A/S FRIED CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIAN DFM KARASIN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 012528

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PBTS ETRD GG MD UP RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIAN DFM KARASIN,
NOVEMBER 15

REF: MOSCOW 11941

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS. Reason 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried and Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin focused on Georgia, Ukraine
and Moldova in a two hour discussion November 15. Karasin
dismissed Georgian conciliatory steps as cosmetic; Fried said
they are real and Russia should respond by ending sanctions.
Karasin decried Georgian "militarization;" Fried assured
Karasin that the U.S. will not support any use of force to
resolve separatist conflicts in Georgia. Karasin recognized
that the conflicts are taking place "on Georgian territory"
and guaranteed Russia will be "responsible" with regard to
South Ossetian and Abkhaz demands for recognition. Fried
laid out U.S. proposals for confidence-building measures in
the two conflicts. Karasin was not enthusiastic but promised
to look at them. Karasin claimed Georgia is not fulfilling
the mandate of UNSCR 1716 to withdraw armed forces from the
Kodori Gorge. Fried answered that our approach to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia is to rule out the use of force, increase
internationalization and promote contacts between the
parties.


2. (C) On Ukraine, Karasin expressed satisfaction that
political tensions have defused and Ukraine's leaders are
engaging on real issues, including in relations with Russia.
He expected a summit in the coming months. Fried said the
U.S., too, is prepared to work with the Ukrainian government.
On Moldova, Karasin said Russia is trying to promote direct
Moldovan-Transnistrian contact to move toward settlement and
stressed the need for a transit protocol. DAS David Kramer
blamed Transnistrian negotiator Litskai for refusing direct
contact at Odessa, and said there is a potential solution for
the transit protocol issue. End Summary.


3. (C) EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried, Ambassador and
EUR DAS David Kramer met with DFM Grigoriy Karasin for two
hours November 15. Karasin was accompanied by 4th CIS
Department Deputy Director Tarabrin and North America
Department Deputy Director Vinokurov. The meeting was
characterized by sharp give and take on substance, while
maintaining a friendly atmosphere.

Georgian-Russian Relations
--------------


4. (C) Karasin stated that the crisis in Georgian-Russian
relations continues. The Georgian leadership is not taking
steps to alleviate Russian concerns. Despite an agreement by
FMs Lavrov and Bezhuashvili not to raise emotions,
Bezhuashvili's subsequent speech in Paris claimed that Russia
is preparing for war against Georgia.


5. (C) Fried answered that he is sorry to hear that Georgia
must take further steps before Russia will take any steps to
improve the situation. Georgia has already taken significant
steps. It reacted responsibly to the October 25 rocket
attack in Kodori. President Saakashvili sacked DefMin
Okruashvili, whom the Russians repeatedly told us they found
objectionable. Saakashvili's November 14 speech to the
European Parliament was responsible and conciliatory, and the
Georgian response to Gazprom's attempt to double the price of
gas was restrained. Russia has seen these steps, which are
both in action and rhetoric. It will not do to ignore them
and demand more. Russia must make efforts, too.


6. (C) Fried returned to this issue several times during the
conversation, pressing Russia hard to ease its sanctions
against Georgia. Karasin tried to deflect the issue to
frozen conflicts, but Fried maintained that Georgia-Russia
relations cannot be separated from these conflicts. Russia
needs to build confidence by easing sanctions. Georgia sees
that Russia supports South Ossetia and Abkhazia while
severing economic and transportation links with Georgia.
Under those circumstances it is hard to convince Georgia to
reach out to its separatist provinces. If the Georgians
believe Russia is trying to destroy their economy, they are
less apt to listen to the U.S. when it counsels restraint and
moderation. Georgia has taken steps and needs to see that
those steps meet a response. Under no circumstances will the
U.S. support Georgian military action to resolve the
conflicts, but the increased tensions from Russia's economic
measures leave both Georgia and Russia vulnerable to
provocations.


