FORMER RUSSIAN PM KASYANOV: OPPOSITION WOES,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 012042

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: FORMER RUSSIAN PM KASYANOV: OPPOSITION WOES,
REGISTRATION UPDATE


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In a recent one-on-one lunch with Ambassador, a
confident ex-prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov cited reasons to
be optimistic about his presidential prospects:

-- the business community's alleged latent support for his
economic reform agenda;

-- the weakness of current contenders Medvedev
(inexperienced),Ivanov (distrusted) and Mironov
(charisma-challenged);

-- looming, unresolved economic and social problems;

-- the lack of other strong contenders in the democratic camp.


2. (C) Kasyanov's optimism contrasts sharply with pessimistic
prognoses by analysts about the future of the
western-oriented democratic opposition, whose micro-parties
remain in disarray. Another cause for pessimism is the
refusal of the Federal Registration Service (FRS) to register
Kasyanov's "Russian Popular Democratic Union (RPDU)." The
FRS maintains that the reasons for denying the RPDU were
technical. Kasyanov and members of his organization see it
otherwise, and have refused to re-apply. Registration would
have simplified the RPDU's financial dealings and laid the
groundwork for its transformation into a political party.
Kasyanov seconded the views of observers here that President
Putin has no interest in staying beyond 2008, but cautioned
that Kremlin rivalries might complicate his farewell. End
summary.

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Kasyanov Remains Optimistic
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2. (C) In a recent one-on-one lunch at Spaso House, former
PM Kasyanov was confident, verging on smug, about his future
political prospects, arguing that he was playing "a long
game." Surveying the field of "democratic" leaders and
political parties, Kasyanov was dismissive of Yabloko and
SPS, arguing that their decision not to attend the July 2006
Other Russia conference and implicit pact with the Kremlin
had left them weaker, not stronger electorally. Russian
Republican Party (RPR) president Vladimir Ryzhkov, he
predicted, would have to crawl back to the Other Russia fold
after his resounding defeat in the October 2006 regional
elections in Astrakhan; Kasyanov questioned whether RPR could
expect to secure registration from the Central Election
Commissioner. As for his Other Russia partner, Garry
Kasparov's lack of experience made him "excitable," but
Kasyanov endorsed their working arrangement. (Separately,
Kasyanov's chief aides, Konstantin Merzlikin and Oleg
Buklemishev, were less charitable, impugning Kasparov's
"black and white" view of the world, rejecting his call to
boycott the Presidential elections, and noting that the chess
champion had not even informed them that his wife's pregnancy
was the reason for his long sojourn in the U.S.)


3. (C) Whether or not Putin seeks a third term is the
central, unresolved issue of the 2008 elections, according to
Kasyanov, who noted that from a parochial perspective having
Putin remain in office as social and economic issues came to
a head was attractive. Kasyanov, like most observers here,
believes that Putin wants out. However, he argued that Putin
should be worried about his failure to date to transfer his
own popularity to his presumed candidates for succession,
Dmitriy Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov, who were not catching
fire in the popular imagination. Kasyanov predicted that the
rivalries between Kremlin blocs would make it difficult for
Putin to depart, with "old oligarchs" throwing their weight
behind Medvedev and "new oligarchs" (i.e. Sechin) lacking
confidence in the First Deputy Prime Minister and detesting
MinDef Ivanov. Kasyanov insisted, not once but three times,
that it was only a question of three to five years "before
the revolution comes."


4. (C) Kasyanov's optimism was a function of his faith in
the Russian business community's latent support for his
economic reform agenda. Noting that corruption was sure to
play a larger role in the 2008 elections, Kasyanov attempted
to fireproof himself, noting that additional charges of
personal corruption might seep out, and volunteering that his
recently acquired son-in-law, heir to a multimillionaire

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Moscow construction firm scion, had a reputation for some
shady real estate deals. That aside, Kasyanov intimated that
he was "still friends" with Sergey Ivanov, and that the
inexperience of Medvedev and the charisma deficit of
Federation Council Speaker Mironov would play into his hands,
rendering him an attractive last-minute compromise candidate.

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Other Russia Moribund
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5. (C) Kasyanov's advisers told us that his political
strategy remains largely unchanged. Because he remains a
political "untouchable," any effort to unite formally with
members of the democratic opposition would provoke a Kremlin
response. Instead, the former Prime Minister will head the
Russian Popular Democratic Union movement (with movements not
subject to electoral commission requirements to prove a
membership base of 50,000, distributed throughout at least 45
of the 88 federal subjects) and use Other Russia as an
incubator for opposition ideas. Merzlikin and Buklemishev
were careful to deny Kasyanov's leadership of Other Russia --
with earlier intimations having precipitated RPR Ryzhkov's
repudiation of the Other Russia format. Kasyanov continues
to travel around the country, drawing Kremlin-friendly Nashi
protesters at most locales. Merzlikin noted with some irony
that the Nashi protesters increased, rather than detracted,
from Kasyanov's profile. Neither Kasyanov aide complained of
official harassment, with the exception that university
campuses appeared to be off limits, with rectors pressured
into canceling lectures by Kasyanov, despite initial
enthusiasm in booking the former Prime Minister.


