Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06MOSCOW12402
2006-11-09 15:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE

Tags:  PREL KNDP ECON ETRD RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091558Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5104
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0144
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012402 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2026
TAGS: PREL KNDP ECON ETRD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 012402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2026
TAGS: PREL KNDP ECON ETRD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: BILATERAL RELATIONS UPDATE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: In a November 8 meeting with the
Ambassador, DFM Kislyak expressed concern over the potential
impact of US congressional elections on WTO and bilateral
nuclear cooperation. He argued again that US sanctions
against Sukhoi were symbolic of the failings in bilateral
relations -- deeply offending Putin, who would likely raise
the topic with the President at APEC. Kislyak flagged a
possible visit to Washington in early December to consult
with U/S Joseph in advance of the next round of the Strategic
Security Dialogue. He praised the inauguration of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, pushed for immunity
in the Kuznetsov case, welcomed an Embassy Baghdad briefing
on the Yousifiyah power plant, and urged closure on the
Putin-Bush meeting time in Hanoi-- noting that DFM Denisov
would represent the GOR at the APEC ministerial prior to FM
Lavrov's November 18th arrival. Kislyak agreed it was time
to revisit commitments to the International Science and
Technology Center, and welcomed planning for the 200th
anniversary celebration. Iran portion of conversation
reported septel. End Summary


2. (C) US-Russian Relations Post-Elections: Kislyak
expressed concern that US-Russian relations would be "held
hostage" to congressional elections, with ratification of key
elements of the presidential checklist -- WTO and "123" --
subject to a more critical reception. Kislyak interpreted
the language of the Iran Non-Proliferation Act amendments as
a bellwether of congressional activism. The Ambassador
responded that WTO would be a signal accomplishment, but
agreed that it would face tough scrutiny. While a "123"
agreement would provide Congress with a 90 day period to
react, but no formal requirement to vote, the Ambassador
stressed that Russian cooperation on North Korea and Iran
would remain important factors in congressional
deliberations. The Ambassador reminded Kislyak that prior to
the mid-term elections, congressional skepticism towards
Russia was acute: a strong case would need to be made on the
merits of US-Russian cooperation.



3. (C) Sukhoi: Launching into a lecture on the failure of
the US to be a predictable partner in foreign affairs (citing
shifting US budgetary support for CW destruction and CTR),
Kislyak revisited GOR unhappiness over the US decision to
impose sanctions against Sukhoi. The company that had done
the most to advocate long-term cooperation with the United
States, he argued, had been singled out for punishment.
Kislyak argued that an apology was in order, taking
particular offense at the Federal Register language that
labeled Russian firms overseen by Putin as proliferators.
Noting that he had made the same points with U/S Joseph,
Kislyak rejected US explanations that the Federal Register
language mirrored the legislation, and repeated that it was
unacceptable that an official US document labeled Russian
parastatals as proliferators. The Sukhoi sanctions were
symbolic of what was wrong in the relationship and
constituted a personal offense to Putin, who would raise the
issue with the President in Hanoi. The Ambassador responded
that Kislyak's conversation with U/S Joseph had been a
positive first step in reviewing the Sukhoi issue. The focus
now needed to be on careful consultations on the facts and
moving forward.


4. (C) Possible Kislyak Visit Early December: Kislyak
noted that he might add a Washington leg to an early December
trip to Central America in order to consult with U/S Joseph
prior to the next round of the Strategic Security Dialogue
scheduled for Moscow before year's end. The Ambassador
encouraged the visit, reminding Kislyak that the 15th
anniversary of the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement
would give momentum to the Bratislava checklist, but also
provide an opportunity to assess how best to move forward.
He underscored that a Washington visit would not obviate the
need for a follow-on session of the Strategic Security
Dialogue in Moscow.


5. (C) Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism:
Kislyak praised the inaugural session of the Global
Initiative in Morocco, underscoring his appreciation for the
work of U/S Joseph's team. With the next session in Turkey
to be followed by a larger event in Astana, Kislyak noted
that it did not take much GOR persuasion to win over
President Nazarbayev to the merits of hosting the
high-profile gathering. Some doubts were quietly expressed
to the GOR by Turkey and Kazakhstan over the fact that the
summits were exclusively in Muslim countries. Kislyak said
he refuted the notion of a faith-based selection process.


6. (C) Kuznetsov Immunity: Kislyak reiterated Lavrov's
written request to the Secretary for a "political and

MOSCOW 00012402 002 OF 002


extrajudicial" determination of the case, arguing that
regardless of the SYG's decision to waive immunity, the US
made its own determination of immunity through the visa
process. The Ambassador noted that a written response to
Lavrov's letter was forthcoming, but did not provide any
grounds for optimism that the US would change its position.


7. (C) Yousifiyah Power Plant: The Ambassador informed
Kislyak that Embassy Baghdad had extended an offer to brief
the Russian mission on the state of play at the facility,
which was still the site of numerous and severe security
incidents, and was awaiting a response. Kislyak said that he
would send instructions for the Russian mission to set up the
meeting, adding that it was not in the interest of either the
US or Russia for the facility to be further damaged.


8. (C) APEC/Putin-President Bilateral: Kislyak pushed for
closure on the timing of the presidential bilateral in Hanoi,
noting that Putin accords "great importance" to his meeting
with the President, which meant that the rest of his schedule
was in limbo. He clarified that First DFM Denisov would
precede Lavrov to Hanoi and would represent the GOR at the
ministerial. Lavrov arrives on the 18th and is available to
meet the Secretary on the 18th or 19th, with his preference
the 18th.


9. (C) International Science and Technology Center (ISTC):
The Ambassador flagged the upcoming visit of ISN DAS Semmel
as an opportune time to address the status of the ISTC,
noting declining US budgetary support for the center.
Kislyak said that he had raised this issue with Rosatom
Kiriyenko, who had asked for more time to come up to speed on
the issue. The GOR valued the ISTC for the transparent rules
and world standards that it propagated. Kislyak agreed in
principle that the ISTC needed to adapt to new realities and
conditions.


10. (SBU) 200th Anniversary: Expressing appreciation for
Putin's letter endorsing the official commemoration of 200
years of diplomatic relations in 2007, the Ambassador said
the Embassy would work closely with the MFA on the range of
US-supported events that were under consideration. Kislyak
said the MFA was committed to the project, and valued the
public diplomacy dimension that it added to US-Russian
relations.
BURNS