7. (C) Karasin responded that he cannot satisfy Fried on this
issue because the Georgians have not satisfied Russia. They

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have taken some cosmetic steps that will not lead to
relaxation of the measures Russia has taken against Georgia.
Karasin regretted the anti-Georgian mood that had caused
Russians of Georgian ethnicity to suffer, but such excesses
have stopped. Georgia must understand Russia's position and
think through its policies with regard to Russia. Karasin
also warned against the U.S. positioning itself as a
"mediator" between Russia and Georgia.

Charges of Militarization
--------------


8. (C) Karasin charged that Georgia is acquiring offensive
weapons and training special units for commando operations
against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has "facts"
showing U.S., NATO and "post-Soviet" participation in this
effort. That could increase Georgian "appetite" for a
military solution to the conflicts on Georgian territory. He
repeated that these conflicts are on "Georgian territory,"
and Fried assured him that he understood Karasin's emphasis.


9. (C) Fried said reform and improvement of the Georgian army
were a necessity under any circumstances. Putin himself had
demanded in 2001 that Georgia gain the capability to police
and control its territory against movements of insurgents and
terrorists. The U.S. has helped increase Georgia's
capabilities to do that with light infantry. U.S. military
experts have assured Fried that there is no evidence that
Georgia is preparing a military offensive. We will be happy
to check out any Russian evidence. Karasin cited a Georgian
36D6 air defense radar that peacekeepers had discovered in
the South Ossetia conflict zone.

Separatist Conflicts: Use of Force
--------------


10. (C) Karasin said that armed conflict would close the door
to any solution, because reestablishing trust would be
problematic. Fried said the U.S. has made its position
absolutely clear to Georgia: there are no circumstances
under which we would support Georgia initiating military
operations to settle by force the conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. Karasin asked whether the U.S. still maintains
this attitude. "Certainly," Fried replied. He said he sees
no circumstances under which that attitude will change.


11. (C) Fried said that the October 25 rocket attack in Upper
Kodori showed that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are potentially
explosive. Actors not under Georgian or Russian (or even
Abkhaz) control, such as deposed warlord Kvitsiani, can
provoke crises. We should not wait for the next crisis, but
should act now to build confidence. Though political
settlements will take time, CBMs will prepare the groundwork
and are a necessary first step. Karasin said Russia has
always maintained that, before any discussion of status,
Georgia must build trust in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
convincing them that they can develop constructive relations.
But, he maintained, Georgia is doing nothing along those
lines.

Separatist Conflicts: Referendum and Recognition
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Karasin criticized U.S. and EU statements of intent
not to recognize the referendum in South Ossetia as a "stupid
policy." The referendum made clear the course that the
population will support, and it is offensive to the Ossetians
to declare that their opinion does not matter. He asked for
Fried's comment on the referendum.


13. (C) Fried answered that the Russian MFA had called the
referendum in South Ossetia "the envy" of democratic
institutions. Fried said the U.S. does not envy anything
about the South Ossetian political order -- he noted that
Kokoity's income derives in part from counterfeiting U.S.
currency -- and does not believe Russia seriously does,
either. Rather, Russia's open support for South Ossetia and
Abkhazia is subject to misinterpretation by the separatists,
who might think it means they can start hostilities. Russia,
whose citizens make up a large part of the leadership of the
South Ossetian army and security services, has a
responsibility to see this does not happen.


14. (C) In addition to his recognition that the separatist
conflicts are taking place "on Georgian territory," Karasin
repeated his October 21 assurance to Fried (Reftel) that,
despite public sympathy with South Ossetia's appeal to Russia
to recognize its independence, Russia will act responsibly.
"I can guarantee that," he affirmed. Fried thanked Karasin
for that guarantee. Later Karasin said that Abkhazia, like
South Ossetia, has appealed to Russia's Duma for recognition.

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He repeated that Russia will act responsibly, but said that
Georgia's anti-Russian line makes it harder to persuade
deputies to deny the appeal.