6. (C) Other Russia founding member, Lyudmila Alekseyeva,
acknowledged that it was reduced to a core group of about 30
members meeting every six weeks to two months. She defended
the concept of the big opposition tent, expansive enough to
include National Bolsheviks and quasi-Stalinists, and united
only in the rejection of Putin, as a necessary recourse in a
system dominated by the Kremlin. Other Russia was more a
"brand" than a political party. Alekseyeva remains scathing
in her criticism of SPS and Yabloko, labeling their decision
to boycott Other Russia as a betrayal of democratic ideals,
while conceding that their parties remain the incubators for
the future democratic leadership of Russia.


7. (C) Political scientist and hired consultant for United
Russia, Boris Makarenko said that based on the latest polling
conducted by his Center for Political Technologies he has
"practically lost hope" for the liberal/democratic parties.
Using Moscow polling data as an illustration, Makarenko noted
that liberals garnered only about five percent of the vote,
with "old Soviets" (i.e., those rejecting the market economy)
polling in the 10-15 percent range. The mass of voters, 80
percent, hate the bureaucracy and the power structure (with
the exception of Putin). What divides them is their
orientation to power: do they seek an accommodation and
negotiations with the power structure (United Russia voters),
or do Q prefer to yell at the system. With this data,
Makarenko argued, the new political union led by the Party of
Life is well-poised to be an acceptable alternative to the
party of power and well-placed to garner a respectable
second-place showing in parliamentary elections. At this
stage, he underscored, there is no difference between United
Russia and the Party of Life: they are competing for power,
not fighting over ideas. But, he noted, the emergence of an
officially tolerated second party was a healthy development,
if not one to exaggerate.

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Registration Refusal "Politically Motivated"
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8. (C) Kasyanov advisor Oleg Buklemishev told us October 25
that Kasyanov's "Russian Popular Democratic Union" (RPDU)
would not contest the Federal Registration Service's (FRS)
October 23 refusal to register it. Bulemishev joined
Kasyanov in labeling the FRS's denial "politically
motivated." He disputed assertions by acting Director of the
FRS's Directorate for Political Parties, NGOs, Religious, and
Other Organizations Galina Fokina (as reported in the October
24 edition of Izvestiya) that the RPDU was refused
registration for purely technical reasons that could easily
be remedied. Fokina said there were four reasons for the
refusal. She cited two in the Izvestiya piece:

-- the use of two distinct organizational terms to describe
the RPDU: "movement" and "union";
-- the provision of the address of executive body, instead of

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the address of the governing body.


9. (C) Buklemishev rejected Fokina's assertion that the RPDU
was refused for technical reasons, and referred Embassy to
the full text of the FRS's refusal letter as evidence. The
October 23 letter, in addition to the reasons for refusal
cited by Fokina in Izvestiya, alleges that parts of the
RPDU's application were not in conformity with the Law on
Non-Governmental Organizations. It also holds that
information provided to support the assertion that regional
offices had been established in the Ulyanovsk region, the
Republic of Chuvashiya, and the Republic of Mariy El was
false. The evidence it provides to support that contention
suggests that the RPDU's application was at a minimum very
carefully examined. The letter notes, for example, that
"E.S. Ksenofontova," allegedly listed in supporting documents
as a founder of the Cheboksary (Chuvashiya) regional office,
"has been in the United States since May 2006," while
Cheboksary founders E.A. Nosova and S.V. Prokopeva told the
FRS that they were not in the city on August 5, 2006, the day
of the founding congress.


10. (C) Buklemishev saw behind the FRS's willingness to comb
the RPDU's application for discrepancies evidence of a
political decision to keep Kasyanov's organization on the
sidelines. In any event, he said, unregistered or not, the
RPDU would continue its efforts to build a democratic society
in Russia. Kasyanov and the other members of his team
continued to travel around the country. The RPSU was
especially strong in the Bryansk and Tula regions.
Buklemishev ascribed RPSU's strength in some of the regions
to "local members able to provide" the political cover
necessary to allow the RPSU prosper there.

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Comment
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11. (C) The RPDU does not have to be registered in order to
continue it activities, but registration would simplify the
movement's financial transactions and prepare the way for its
transformation into a political party, should Kasyanov want
to pursue that option. The FRS put the RPSU application under
a microscope, but the decision not to approve the FRS ruling
and to address the technical issues doesn't seem to us to be
politically astute. Rodina and the Communist Party agree
with Kasyanov that many of the legal requirements for
registration are so onerous that all applicants are likely in
technical violation of one or another of its provisions,
making it easy for the FRS to single out those organizations
whose leaders are a source of unhappiness for the Kremlin.
Nonetheless, foreign NGOs which had been singled out for
clearly political reasons were able to overcome the technical
shortcomings identified and get themselves registered.
BURNS