status. While the
present situation did not present ideal circumstances for
Kosovar independence, this was still the best alternative
available. Arguments for delaying a settlement risked
creating gridlock in the international community, uncertainty
about KFOR's status, and bloodshed in Kosovo.


10. (C) Titov said that Russia was also concerned about
instability -- if a "quick" decision was reached, Moscow
wouldn't exclude the possibility of an uprising among the
Serb population in northern Kosovo. While Serbia was
unlikely to use military force, unorganized violence was
possible. Fried responded that KFOR was better prepared now
than it had been in March 2004 and that it would act to
protect all sides in the event of civil disturbances. In any
event, chaos and bloodshed would be more likely in the event
of a unilateral Kosovar declaration of independence, which
Titov had himself admitted would be the likely outcome of
continued stalemate.
.
UNIVERSALITY AND FEAR OF A GREATER ALBANIA
--------------

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11. (C) Arguing that the solution in Kosovo would create a
precedent for other disputes, Titov argued that the
situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia had similar
historical roots -- central authorities in the 1990's had
tried to limit local autonomy and had produced a sharp
reaction. Each of the separatists regions was following the
situation in Kosovo attentively. Titov complained that
Ahtisaari had promised a year ago to provide a paper
justifying why Kosovo was a unique case but had failed to do
so. Titov also raised the prospects for a greater Albania,
arguing that the Kosovars were keeping quiet now, but would
push the idea as soon as they achieved independence. This
would lead to destabilization in the Balkans and was of
concern to Kosovo's neighbors as well as Russia.


12. (C) A/S Fried reiterated that Kosovo would not form a
precedent for resolving other disputes because of the unique
character of the situation there. He underlined that the
U.S. had made clear to Albania that its relations with the
U.S. depended on Albania reining in irredentist tendencies.
Tirana had not exhibited any. Fried acknowledged that any
solution would put pressure on Kosovo's neighbors and that
the CG needed to work closely with them to alleviate any
negative fallout. He appealed for Russia not to block a
solution that Moscow should recognize is the best that can be
achieved. Choosing the imperfect was better than the chaos
that would likely descend on Kosovo and the Balkans if the
status process was not concluded expeditiously.


13. (C) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried.
BURNS