South Ossetia -- CBMs
--------------


15. (C) Fried ran through U.S. ideas on CBMs for South
Ossetia, noting that he wanted to share them before these
could come up at the OSCE ministerial in Brussels. Fried
said the list is not exhaustive and that we would welcome
Russian contributions. He stressed extending OSCE monitoring
to all of South Ossetia; setting up joint checkpoints and
monitoring at Didi Gupta and/or Roki Tunnel; accelerating
OSCE economic rehabilitation plans; and working to establish
a free trade corridor to link North Ossetia and South Ossetia
to Georgia's Black Sea ports. He drew Karasin's attention to
the absence of demands to change negotiating formats. He
asked for Karasin's views.


16. (C) Karasin thanked Fried for sharing the U.S. ideas in
advance. After questioning whether Georgian actions in South
Ossetia -- installing an air defense radar and sponsoring an
alternative election -- showed a willingness to build
confidence, Karasin said Russia wants to continue the
economic rehabilitation process set out in the Brussels
Donors Conference in May. He called for facilitating direct
contacts between the South Ossetian and Georgian leaders.
Fried said we support both points. DAS Matt Bryza will be in
Tbilisi November 17, and will look for ways to facilitate a
meeting of South Ossetian and Georgian leaders. Fried
returned to the package of CBMs to be unveiled at Brussels
and asked Karasin's opinion. Karasin said, "I don't want to
disappoint you with my answer." His said CBMs should not
only be technical, but should support an atmosphere of
confidence among people. Fried answered that statements are
important -- Putin has recently made the constructive
statement that South Ossetia and Abkhazia need to builds a
common state with Georgia -- but CBMs should not be simply
rhetorical, either. They should include actions such as the
ones we have outlined.

Abkhazia
--------------


17. (C) Karasin claimed Georgia is not fulfilling the mandate
of UNSCR 1716 to withdraw all armed formations from Kodori.
There are still 500 Georgian troops of both Interior and
Defense Ministries, plus heavy weapons, armor and
sophisticated weapons systems. Russia wants regular joint
PKF-UNOMIG monitoring of the Kodori Gorge. The current
situation in Kodori, including the presence of the
"Government-in-Exile," does not suit Russia. Karasin called
on the U.S. to press Tbilisi to observe 1716. He said Russia
is working with the Abkhaz on the idea of police advisors in
Gali. He asked about the status of "FM" Shamba's visa to
visit the UN.


18. (C) Fried answered that the U.S. approach on Abkhazia is
to stress no use of force, increase the international
presence on the ground, and promote Georgian-Abkhaz contacts.
We have no opposition in principle to a Shamba visit, which
a better UNSCR would have secured. We support monitoring of
Kodori. Our ideas for CBMs in Abkhazia include promoting
economic contacts (under UN leadership),de-isolating
Abkhazia and expanding its economic ties to Europe,
increasing international presence such as an international
police force, sending a FSG/SRSG fact-finding mission to
Gali, returning to the previous Abkhaz agreement to allow
Georgian language teaching in Gali, seeking a Georgian pledge
not to use force, and surveying IDP returnees to Gali. We
will also recommend that Georgia rename the administrators it
has sent to Upper Kodori, dropping the "Government-in-Exile"
title.


19. (C) Fried stressed that we are not interested in changing
negotiating formats in Abkhazia at this time but in getting
things done. Secretary Rice's instructions are to work with
Russia creatively on CBMs and come back to her if we need
help. Karasin (finally) said Russia is willing to work on
building confidence and will look at the U.S. proposals. The
greatest obstacle, however, is that the Abkhaz have no
confidence that Georgia is willing to consider Abkhaz
interests and engage in talks on an equal basis, with respect
and without preconditions. No one has made an effort to
prove that Georgia is willing to do so. One appropriate step
in getting the Abkhaz to engage was the removal of
endorsement of the Boden paper from UNSCRs, as this prejudged
the outcome of status negotiations and led to a dead end.


20. (C) Fried said the U.S. is suggesting the measures he

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outlined without precondition. We support Georgia's
territorial integrity within its existing borders, "and so do
you." But it is not the U.S. position that the Abkhaz must
pledge allegiance to Georgia before discussing anything else.
Fried noted that in Cyprus confidence has improved between
the communities even though the status question remains
unresolved. Fried took Karasin's point that the Abkhaz
believe the Georgians do not respect them, but working with
Georgians such as UN PermRep Alasania can remedy that.

Georgia Human Rights
--------------


21. (C) Fried signaled that there would probably be a written
response to the letter Karasin sent to Under Secretary Burns
on November 13. Fried said there is an answer for every
point in the letter, whose arguments he characterized as
weak. He would not insist on going into detail in this
meeting, but had the overall comment that if Russia is
concerned for the welfare of the Georgian people as the
letter claims, it should not be trying to impoverish them
with economic sanctions.

Ukraine
--------------


22. (C) Karasin briefed on his recent trip to Kyiv, where he
found the political atmosphere less tense. Leaders are
engaging on real issues. To be sure, there is friction, but
no side is monochromatically black or white. All agree on
the need to work together to resolve problems. Karasin had a
productive conversation with FM Tarasyuk. The
"sensationalism" has been removed from many issues such as
border questions, the Black Sea Fleet and working out joint
approaches to new challenges and terrorism. In his meeting
with Yushchenko, Karasin was reassured that Ukraine does not
look at the Great Famine (Holodomor) as genocide against
Ukrainians. The Russian-Ukrainian bilateral commission's
groups are working in phases -- Lavrov-Tarasyuk on
international affairs, Yanukovich-Fradkov on the economy, as
well as the security and human dimension groups. The work
will lead to a summit.


23. (C) Fried said the U.S. approach is simple: Yanukovich
was democratically elected and we will work with him. He
will be in Washington in early December, hosted by Vice
President Cheney. We are relaxed about such issues as NATO
membership and welcome the improvement in Russian-Ukrainian
relations. We are more focused on Ukrainian WTO accession.
Fried was on his way to Kyiv, where he will meet with
Yushchenko, Yanukovich and opposition leader Tymoshenko.
Yanukovich appears to be thinking of Ukraine's place in the
world for the first time. Like us, Poland also seems
prepared to work with the Ukrainian leadership. Karasin
attempted a question as to whether Poland now thinks of
itself as Ukraine's elder brother; Fried replied that Ukraine
has already many types of elder brother.

Moldova
--------------


24. (C) Karasin said Russia is "activating" its relations
with Moldova and broadening them beyond the Transnistria
conflict. On Transnistria, Russia's main thrust is promoting
contact between Moldova and Transnistria. Some elements from
the 2003 Kozak memo can be used to give a push toward
resolution. Karasin was impressed by Voronin's flexibility.
Meanwhile, Transnistrians are looking for the way forward.
Russia hopes Ukraine will begin to play a more active role in
the conflict. Karasin endorsed the 5 plus 2 negotiating
format.


25. (C) Fried said the U.S. supports direct contacts.
Moldovan territorial integrity remains our starting point.
Fried said we were surprised by the cancellation of train no.
47 and asked why it should stop in Tiraspol and not Chisinau.
Kramer added that the Moldovans and Transnistrians could
have talked earlier in the month at Odessa, but Litskai
refused. Russian negotiator Nesterushkin did not give
sufficient encouragement to direct contact. Karasin said
that a transit protocol for the Transnistrians would be an
important next step. Kramer said Voronin had told him that
Chisinau was willing to turn a March Moldovan declaration on
the issue into a protocol; the language of the declaration
was acceptable to Transnistria but because of the lack of
trust Tiraspol has for Chisinau, it needed to be signed by
others in the 5 2. This should allow negotiations to resume.
Kramer said the Transnistrians at present feel no pressure
to move towards a settlement; he hoped Russia can convince
them to work with the Moldovans.


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Karasin Trip to Washington
--------------


26. (C) Fried proposed December 15 or 19 for Karasin's
long-promised trip to Washington. Karasin said he would get
back on dates, but proposed taking a number of directors with
him, including MFA 3rd CIS Department Director Peshkov to
participate in Karasin's talk with Assistant Secretary
Boucher about Central Asia.



27. (U) A/S Fried and DAS Kramer have cleared this message.
BURNS